Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

216. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 52–56

Washington , November 13, 1956.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN²

The Problem

To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Pakistan with particular emphasis on the period through 1957.

Conclusions³

1. At least over the next few years, Pakistan will remain basically unstable, plagued by serious differences of interest and outlook between the two parts of the country, by a dearth of responsible leaders, by weak political institutions, and by widespread frustration and discontent, particularly in East Pakistan. (Paras. 10–20)

2. President Mirza will probably continue for the next few years to exercise a dominant influence over the government, thus assuring a modicum of stability. Despite the difficulties which Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy will experience in working with one another, their present alliance will probably continue at least for the next six months or so and possibly past the general elections contemplated for late 1957 or early 1958. (Paras. 21–26)

3. If Mirza cannot preserve his dominance over the government by ordinary means, he would almost certainly exercise his emergency powers to rule by decree. Such action would widen the existing gap between the government and the people and would probably entail more pervasive and sustained use of authoritarian methods than has hitherto been required. Such action would also create additional discontent in East Pakistan and increase tensions between the two wings of the country. (Paras. 27–28)

4. Despite probable delays and difficulties in finalizing and putting into effect the proposed five year development program for 1955–1960, there will probably be an acceleration of development activities and expenditures in 1959 and 1960, and by the latter year the rate of growth of the national income may approach a level of somewhat over three percent a year. However, Pakistan will almost certainly fail to realize a substantial part of the plan goals by 1960 and, despite probable progress in raising food grain production levels, will probably remain subject to food shortages resulting from floods and droughts. (Paras. 40–43)

5. With Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings likely to hold up at approximately present levels and economic development expenditures likely to lag, Pakistan will probably require a lower annual level of economic assistance (exclusive of military aid) in FY 1957 and 1958 than was provided by the US in FY 1956. However, in the period following 1958, the probable rising expenditures for the development program and the increase in annual costs of an enlarged military establishment are likely to require a substantial increase in US economic assistance. It is likely that Pakistan will be dependent on larger-scale economic assistance by FY 1960 than was granted by the US in FY 1956. (Paras. 43–44)

6. Pakistan will probably continue to make heavy expenditures on its military establishment. However, maintenance of that establishment will require continuing US matériel and direct forces support, not only through the expected completion of the present military aid program in 1959 or 1960, but probably for an indeterminate period. (Paras. 46, 53)

7. Present strains in Pakistan’s relations with India will probably continue substantially unchanged. There may be some improvement in Afghan-Pakistan relations. (Paras. 63–64)

8. Despite the strain placed on Pakistan’s relations with the UK by the crisis arising out of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, we believe it unlikely that the Pakistan government presently plans to leave the Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact, or SEATO. However, it is still possible that the crisis may develop so as to cause Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth and these organizations. (Para. 60)

9. At best, the Pakistan government will be under increasing popular pressure to de-emphasize its ties with the West and demonstrate its independence of “Western domination.” It will probably take a less active interest in regional defense matters, at least in the absence of greatly increased US support. It would probably be unwilling to grant military bases to the US in peacetime, and almost certainly remain unwilling to commit more than token forces for use under SEATO or the Baghdad Pact outside Pakistan. It will probably be increasingly receptive to offers of trade and friendship by Communist China, the USSR, and other members of the Bloc. These trends would be accelerated if US military and economic aid were reduced. (Paras. 58–62, 65–66)

[Here follows the Discussion section of this estimate, paragraphs 10–66.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files; Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with this estimate on November 13 with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
2. Supersedes NIE 52–55, “Probable Developments in Pakistan,” 15 March 1955. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 52–55 is printed as Document 190.]
3. For Summary Conclusions see Appendix page 18. [Footnote in the source text. This appendix is not printed.]