202. Telegram from the Consulate General at Lahore to the Department of State1

41. Pouching despatch2 on talk with General Ayub who says US let down on military aid to Pakistan likely be exposed in Consembly with result various Mid-East countries will take “I told you so” attitude on [or?] argument “You can’t trust Americans.”

Says his face now red re contentions he made to King Saudi Arabia who personally warned him in Pindi 1954 “Americans can’t be trusted.” Says he also “had certain knowledge” that Shah of Iran felt same way and so he Ayub sent emissary to convince Shah USA different from British. Ayub thinks unlikely now Mid-East countries will line up with USA for they will learn that “USA did not keep commitment to Pakistan.”

General further pointed out he personally in very bad position in Pakistan now because he shrugged off doubters and scoffers at beginning of his negotiations with assertion he convinced both lightness US foreign objectives and firmness its integrity. Says now he stands to “lose my trousers” and in no position answer growing feeling in Army circles that at least US engaging in “political opportunism” with Pakistan. Would not elaborate latter point though I questioned at length.

Other sources Rawalpindi indicate opinion of intelligentsia is that retirement such top Army men as Lt. General Youssuf and Major General Adnan Khan result their criticism Ayub’s taking second term as C-in-C which thwarts their ambitions. To me this suggests Army may not be the sound element for stability our policy assumes it is. This point strengthened by vigor with which some Army men still advocate settling Kashmir issue by force, using United States military aid of course.

This important because public passions aroused anew over Kashmir lately.

In my opinion we should strengthen Ayub’s position in Pakistan because he apparently only imposing figure in Army ranks will trust and also general public. My populous district rates him alone with Choudhri Mohdzrli as statesman with integrity. To prevent political setback to USA I request two measures: (1) Embassy urge high level review extent our military aid, and (2) Department be requested [Page 445] consider having Assistant Secretary Allen extend his trip3 to reassure Ayub that his present deep and bitter disillusionment ill founded.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/10–455. Secret. Also sent to Karachi.
  2. Despatch 56, October 4, not printed. (Ibid.)
  3. Allen was on a brief trip to the Middle East which began September 30. Documentation is ibid., 110.15–AL.
  4. In telegram 662 from Karachi, October 6, Chargé Gardiner commented that Ayub’s “diatribe” on the effects of the U.S. decision to limit its military assistance program to $171 million contrasted strikingly with the “temperate line” of Mirza. Gardiner concurred with Fisk that a thorough review of the program was needed but recommended that a visit by Allen would not be necessary. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/10–655)

    At a meeting of the National Security Council on October 6, Admiral Radford brought up the issue of military assistance to Pakistan during a discussion of the Middle East. According to the memorandum of discussion, Radford “indicated that Pakistan also was eager for additional United States assistance and is at the moment full of recriminations against the United States for failing to supply more aid. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now faced squarely with the problem of finding additional financing for Pakistan. If we do attempt to find such additional financing, we shall probably have to cut aid programs elsewhere in the world.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council by Gleason, October 7; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)