118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon1

649. Embtel 442.2 We share your concern over political developments in Lebanon and possible consolidation opposition to Chamoun….

Accordingly you authorized at your discretion and at time you think best to assure Chamoun orally as follows: From association with him first in UN circles and during three years his Presidency, US has come to have great confidence in his judgment, and believes that his conception of best interests of Lebanon and Near East area coincide with ours. We fully support his desire for independent progressive Lebanon. We impressed by his personal attitude toward Jordan Valley development plan which indicates his awareness of importance of regional economic development; his efforts maintain quiet on Israel border which shows importance he attaches to stability; and his conversations with you (Embtel 4093) which reveal he recognizes insidious nature Communist threat and far reaching implications deals with Soviet bloc such as Egyptian arms arrangement.

FYI: We are currently reviewing Embtel 4144 and canvassing other possibilities assisting states in area which cooperate with us but are not yet in position to make definite suggestions. Also we agree with you that timing of any approach to Lebanon should take [Page 178] into consideration possible emergence of Solh as Prime Minister … .

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–1755. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Allen.
  2. In telegram 442, October 17, Chargé John K. Emmerson noted, inter alia, that opposition in Lebanon to Chamoun had been increasing for the past 3 months. Emerson wanted to assure Chamoun that the United States had confidence in him. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 409, October 9, Emmerson summarized a conversation he had with Chamoun on October 8. According to Emmerson, the Lebanese President was concerned with what he saw as increasing Communist influence in Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Emmerson noted that Chamoun was concerned enough to consider adhering to a Syria-Iraq rapprochement, if Lebanon’s independence could be guaranteed. (Ibid., 780.00/10–955)
  4. In telegram 414, October 11, Emmerson reported, inter alia, his belief that negotiations to obtain for the United States general rights to Beirut International Airport, and subsequently improve facilities at the airport, would be an “excellent move” in the context of the current Middle East situation. He felt that once the United States made such an approach to Lebanon, the Lebanese Government would “likely press hard for military assistance” as an accompaniment to an air agreement. Such action, according to Emmerson, would forestall Egyptian dominance over Lebanese policy and encourage Lebanese resistance to Syrian neutralist pressures. (Ibid., 711.56383A/10–1155)