22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

2683. Re USUN 9572 to Department repeated by Department to Karachi re Kashmir:

Department sympathetic Pakistani desire to make progress Kashmir dispute. However we continue believe many difficulties in way SC action would be satisfactory to Pakistanis. Moreover seems probable Soviets would veto any resolution unwelcome to Indians.
Department sees some advantages in postponement SC consideration to January for reasons such as those cited reftel. In any case Department believes consideration should be deferred two or three months. However if Pakistanis after consultation find majority other members SC favors early consideration we would go along. FYI We understand British High Commissioner Karachi being told British would prefer Pakistanis, if they consider it necessary raise Kashmir question again SC, not do so until after Prime Ministers’ conference June but that as British cannot hold out hope effective discussion in London then, they cannot press preference for postponement very far. End FYI.
We think if and when SC does consider Kashmir problem one of most constructive courses action might be request Graham by consensus of Council (no new resolution necessary) return to subcontinent for review existing situation, discussion with leaders both Governments and report within specified period of time to Council. This might offer opportunity both sides make clear presentation their viewpoint avoiding tension and acrimony which would result should Council seek to be brought up-to-date on issue in discussions before Council itself. We would encourage Indians give full cooperation Graham Mission.
US believes all parties should keep in mind that ultimately reference to GA may be only remaining course with prospect progress towards solution.

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Embassy should convey to GOP above US viewpoint. Inform Department soonest Pakistani reaction.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–1156. Confidential. Drafted by Thacher and Jones, cleared with UNP and IO, and approved by Rountree. Repeated to New Delhi, London, and USUN in New York.
  2. In telegram 957, May 11, to Secretary Dulles, Henry Cabot Lodge summarized the substance of a recent conversation with Mir Khan, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative. Lodge informed Khan that the United States was sympathetic to Pakistan’s desire to bring the Kashmir question before the United Nations, but that he had not yet received any instructions on possible U.S. support of any Pakistani resolution. Lodge informed Dulles that he believed the Pakistanis would agree to postpone bringing Kashmir before the United Nations until January 1957 if the United States indicated it would support a resolution calling for a plebiscite. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 2475 from Karachi, May 18, Ambassador Hildreth reported that he conveyed this message to Prime Minister Mohammed Ali the previous day. Ali pointed out that most Security Council members would follow the lead of the United Kingdom and the United States. All Pakistan wanted, he emphasized, was support for a plebiscite and not a decision by the Council affecting the fate of Kashmir. He warned that U.N. prestige would suffer and Indian influence on international affairs would grow if the United Nations failed to act. He requested Hildreth to impress this view strongly on the Department of State. Regarding the question of timing, he indicated that Pakistan could not wait for a year to bring the Kashmir question before the United Nations again; such a delay would put the government in a “false and impossible position” and Pakistan’s relations with both the United States and the United Kingdom would be adversely affected. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–1856)