Office of the Historian

9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, September 3, 1955–3:55 p.m.

507. Re Kashmir. In response question raised Embtel 356,2 you may point out at your discretion to GOP:

1)
Department hopes Pakistanis will make another full scale attempt find basis for settlement through bilateral negotiations at highest level GOI, since we believe continuation these efforts represents best hope for progress.
2)
US will be glad consult with GOP re appropriateness and timing of reference to SC in light of results of foregoing attempt.
3)
If issue does come before Council we should wish discuss with Pakistanis best method of proceeding.

FYI. If impasse between parties continues, may be desirable consider SC meeting for purposes referring Kashmir question to GA where Arab-Asian influence could probably make substantial impact on both parties and give impetus to fresh approach.

Report GOP reaction.3

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/8–2655. Secret. Drafted by Nicholas G. Thacher and Joseph J. Sisco of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs; cleared by David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; and approved by John D. Jernegan. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Dacca, and Lahore.↩
  2. In telegram 356, August 26, Ambassador Hildreth reported that Pakistani Acting Governor General Mirza informed him that morning that Pakistan would immediately press the issue of a Kashmir plebiscite with Nehru, and that if no satisfactory progress were made, would take the issue to the Security Council. Mirza requested U.S. support for Pakistan in the Security Council and inquired regarding the position the United States would take on the Kashmir dispute. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 475 from Karachi, September 13, Chargé Arthur Z. Gardiner informed the Department that he had conveyed the substance of telegram 507 to Pakistani Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammed Ali the previous day. The Prime Minister assured him that Pakistan would fully consult the United States before making any moves in the United Nations. (Ibid., 690D.91/9–1355)↩