Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

37. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, December 24, 1956—4 p.m.

1769. Re Deptel 1611² on Kashmir. Embassy appreciates validity points presented reference telegram and strength arguments in Karachi telegrams 95 and 96.³ Our estimate over-all situation remains essentially same as in our telegram 271 to Department⁴ (repeated Karachi 14, August 1, 1956). But situation has obviously taken on new aspect and new urgency as result recent Egyptian and Hungarian crises in which UN action taken. We agree that further Security Council consideration Kashmir cannot be avoided and that mutually acceptable solution on basis UN principles should be sought.

… Embassy has following comments for consideration in evolving US position.

1. GOI will certainly demand that UN name Pakistan as original aggressor in Kashmir and will use other arguments outlined paragraphs 2 to 4 Embassy telegram 271…. Indians would be put on spot, however, and their position unmasked if UN recognized initial Pakistan aggression and coupled it with demand for solution based on previous UN resolutions calling for withdrawal of forces and plebiscite. Then Indian failure abide by provisions UN resolutions applicable to them could also be condemned.

2. If it is not possible for US and UN to indicate Pakistanis guilty of aggression (and Embassy not in position judge), believe Indians will adamantly maintain their present position. Of course, we recognize that finding of GOP aggression would not necessarily cause GOI to accede to UN resolutions. But establishment of a major Indian contention might make them willing to negotiate a settlement.

3. Pakistan insistence on UN force for Kashmir would raise very serious problems of composition and authority. Would any countries be willing contribute? Would it be in US interest to see Yugoslav or perhaps Egyptian troops (if UN force were acceptable to India, which is doubtful) in such UN contingent?

4. … problem of nature of eventual settlement remains. Karachi suggests it might lead to face-saving compromise re plebiscites in different regions which would result in partition along more satisfactory line than present armistice line. If such stage reached perhaps it could be part of package deal (as discussed Embassy telegram 271) which would assure Pakistan adequate water supply.

5. … Any US position which India might interpret as tending to favor Pakistan re Kashmir would invite wave of criticism in India. Current atmosphere of friendly US-Indian relations resulting from Nehru’s visit to US could be dissipated quickly. While GOI may need US economic assistance and help on various matters more now than previously, it is highly unlikely that it would modify its position on Kashmir and Pakistan in period before general elections in March.

Bartlett

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–2456. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Lahore, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
2. Dated December 19, not printed. (Ibid., 690D.91/12–1956)
3. These telegrams, both December 21, cautioned that the Department should not pursue a policy toward the Kashmir question in the United Nations which would appear to Pakistani officials as a retreat from previously stated U.S. support for a plebiscite. (Ibid., 690D.91/12–1256)
4. Document 32.