Office of the Historian

20. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1

Paris, April 25, 1956—1 p.m.

4975. From Cooper. Before leaving Delhi in talks with President, Vice President and Pant all emphasized effect United States aid on GOI in terms of requiring necessary steps for defense. Vice President said that Mikoyan2 during his visit Delhi told Nehru and others that when Mikoyan asked Pakistan officials why Pakistan would enter into pacts and secure United States military aid against Soviets, officials responded that their purpose was not to secure arms against Soviets but because of their difficulties with India.

Krishna Menon, without identifying Mikoyan, told me that Pakistan had made this statement to Russians and Russians had told GOI. Pillai told me April 21 that there was uncertainty among some in MEA about Secretary’s information to Nehru regarding volume of United States military aid Pakistan. He believed there might have been misunderstanding, saying that since Secretary Dulles’ talk, Nehru had been more concerned about United States aid and seemed to believe that large volume of armor on way to Pakistan. As this personal statement of Pillai, do not think reference should be made to him in any communication.3

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/4–2556. Secret. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩
  2. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.↩
  3. In telegram 2265 from Karachi, April 28, Ambassador Hildreth noted that many Pakistani officials hoped that U.S. military aid would strengthen Pakistan against India, despite Pakistan’s official position, as stated by President Mirza, that the Pakistani army was an instrument “for service not only of Pakistan but of free world.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/4–2856)↩