50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
2148. For Bartlett from Rountree. Appreciate evaluation of Indian position on Kashmir question contained your 21962 and have taken into consideration your recommendations in determining form of resolution which US will support in SC. Also appreciate views your 22213 but doubt all Bandung members willing offer good offices. Moreover SC determined proceed with action seeking early solution. We are now discussing text of draft resolution with British and hope to be able send text to you soon. This text will meet a number of your points.
As you know US support Kashmir solution based plebiscite under UN auspices. We favor this solution not only because in line with previous UN decisions but because it is only method settlement [Page 126] to which parties have agreed. It would be undesirable recede from this position in absence of at least reasonable chance agreement on alternative means settlement. As you suggest we should encourage India come forth with constructive proposals. However we are not convinced division Kashmir along present cease fire line even if India prepared concede somewhat on Pakistan debt and canal waters would provide satisfactory alternative road to settlement.
Understand your apprehension holding plebiscite might increase communal tension in India and result in deepening enmity between India and Pakistan. This might be case though GOI surely has responsibility protect its minorities. On other hand failure make progress towards solution Kashmir issue might also have effect increasing communal tension in subcontinent and we believe would deepen enmity between two countries to greater degree than holding plebiscite.
We fully cognizant that if SC unanimously with exception USSR takes action contrary to Indian view GOI and Indian people may adopt attitude USSR their only friend. This is danger we must face in pursuing our efforts for acceptable settlement Kashmir issue as we cannot of course determine our own policy on basis of what attitude Soviets will take. We hope we could counter this possible feeling on part of Indians by pointing out to them many ways in which we have attempted take their views into account in deciding upon form of resolution. USUN and UK Del discussed basic points our proposed resolution with Menon and Firoz Khan Noon yesterday. USUN 5734 reporting substance these conversations repeated FYI. Request you not discuss with GOI pending receipt further instructions from Department.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/2–657. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Jones and Withers, cleared with DePalma, and approved by Rountree.↩
- In telegram 2196, February 6, Bartlett stated that the Embassy believed Nehru would never agree to a U.N. supervised plebiscite for Kashmir; for that reason the Embassy considered a plebiscite solution to be impracticable. In addition, the Chargé noted, the Embassy was convinced that a plebiscite would lead to widespread communal animosity which would quickly spread throughout important parts of the subcontinent. If the “West” attempted to force a plebiscite on India, moreover, Bartlett believed that Nehru might then move closer to the Soviet Union. He recommended, instead, that the Security Council consider instructing either the U.N. Secretary-General or its President to reexamine the situation on the spot and submit a report analyzing the alleged changes since 1951 and recommending a new approach to the United Nations. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 2221, February 8, Bartlett reported that Prime Minister S.W.R.O. Bandaranaike of Ceylon had stated the previous day that he would shortly address a letter to the Bandung powers asking them to use their good offices to help bring about a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The Chargé suggested that this initiative might be productive and requested the Department’s assessment. (Ibid., 690D.91/2–857)↩
- Dated February 11, not printed. (Ibid., 690D.91/2–1157)↩