Office of the Historian

222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 12, 19571

Washington, July 12, 1957

SUBJECT

  • Military Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

  • Pakistan
    • The Prime Minister
    • Mr. M.S.A. Baig, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
    • Mr. A. Husain, Secretary of Defense
  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • The Under Secretary
    • Ambassador-designate James Langley
    • William M. Rountree, NEA
    • Robert R. Bowie, S/P
    • J. Jefferson Jones, III, SOA
    • Charles D. Withers, SOA
    • John M. Howison, SOA

The Secretary said that he understood that Pakistani representatives had discussed military assistance proposals with Defense officials on July 10.2 According to his understanding, Defense officials had promised to consider the Pakistani request.

Mr. Suhrawardy responded that in order to provide adequately for Pakistani needs it would be necessary that the Defense Department receive guidance from the Department of State. He hoped that the Department of State would use its influence with the Department [Page 483] of Defense in order to obtain the agreement of the latter to the Pakistani request. He wanted a submarine if the Defense Department agrees that it would be a good thing for Pakistan to have. Arguing that his motives were similar to those of the US in wanting a nuclear bomb deterrent to Soviet aggression, Mr. Suhrawardy stressed that he wanted light bombers as a deterrent against possible Indian aggression.

The Secretary said that he had observed with concern the tendency of a number of states in the Middle East to give too much emphasis to the buildup of their military forces. For example, Egypt had sacrificed much in order to obtain large amounts of military equipment, which it had done from the Soviet Union. Where was the equipment now? A great deal of it was in the possession of the enemy of Egypt.

Mr. Suhrawardy replied that Pakistan did not fit in this category; he wanted only useful weapons. Pakistan was taking good care of its tanks, although the tank force was at present static. Pakistan did not want new tanks, however. Bombers were essential. A submarine was also most important. One of its most important uses would be to provide opportunities for training. Mr. Rountree responded that he would be glad to consider the possibility of training Pakistanis in submarines in the United States.

Recalling his earlier claim that Nehru had been deterred from attacking Pakistan in 1950 by Pakistan’s possession of bombers, Mr. Suhrawardy noted that four or twelve or eighteen bombers in Pakistan’s hands today would enable Pakistan to deter but not to compete with or attack India. He reiterated that the US must have confidence that Pakistan would not misuse such equipment.

The Secretary replied that the US does have great confidence in Pakistan’s non-aggressive intent. Otherwise, he declared, the US would not be doing what it now is in the way of supplying arms.

Mr. Suhrawardy expressed dissatisfaction that light bombers which had originally been programmed for 1954 were now being programmed for 1959. He emphasized that Pakistan realized bombers were expensive to maintain, and that this was the reason Pakistan wished to begin with only a few of them.

Mr. Rountree observed that one consideration involved was that in the judgment of our military experts Pakistan would not be ready to absorb bombers for some time. Mr. Husain responded that when programming bombers was first deferred, Pakistan was told it was because bombers are offensive weapons. He declared that the Pakistan Air Force had now absorbed fighters and that bombers were the logical next step.

[Page 484]

Mr. Dulles closed the discussion of military assistance by observing that the Department of State would review Pakistan’s requirements further with the Department of Defense.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted Jones and Howison.↩
  2. At this meeting, actually held on July 11, Pakistani officials requested a commitment from the Department of Defense for additional military aid, including four light bomber squadrons with accompanying radar equipment. They also indicated that they would soon provide Defense with a complete list of equipment which the Pakistani Government believed was necessary as part of “phase two” of the U.S. military assistance program. (Memorandum of conversation by Rear Admiral Charles K. Bergin, Director, NESA/ISA, July 12; Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files, NESA Records, Pakistan; memorandum from Stevens to Jones, July 12, Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/7–1257)↩