Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

205. Telegram From the Department of State to Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, November 12, 1955—8:32 p.m.

1033. Embtel 906.² Departments State and Defense deeply concerned possibility severe damage our relations Pakistan and adverse repercussions other Middle Eastern nations which could follow publication Ayub’s letter to Radford, being telegraphed to Embassy separately.³

Department believes Embassy should approach Prime Minister and or Governor General along following lines:

1. Nothing but bitterness between two countries and satisfaction to their enemies can follow effort this type use public opinion force US accommodation to Pak viewpoint.

2. It was agreed in aide-mémoire details US military assistance would be regarded by both nations as secret. This agreement breached by Ayub in releasing his letter to Radford.

3. US believes its overall record assistance to Pakistan is wholly defensible.

4. US deeply wishes, however, avoid this type public controversy and hopes if Ayub’s letter or its substance becomes public GOP will be able issue counteracting statement reaffirming mutual US-Pakistan confidence.

5. US intends continue making every effort meet commitment set out in Aide-Mémoire and does not regard this as limited to $171 million. Within amounts made available by Congress in next fiscal year it is our intention continue contributing towards meeting deficiencies in 5½ divisions.

Should publicity given release Ayub’s letter seem warrant such action Embassy authorized issue public statement which Department suggests be as conciliatory in tone as possible. With reference military assistance you might say “US Government still intends carry out military assistance program discussed with Pakistan Prime Minister and his advisers in Washington a little over year ago. No fixed dollar limitation has been set on amount of military assistance to be received by Pakistan and US intends meet material goals discussed in Washington. US has, however, other heavy military and financial commitments throughout world and as was pointed out in Washington discussions priority of various requirements is decided ultimately by US Congress.”

FYI. Above viewpoint worked out between Ambassador Hildreth and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire in discussions November 10⁴ at which time DOD made clear it intends at present ask Congress for an amount substantially above $26 million for FY 57. End FYI.

In public statement Embassy will no doubt wish consider advisability reciting past economic aid programs, etc. providing US support for Pakistan.⁵

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/11–1255. Secret. Drafted by Thacher, cleared in draft with General James K. Wilson, and approved by Jones. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
2. In telegram 906, November 12, the Embassy reported that recent discussions between Ayub Khan and a U.S. Congressional delegation, headed by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki from Wisconsin, had taken an unpleasant turn with Ayub accusing the United States of bad faith in not carrying out its military commitments to Pakistan. Ayub had also complained of U.S. failure to uphold its military commitment to Pakistan in an interview with a reporter from the New York Times. The Embassy suggested that an indication that Washington had reconsidered the scope and timing of the military aid program for Pakistan, or was prepared to do so pending the outcome of the upcoming Baghdad Conference, would be helpful. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1034, November 12, not printed. (Ibid.)
4. A memorandum of this conversation, drafted on November 15 by Lieutenant Colonel W.J. Higgins of the Operations Division, Office of Military Assistance Programs, is in Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files, NESA Records, Pakistan.
5. In telegram 928 from Karachi, November 16, Gardiner reported that he conveyed this message to Mirza on November 14 and to Chaudhri Mohammed Ali the following day. Mirza stated that a time-phased program looking to force goals was fine while Chaudhri Mohammed Ali indicated that he was gratified to learn the results of Hildreth’s negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/11–1655)