Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

69. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, November 22, 1957—2 p.m.

1355. Re Kashmir and Deptel 1339;² repeated from USUN November 19. Extreme Indian reactions to US-UK draft resolution were to be expected and indicate proceeding with idea of revived Graham mission as presently drafted unlikely to be productive. Krishna Menon’s recent speeches in SC, beginning with his October 9 presentation,³ made abundantly clear India’s opposition to idea of Graham mission and proposals for demilitarization-cum-plebiscite. Menon’s position has had and continues to have complete support of GOI. No dissenting voices have been heard anywhere to substance Menon’s position although some regret voiced over his insulting mannerisms and personal attacks on certain other countries and delegations. Conditions laid down in Menon’s October 9 speech so extreme that they seem designed to tell Pakistan there is not hope of obtaining any results through UN; for example, he emphasized that Kashmir is not “no-man’s land” but under Indian sovereignty which can only be removed by “war or agreement”. Whether we like it or not there is every prospect that GOI will continue adamant on this issue. But that does not rule out possibility of India accepting general settlement which would involve partition of Kashmir.

We have impression GOI views possibility Soviet veto without pleasure and does not thank sponsors of resolution which gives USSR that opportunity.

From here it continues seem highly unlikely that any real solution can be worked out in Security Council. Perhaps best that can be done is to freeze Kashmir issue for time being, leaving question of moral and legal rights in state of suspended animation, while other avenues of settlement are explored. It is important, therefore, to allow time for effort to resolve package of Indo-Pakistan problems through mediatory efforts of US along lines under consideration by Department.

If foregoing represents US objective tactical problem is to find best form in which to let matter rest while pursuing mediatory efforts. We agree that US should not submit watered-down resolution immediately after Soviet veto. We also agree that action suggested (1) (D) in reference telegram⁴ preferable and that it would be least damaging to us here in India. Probably best procedure from GOI viewpoint would be for SC to refer question of accession to ICJ. From US viewpoint this would serve to freeze Kashmir issue for considerable length of time and yet keep in reserve weapon of possible further UN consideration as lever to use with both India and Pakistan in any private mediatory efforts we may undertake.⁵

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11–2257. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
2. Telegram 1339, November 19, repeated telegram 503 from New York, November 18, in which Lodge reported that the Indians were strongly opposed to the U.S.-British draft resolution. (Ibid., 690D.91/11–1857)
3. U.N. doc. S/PV. 795.
4. Lodge suggested that, if the Kashmir question were referred to the General Assembly without its deseizure by the Security Council, the Assembly could not then adopt any resolutions regarding the dispute.
5. In telegram 517 from New York, November 22, Wadsworth stated that he was “absolutely convinced” that the Security Council would never be able to bring about Indian acquiescence in a plebiscite for Kashmir. “Continued discussion of Kashmir in SC now injures our relations with India,” he noted, “and will have little real future value for Pakistan, since it now seems clear Soviets will veto any proposed Council action which moves towards holding of plebiscite.” In the long run, he pointed out, the United States would be in an easier position with India and Pakistan if the Kashmir problem was transferred to the General Assembly. Wadsworth believed that if any real solution to the dispute could be found, it would necessarily be accomplished by secret mediation efforts carried on by an appropriate third party, such as the British, the Canadians, or the Americans; it would probably have to be a solution based substantially on the status quo, he emphasized. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/2257)