Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

197. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, August 12, 1955—4 p.m.

272. US interests in current political turmoil GOP suggests desirability appraisal current situation and appropriate measures and attitudes US Government should adopt pending stabilization of Cabinet structure.

Current situation: Mirza and Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali² have publicly indicated wish include Suhrawardy and Awami leaguers in Cabinet, and have privately reaffirmed this is their wish and that offer to Suhrawardy is open for next ten days. (Assume offer is conditioned to some extent on receipt assurances from Suhrawardy of his cooperation.) Ambassador has told Mirza, and it will be made clear to Suhrawardy by others, that US has no objection inclusion Suhrawardy in high Cabinet post.

Embassy considers best long-run interests of Pakistan will be served by coalition three parties and inclusion Suhrawardy during present sessions of CA and pending prospective national elections; desirable have one-unit³ legislated on non-partisan basis; sessions of CA that follow in constitution drafting should be guided by nonpartisan Cabinets; Suhrawardy’s talents and cooperation as legislator could be of utmost importance if effective steps are to be taken in combatting probable amendments one-unit legislation and devising constitution; his presence in government would ease strain on Prime Minister whose health is well known subject concern. At this critical period Pakistan development, and pending establishment of a constitution, probable new adjustments in party politics, common sense and patriotism all call for submergence of party politics and struggle for personal position. (This may be unrealistic, but it is nonetheless desirable and worth trying for.)

While fully understanding necessity avoid US involvement in internal politics through any public stand, fact is that US relationships so important to Pakistanis that complete non-involvement impossible. If Embassy officers ignore Suhrawardy, for example, for next two weeks this may well be interpreted here as official policy indicative disapproval of his inclusion in Cabinet; if he is cultivated by Embassy even on purely social basis, interpretation of US approval may be placed on such actions. Conclusion, in light our appraisal is that (1) we should encourage Suhrawardy through third parties to take Cabinet post under new Prime Minister, protecting our public position at all times. (2) Embassy officers should make some effort to maintain pleasant personal social contacts with Suhrawardy.

If Department differs from above course please advise.⁴

Hildreth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.13/8–1255. Secret. Repeated to London, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore.
2. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali became Prime Minister on August 11, replacing Mohammed Ali.
3. An administrative plan to amalgamate the four provinces of West Pakistan into a single province, designed primarily to balance the political relationship between East and West Pakistan.
4. The Department did not reply to this telegram. On August 22, Jones sent a memorandum to Allen which evaluated the new Pakistani cabinet. “The combination of General Mirza and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali,” he suggested, “represents a top leadership very friendly to the United States.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 545, Pakistan)