Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

71. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 23, 1957¹

Washington, November 23, 1957

SUBJECT

• Kashmir and Aid to India

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Feroz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
• Mr. Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
• Mr. M.S.A. Baig, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan
• The Secretary
• NEA—Lampton Berry
• SOA—Frederic P. Bartlett

Reviewing briefly the fears of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, Mr. Noon noted that on partition the United Kingdom Government had given India practically all of the former British arsenals and weapons then in India. The Pakistan army at that time did not even have enough small arms to equip its infantry soldiers. Then the United States and Pakistan entered into their military aid agreement and Pakistan was reassured against the ever present threat from India. Now, however, India was expanding its armaments on a very large scale. The Foreign Minister believed that part of this build-up by India had been made possible through United States economic assistance to that country which in turn permitted India to divert its own resources to military procurement. In these circumstances, the Foreign Minister asserted, it was not sufficient for the United States just to say: “We’ll help you; we’ll help you”. What the United States should actually do was to bring pressure on India to stop its military build-up by refusing to give further aid to India until that country settled the Kashmir issue in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations.

Mr. Noon maintained that the Soviets’ stock had gone up in the East thanks to its veto on the Kashmir issue. This was because Asians believe it is natural to make peace with the devil himself, since he will destroy you, provided the other side is represented by a gentleman. The Russians wanted only to increase tensions in the area over Kashmir and this must be countered by the United States helping the Security Council to retrieve its position.

Regarding attaching conditions to our aid to India, the Secretary was convinced that it was good for the world to have a great power like the United States which was determined not to sell its veto power to the highest bidder. This, of course, was what the Soviets were doing with their veto in the Kashmir situation. It was also good to have a world power which maintained a consistent position and which did not shift sides for momentary advantage. It would of course be gratifying to the friends of the United States if this country could go along with them 100% on all issues—and the Indians are our friends too—but this might not promote the basic conditions for bringing about true peace with justice in such a complex situation as Kashmir.

Thus this government cannot attach political “strings” to United States economic assistance to India; such assistance was itself important for the free world. This stand, however, did not mean that the United States could not let the GOI know that in the opinion of the United States Government the GOI should fulfill its commitment to settle the Kashmir problem along the lines of the UN resolutions. The GOI could also be informed that in the opinion of the United States Government it was unwise of them to spend their scarce foreign exchange in buying bombers or other comparably expensive equipment.

The GOI, indeed, was using an incorrect representation regarding the effect of American military aid to Pakistan in an effort to persuade world opinion that it was thereby being forced to secure counter-balancing armaments from elsewhere. The Secretary had told Bevan² himself that this was not correct and that the GOI was using American arms aid to Pakistan as a pretext to justify their own build-up.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11–2357. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett.
2. Aneurin Bevan, Treasurer of the British Labour Party and Member of Parliament.
3. In another conversation with Dulles that same day, Noon requested a statement from the United States that it would defend Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack. Dulles replied that Pakistan should really not feel any concern regarding aggression and mentioned in this regard SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, the United Nations, and the Congressional Resolution on the Middle East. (Memorandum of conversation by Berry, November 23; Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/11–2357)