Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, January 17, 1957—4:22 p.m.

1884. Suggest you take following line in reply Pillai representations re Kashmir. (Embtel 1965)²

We are aware delicate problems raised by forthcoming Security Council consideration Kashmir issue. We will keep in mind in determining our policy high desirability attempting prevent setback in friendly relations between two countries to which Prime Minister’s visit made such contribution. We have noted restraint with which Prime Minister and Indian Government have reacted towards new Middle East program.

US in determining its position in connection forthcoming SC consideration Kashmir dispute will be guided by basic principle of supporting UN action which we feel would contribute solution dispute. To take any other action would be in conflict with a basic principle of US policy. Our recent action in connection with the Egyptian crisis demonstrated once again our reliance on the UN as an instrument to settle international disputes. In general in forthcoming hearings we shall support the line laid down in previous UN decisions on the question. We expect maintain positions taken in previous SC hearings that, failing agreement between two parties on any other means or terms of settlement, the issue should be determined through a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices in which people of Kashmir would have opportunity freely express their wishes as to their future political status. This is position both India and Pakistan have accepted.

We should be glad consult closely with Indian delegation during course UN consideration.³

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–1557. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Jones, cleared with Wilcox and Ludlow, and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Karachi and USUN in New York.
2. In telegram 1965, January 15, Bartlett reported that Pillai had called him to his office that day to make a plea for the United States to do all in its power to prevent the Kashmir issue in the Security Council from taking such a course as would strain the newly established understanding between the United States and India. If the Security Council took an attitude critical of India, Pillai pointed out, the net result could be a serious setback to the ties of friendship between India and the United States which had been developing over the past months. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 2021 from New Delhi, January 20, Bartlett reported that he explained the U.S. position as outlined in this telegram to Prime Minister Nehru, and that Nehru received the message without change of facial expression and without comment. Bartlett observed that Nehru was deeply concerned that a Kashmir plebiscite might set off communal disturbances throughout India; Bartlett also went on to say that the Embassy believed Nehru’s assessment of the dangers of communal strife was correct. (Ibid., 690D.91/1–2057)