5. National Security Council Report1
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA
(India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal)
1. South Asia has become a region of major international importance. The five countries of the subcontinent have a population of about 500 million, twenty per cent of the world total. They represent a significant segment of the world’s newly-independent, [Page 30] “under-developed”, and vigorously anticolonial countries. India, in particular, has emerged as a foremost representative of the Asian-African, or “Bandung”, region and is the leading political contender with Communist China in Asia. Pakistan actively seeks leadership of the Moslem world and is the only Asian member of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Three of the South Asian nations-India, Pakistan and Ceylon-are members of the British Commonwealth.
2. In addition to many special difficulties, South Asia exhibits many of the political features that characterize less developed countries in general:
- Non-alignment. Four of the five South Asian governments profess a policy of “non-alignment” in Communist bloc-free world issues and the same approach would have at least some appeal in the fifth country, Pakistan. This policy is not merely a philosophical attitude; these nations, and especially India, consider that their own national interests will best be served by independent international policy.
- Anti-colonialism. Each of these nations is compelled by popular pressures as well as historical experience to oppose the continued existence of European colonies in Asia and Africa. One of these colonial problems present in the area itself is that of the Portuguese possessions on the Indian Coast.
- Aspirations for Economic Development. Each of the countries is confronted by at least some measure of articulate popular aspiration for economic growth. Each lacks to important though varying degrees the skills, administrative expertise and mobilizable resources needed to assure that this aspiration can be reasonably met.
- Intra-regional Disputes. A number of post-independence territorial and political disputes have operated to maintain tension between the South Asian states. The most serious of these are between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pushtu tribes. Pakistan’s membership in SEATO and U.S. military assistance to Pakistan are interpreted by many as U.S. intervention in these issues in behalf of Pakistan.
3. In recent years both the USSR and Communist China have waged an intensive campaign to roll back the free world position in South Asia. No longer depending primarily on small or illegal Communist Parties, the USSR is engaged in a vigorous and open diplomatic, propaganda, and economic campaign to increase its influence in the area. Hundreds of South Asian political leaders, technicians and cultural figures have been official guests of Communist bloc countries over the last few years. The Soviet leaders are identifying Soviet policy with the anti-colonialist sentiments in the area; they are appealing to the area’s strong desire for peace and non-involvement in world conflict. Finally, the USSR is capitalizing on aspirations for economic improvement through substantial offers of aid, trade, and credits on easy terms and ostensibly with no political strings attached.[Page 31]
4. A solid basis has been laid for the Indian national state by a series of domestic political successes: in dealing with the princely states, in conducting national elections, and in laying down a national constitution. The revision of the Indian state structure along linguistic lines has now been completed, thereby alleviating a major divisive problem. However, India is confronted with a colossal problem of economic development.
5. Despite substantial progress made under the first five-year plan (1951—1955), the continuing problem of unemployment and underemployment and the growing public demand for economic improvement have made necessary higher targets for the second plan. Unemployment is increasing in urban areas and provides potential tinder for political extremism. The current plan places main emphasis on industrialization. This involves deficit financing and heavy pressure on foreign exchange reserves. It is evident that the new plan requires that India obtain more than $2.0 billion from all foreign sources in loans and grants over a five-year period, more than twice that received during the previous plan period. Nevertheless, the higher targets are necessary if India is to cope with its long-term economic problems and hold in check the grave political dangers implicit in large-scale unemployment. The first two years of the plan, in particular, will be critical, as the shift in emphasis of development activity will severely strain India’s ability to manage the inflationary pressures of the new approach.
6. Should India fall significantly short of the projected expansion during the crucial next five years and lose the momentum it has gained under Nehru’s leadership, it is unlikely to regain this momentum during the foreseeable future. A period of economic and political decline would almost certainly set in, popular support for the Congress Party would diminish, dissension would grow both inside and outside the Congress Party, and unrest would ensue.
7. India’s economic development program has international political ramifications as well. The outcome of the competition between Communist China and India as to which can best satisfy the aspirations of peoples for economic improvement, will have a profound effect throughout Asia and Africa. Similarly, the relative advantages to be derived from economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc or the West will be closely watched.
8. In relation to its size and population, India maintains a relatively modest though by no means negligible military establishment. India’s abiding concern is to maintain its present margin of superiority over Pakistan. India will continue to purchase military equipment from abroad to modernize its forces, particularly in view [Page 32] of the anticipated increase in Pakistani combat capabilities as a result of U.S. aid.
9. Despite its success in coping with the weighty problems which confronted it at the outset, Pakistan after nine years of independent existence still lacks many of the basic ingredients of internal stability. The eastern and western parts of the country, separated by about a thousand miles of Indian territory, represent two widely disparate cultural groups, differing from each other in language, social and economic structure, and outlook. Islam is now less of a force for national unity than it was at the inception of Pakistan, and has increasingly become a source of fundamentalist opposition to the development of a modern secular state. The Muslim League, which Pakistan’s original leaders used as a vehicle of political control, has steadily degenerated, and no effective rival organizations have emerged to take its place. Although much of the Pakistani population remains ignorant and apathetic about political matters, chronic political instability, recurrent economic crises, and continuing frustration over relations with its neighbors, particularly India, have all contributed to growing popular dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs.
10. Although the viability of its democratic processes has yet to be assured, Pakistan has nevertheless maintained its national unity, and has made progress toward the development of parliamentary institutions and the resolution of the problems inherent in the linguistic and geographic separateness of East Pakistan. Pakistan has also accomplished significant gains in industrial development, and is about to undertake a new five-year development plan that will place heavy emphasis on improving the agricultural, power and transportation bases of the economy. The plan’s goals are directed to a major extent to remedying the recurrent food crises, particularly in East Pakistan, where poor marketing and storage facilities and inept administration have aggravated the problems arising from poor harvests of recent years. Heretofore Pakistan’s economic program has not received the degree of emphasis placed on economic planning in India. In fulfilling the plan, the immediate bottleneck seems likely to be technical and administrative skills.
11. The Government of Pakistan has developed policies essentially pro-West in outlook and generally pro-United States in implementation, although its adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to SEATO has been motivated largely by fear of India’s preponderant military position and its own bitter differences with Afghanistan.[Page 33]
12. Pakistan is in the midst of a military build-up based upon a commitment by the United States to provide equipment.2 Pakistan will probably continue to make heavy expenditures on its military establishment. However, maintenance of that establishment will require continuing U.S. matériel and direct forces support not only through the expected completion of the present military aid program in 1959 or 1960 but probably for an indeterminate period. The present Pakistan armed forces (which include about 8½ under-strength divisions) are considered adequate to maintain internal security and defend against attack by Afghanistan. The equipment build-up will add to this ability to resist an initial aggressive thrust by limited Soviet capabilities,3 and will increase to some extent Pakistan’s ability to deter aggression and to contribute to collective security.
13. Sufficient economic development to indicate continuing progress is estimated as necessary to ensure popular allegiance and reasonable stability in Pakistan. The new economic development plan would require Pakistan to obtain some $800 million from all foreign sources in loans or grants over the next five years. Technical and administrative obstacles to planned investments will probably be lessened by 1958 so that the increasing need for resources for economic development will coincide with the increasing costs of maintaining the military establishment. The issues are not unmanageable, but they could cause serious friction between the United States and Pakistan.
14. Pakistan, as a major Muslim power, can exert a moderating influence on the extreme nationalism and anti-Western attitudes of the Arab states. Pakistan’s position on the Suez issue has been helpful to the United States. It is in our national interest to continue to urge Pakistan to take an active role in Middle Eastern affairs.
15. The political scene in isolated and primitive Afghanistan is pervasively colored by the dispute with Pakistan over the Pushtu or Pathan tribes living in the northwest frontier area of Pakistan. As a consequence of Afghanistan’s effort to win political autonomy for these tribes, relations with Pakistan are chronically embittered and Afghanistan’s political and geographic isolation from the rest of the free world has been made more complete. This dispute, combined with Afghanistan’s desire for rapid economic development, has made its leaders receptive to offers of Communist bloc economic, technical and military assistance. Such assistance has been extended on an [Page 34] impressive scale. Afghanistan has already incurred so heavy a burden of debt to the Communist bloc as to threaten its future independence.
16. At the same time, traditional Afghan suspicions of the USSR almost surely persist. The Afghans are willing to accept Western assistance and technical advice and hope to have the best of both worlds. Through our past aid on the multi-purpose Helmand River project, the United States is identified with an undertaking of major significance for Afghanistan’s economic future.
17. So long as British military bases can be maintained there, Ceylon has a potential strategic importance far beyond its small size and population. The neutralist and leftist trends in Asia have substantially engulfed Ceylon and threaten the British bases on the island and even Ceylon’s membership in the British Commonwealth. There is also hostility toward the large Indian (Tamil) minority. Political developments in Ceylon thus endanger its relationships both with the UK and with India. Its principal economic problem arises from the phenomenal rate of its population growth. Thus far Ceylon remains oriented to Western values and to Western political institutions, and seems to wish to avoid serious deterioration in its relations with India.
18. India views Nepal as a virtual Indian protectorate and is resentful of third-power activities there. Nepal is an object of Communist China’s attention and thus a potential source of rivalry between India and the Communist Chinese. Recently India has attempted to improve its position in Nepal in the face of increased efforts by the Chinese Communists to expand their influence. The Nepalese, for their part, are restive under Indian attempts to monopolize Nepal’s external political relations and to guide Nepalese domestic policy.
19. The capability of the United States to shape events in South Asia is severely limited. The United States cannot in the foreseeable future expect to bring the four neutralist South Asian countries into regional defense alliances. It cannot rely upon full support from the area for U.S. policies when these touch upon the colonial problems of its free world allies. It cannot fully satisfy the needs of the South Asian countries for external economic assistance. Nevertheless, much can be done to prevent South Asia from becoming pro-Communist. [Page 35] Progress can be made in increasing South Asian resistance to Communist ambitions and in fostering its recognition of its community of interest with the free world.
20. The political stake of the United States in the independence and integrity of the countries of South Asia, as well as in their stability and peaceful progress, is very large. If India or Pakistan came under Communist influence, chain reaction effects, going as far as Western Europe, would result. Serious political instability in either or both of these large nations would significantly increase Communist influence in the area or, alternatively, might lead to hostilities in South Asia. Either turn of events could engage great power interests to the point of threatening world peace.
21. It remains necessary, therefore, to employ the limited means at our disposal as effectively as possible in South Asia. This will require policies developed country by country, but it will also continue to involve us in intraregional issues and we shall probably find it increasingly necessary that we seek to resolve or at least to keep under control the local controversies that bulk so importantly in the political life of the subcontinent.
22. Pakistan’s differences with India and Afghanistan will continue to complicate our relationships in South Asia. A mutually acceptable resolution of the Kashmir issue and the early resolution of other differences must be an important aim of U.S. policy.
23. Participation by the South Asian countries in regional organizations, such as the Colombo Plan and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), particularly in the economic and technical spheres, and the membership of India, Pakistan and Ceylon in the Commonwealth, strengthen the ties between South Asia and the rest of the free world. It is in the best interests of the United States to encourage closer economic cooperation among the South Asian countries, and between them and the other free world countries. Assistance should therefore be extended when feasible to foster regional projects of economic importance to the area and to other free world countries in Asia.
24. The development and application in South Asia of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, under U.S. leadership, will be particularly important for its potential unifying influence as well as its direct benefits to the nations involved.
25. It is in the U.S. national interest that the genuine independence of India be strengthened and that a moderate, non-Communist government succeed in consolidating the allegiance of the Indian people. There is an undeniable dilemma for U.S. policy in the [Page 36] pursuit of these objectives. The Indian policy of non-alignment will on occasion bring India into opposition with U.S. programs and activities, and a strong and increasingly successful India will add weight to this opposition. Nevertheless, over the longer run, the risks to U.S. security from a weak and vulnerable India would be greater than the risks of a stable and influential India. A weak India might well lead to the loss of South and Southeast Asia to Communism. A strong India would be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in an Asian context and would permit the gradual development of the means to enforce its external security interests against Communist Chinese expansion into South and Southeast Asia.
26. The second five-year plan provides at present the best vehicle for action to promote U.S. interest in an independent and stable India. India must have external assistance to attain the goals of the plan as it is now envisaged. It would appear that Western sources of aid other than the United States will fall short of the mark. It is in our interest that India should substantially achieve the broad aims of the five-year plan, in terms of increases in output and employment, and should continue to make an effective assault upon its development problems. The United States should not, of course, engage its prestige in the success of the program.
27. It is in the U.S. national interest that Pakistan, as an active ally of the United States within the area, should strengthen its independence, make sufficient economic progress to assure the allegiance of its people, and improve its internal stability and defensive capabilities.
28. Without substantial external assistance, Pakistan’s limited resources are inadequate either to sustain the burden of its military build-up or, after the build-up period, to bear both military maintenance costs and the needs of economic growth. There is only a slight prospect that in the early post-build-up period Pakistan could, unaided, support even one of these programs.
29. In the absence of a Pakistani desire for a reduction of the military burden, failure by the United States substantially to fulfill its commitment to Pakistan: could jeopardize the U.S. political position in the area and weaken planned defenses designed to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East; could lead Pakistan to retreat from its present anti-Communist pro-Western policy; and could alienate the Pakistan military, which is potentially the most stable and actively the most cooperative element in Pakistan society. Accordingly, it is in the U.S. national interest to complete the [Page 37] military aid program, with its delivery schedules through FY 1960, which represent the U.S. commitment to Pakistan, unless the Pakistani agree to reduce the commitment in accordance with paragraph 69 hereof. Carrying out of the present military program, on the other hand, will adversely affect Pakistan’s ability to meet economic development goals, and possibly India’s desire to avoid increasing its military expenditures. Our economic aid program should be aimed at increasing the future economic capabilities of Pakistan to carry a larger share of its necessary military expenditures, as well as increasing its political and administrative ability to make the most effective use of its military resources.
30. Ultimately the possibility of a reduction in Pakistan’s requests for U.S. military assistance will be markedly affected by improvement in its relations with India and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the narrowing of Pakistan’s differences with its non-Communist neighbors should be an important aim of U.S. policy in the area. Some time before the end of the build-up period and in the light of the circumstances then prevailing, the United States will have to negotiate an understanding with Pakistan on the character and amount of future U.S. assistance. The object of such negotiations should be to achieve agreement on programs which will reduce so far as feasible the continuing burden of assistance on U.S. resources and on the local economy and which will offer prospects for greater Pakistan self-support.
31. U.S. policy in Afghanistan can be most effective in assisting in the economic development of the country, promoting closer trade ties with Pakistan and resolving the in-transit trade issues with Pakistan. We are already deeply involved in the Helmand Valley, both financially and in terms of American prestige, and it will be highly desirable if the project can be brought forward to successful fruition. We do not have within our power wholly to quiet Afghan agitation over the Pushtunistan issue, but it may be possible, by assisting the improvement of communications through Pakistan to Afghanistan, to bring about closer and more amicable Afghan—Pakistan relations and also give Afghanistan an alternative to its dependence on the USSR.
32. As is the case of India, Ceylon’s need for economic assistance gives us potentially our most useful policy lever for keeping strongly neutralist Ceylon from extending its ties with the bloc or from turning pro-Communist. It is unlikely that Ceylon can be [Page 38] moved from neutralism by any actions we can take, but it is entirely probable that Ceylonese independence will be secure so long as its government exhibits some capacity for dealing with its domestic economic problems. U.S. aid programs initiated in 1956 should be directed toward these ends.
33. The United States has an interest in preventing Nepal from being overrun or dominated by Communist China. These are possibilities of even more urgent concern to India, which regards Nepal as a virtual protectorate. In view of the persistent distrust between India and Nepal, and of the vastly greater U.S. stake in India, U.S. interests would be served by a policy of close but informal consultation with India in regard to free world economic and security interests in Nepal.
34. The continuance of non-Communist governments willing and able to resist Communist blandishments or pressures from within and without.
35. An increased association and identification of South Asian governments, and peoples, with the free world community.
36. A lessening of the tensions between the South Asian states in order to augment their resistance to Communist tactics and to strengthen their bonds with the free world.
37. Strong, stable and, if possible, popularly-based governments in all of the South Asian countries.
38. Increasingly sound and developed economies in each of the South Asian states.
39. A posture of military strength in the area contributing to area stability and as appropriate to the defense of the free world.
Courses of Action
40. FOSTER the continuance of non-Communist governments in South Asia and strengthen their hands against Communist efforts to dominate them.
41. Encourage the governments and peoples of South Asia to expand and strengthen their ties with the free world.
42. Increase consultation with the governments of South Asian countries, particularly India and Pakistan, and encourage them to consult more frankly with us.[Page 39]
43. Maintain adequate information, cultural and exchange of persons programs in the countries of South Asia to support U.S. objectives in the area.
44. Increase the employment of training programs in the United States, host countries and third countries, to multiply as rapidly as possible indigenous capabilities for adequate self-government and economic growth.
45. In the event of overt Communist aggression against Pakistan, or imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within, fulfill U.S. obligations under the Southeast Asia Treaty.
46. Should overt Communist aggression occur against a South Asian state, other than Pakistan, and should such state resist the aggression and make a timely appeal to the UN for assistance, support UN action to counter the aggression, including the use of force if a vital U.S. interest is involved: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress.
47. If the UN fails to act in the contingency envisaged in the preceding paragraph, and provided a vital U.S. interest is involved, consider whether or not it is advisable for the United States to act against the aggression outside the UN.
48. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within a South Asian country other than Pakistan, and assuming some manifest local desire for U.S. assistance, strengthen U.S. support of its non-Communist elements, encourage other free world nations to lend such support, and take all feasible measures to thwart the communist attempt: Provided, that the taking of any military action shall be subject to prior Congressional action.
49. As politically feasible, seek to obtain (a) the use of military and strategic facilities in South Asia, including communications, transit and base rights, and (b) the right to operate forces in the area upon the threat of and during general hostilities.
50. Promote a better understanding in the South Asian countries of the aims of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and, when feasible, encourage a wider cooperation in these or other free world defense arrangements.
51. Assist the governments of the area to develop expanding and sounder economies by:
- Providing technical and developmental assistance in a manner best calculated to further U.S. interests, including assistance when [Page 40] feasible, to foster regional projects of economic importance to the area and to other free world countries in Asia.
- Fostering conditions and government policies favorable to greater participation by private enterprise in economic development; and, where justified, encouraging U.S. and other private investment in the region; and seeking to promote a better understanding of the contribution private enterprises can make to economic growth.
- Stressing the long-range benefits of multilateral trade as opposed to trade under bilateral and barter agreements.
- Encouraging and assisting South Asian states to expand their trade with each other and with other countries of the free world.
52. Render appropriate U.S. assistance to individual nations and to multi-nation associations for development of peaceful uses of atomic energy in accordance with NSC 5507/2.4
53. In providing technical and developmental assistance, do not give the impression that the United States will bid against or attempt to match in size and scope the credit and aid activities of the Communist bloc.
54. Emphasize to South Asian countries the dangers inherent in large financial or trade commitments to the Soviet bloc.
55. Continue efforts to discourage and where possible prevent shipment of strategic materials to the Communist bloc.
56. When justified to alleviate acute food shortages or the effects of natural disasters, extend emergency aid to the South Asian countries as expeditiously as possible.
57. As appropriate, encourage other free world governments and private institutions to extend aid to the South Asian countries for the purposes mentioned above.
India (Courses of action supplemental to the general courses above.)
58. Support the continuation in power of elements which are non-Communist and basically oriented toward the free world, recognizing that the Congress Party comes closest to fulfilling this specification and providing India with a strong, stable and popularly-based government.
59. Provide economic and technical assistance to India, placing emphasis on projects and programs having the maximum potential of support for the goals and aspirations of India’s second five-year plan. Be prepared to consider sound loans, PL 480 arrangements and other measures sufficient to give substantial help in achievement of the broad aims of the plan, including the private investment necessary for its realization.
60. While respecting India’s choice of an “independent” foreign policy, seek to prevent its policy from serving Communist ends and, [Page 41] when in the U.S. interests, make use of Indian mediation or moderating influence in international disputes.
61. As practicable, exploit differences between India and the Communist bloc.
62. Strengthen the orientation of India’s armed forces toward the free world and continue to facilitate India’s procurement of its military equipment from the West.
63. Continue to impress upon India that the Kashmir and Indus Waters issues should be settled on the basis of a solution mutually acceptable to India and Pakistan.
64. Continue to reassure India that by providing military aid to Pakistan and by supporting its participation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, the United States is in no way unfriendly to India and is acting solely in the interests of free world security against the Communist bloc.
65. Continue to reassure India that the United States is not taking sides on the merits of the Goa dispute and would favor any mutually acceptable settlement reached through peaceful means.
Pakistan (Courses of action supplemental to the general courses above.)
66. In conjunction with efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s orientation toward the free world and its support of collective security efforts, encourage the development of more stable and representative government in Pakistan.
67. In extending developmental and technical assistance to help Pakistan to make its economy stable and viable, bear in mind Pakistan’s need to support its military forces.
68. For the present continue to support, by providing U.S. military assistance in accordance with paragraph 29, Pakistan forces capable of maintaining internal security, of offering limited resistance to external aggression, and of contributing to collective security by these means and by the provision of token forces for collective military operations outside Pakistan.
69. Explore the possibility, in light of the rising trend of the U.S. aid programs for Pakistan, of achieving agreements as to future U.S. aid programs for that country which will be more moderate in their demands upon U.S. resources and the Pakistan economy.
70. In providing military aid to Pakistan, the United States should:
- Resist any Pakistani effort to persuade us to increase the present military aid program.
- Encourage the effective use of military resources by Pakistan to the end that necessary force goals can be met with a progressive declining reliance on U.S. aid.
- Avoid becoming committed to assuming any fixed share of Pakistani military maintenance policies in the post-build-up period.
- Attempt to reduce the support cost for the Pakistani military establishment by exerting its influence for a more efficient organization of Pakistani forces and improved logistics system and more austere standards of construction and support.
- Encourage improved relations between Pakistan and India and Afghanistan as a means of reducing demands for U.S. aid.
71. Encourage Pakistan to continue and extend its moderating influence in the Middle East and the Muslim world.
72. Continue to impress upon Pakistan that the United States would welcome solutions of the Kashmir and Indus Waters disputes acceptable to both India and Pakistan.
73. Encourage Pakistan to follow policies toward Afghanistan which will promote Afghan ties with the free world.
Afghanistan (Courses of action supplemental to the general courses above.)
74. Encourage the growth of closer economic and improved political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus creating conditions favorable to resolution of their differences and strengthening Afghanistan’s links with the free world while reducing its dependence upon the USSR.
75. Encourage the settlement of disputes between Afghanistan and Iran, and the development of closer Afghan ties with Iran, Turkey and other nearby nations friendly to the West.
76. In providing technical and developmental assistance, give particular emphasis to programs tending to reduce Afghan economic dependence on the USSR, and to projects which will provide immediately visible evidence of U.S. friendship for and interest in Afghanistan.
77. Encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist bloc for military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other free world sources for military training and assistance.
Ceylon (Courses of action supplemental to the general courses above.)
78. Foster the strengthening of political elements willing and able to resist the temptation to cooperate with local Communist elements.
79. Seek to prevent Ceylonese neutralism from serving Communist ends and encourage Ceylon to identify its national interests more closely with the free world.[Page 43]
80. Continue to impress upon the Government of Ceylon that the provision of U.S. economic aid will be reconsidered should Ceylon expand its trade in rubber or strategic commodities with the Communist bloc, and continue to urge that Ceylon discontinue its rubber exports to Communist China.5
81. To the extent practicable, exert U.S. influence to assure the United Kingdom’s use of naval, air and communications facilities in Ceylon.
Nepal (Courses of action supplemental to the general courses above.)
82. Encourage Nepal to form a stronger, more stable government willing and able to resist Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, inducements or pressures.
83. Consult and, as may be politically desirable, cooperate with India in regard to free world interests in Nepal.
84. Continue to respect Nepal’s desire to be independent of both Communist China and India, but resist its tendency to involve the United States against these powers for its own interest; and be prepared to establish at short notice a U.S. diplomatic mission resident at Katmandu.
- Source: Department of State, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5701—Memoranda. Secret. In a covering note to the NSC from its Executive Secretary, also dated January 10, Lay summarized the action taken by the NSC at its 308th meeting on January 3: “The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5617, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5701; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.” A financial appendix is not printed.↩
- See NSC 5610, Pakistan study. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Estimated in NSC 5610 as 3 to 6 Soviet divisions. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- NSC 5507/2, “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” was approved March 12, 1955.↩
- Paragraph 80 was later revised by a supplement of August 9. (Department of State, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Regarding the NSC meeting of August 8 at which the revised paragraph 80 was adopted, see Document 142.↩