185. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, January 14, 1955, 11:30 a.m.2

[Here follows a list of 27 persons present, including Admiral Arthur W. Radford, General Nathan F. Twining, Admiral David B. Duncan, H. Struve Hensel, Robert Murphy, John D. Jernegan, and General Charles P. Cabell.]


Mr. Murphy stated that he understood Admiral Radford might be willing to give the meeting the Admiral’s views on his recent trip to the Near and Far East.

1. Implementation of Aid Agreements

Admiral Radford replied that one thing we would have to straighten out was the matter of the red tape hampering our military aid program. Mr. Hensel asked the Admiral to elaborate. Admiral Radford said that when General Ayub of Pakistan had been in the U.S. some months back, we had given him certain assurances and had sent him on his way back feeling fine. But when the Admiral saw him in Pakistan two months later, there was a hassle over how the money was to be made available.3 There was confusion as to the [Page 411] responsibilities of the Ambassador, and as to the relevant responsibilities of FOA and the State Department. Were counterpart funds to be used for direct military aid, or were they to be used for economic aid? What proportion was to go to each? All this added up to delay and confusion. The Pakistanis were bewildered and wanted to know what was the matter.

Mr. Murphy interjected that the Pakistanis probably did not lose the opportunity to play one agency against the other.

Admiral Radford added that not only that, but also the Pakistan Finance Minister,4 for example, would present problems to the FOA country team which the team was not qualified to handle.

Mr. Jernegan noted that the main problem was the lack of competent staff for FOA, but that progress was being made along this line. He added that Mr. Jack Bell was soon to go out there as Chief of the FOA Mission, and that Mr. Bell was very well qualified. Replying to the Admiral’s inquiry, Mr. Jernegan said that the present incumbent was leaving.5 The new Deputy Chief of Mission,6 Mr. Jernegan added, also had economic background, and could be expected to improve the situation.

On the other hand, Mr. Jernegan said, there was a lot of trouble over legislative provisions: troubles with the program involving the use of surplus agricultural products as a means of contributing aid; and limitations on the manner of granting aid. As many as six different agencies, Commerce, State, Treasury, FOA, Budget and Defense were involved.

Admiral Radford said that the point was that the President would tell some foreign official that they could have 30 or 40 million dollars, and that then there was general confusion as to how to implement the program.

Mr. Murphy pointed to difficulties on this score with respect to Yugoslavia and the promise of 250 tons of wheat to that country.

Admiral Radford said that there were three countries where he thought this problem was most acute; Turkey, Thailand and Pakistan. If we are going to hedge our offers, he said, we should make that clear from the very start to the foreign officials concerned. Just before he left Pakistan, Admiral Radford said, instructions were received by the Embassy regarding the use of counterpart funds which was not what the Pakistanis wanted. All this, he emphasized, [Page 412] was not doing us any good, and only caused us to lose any good will we might have gained by instituting the program in the first place.

Mr. Jernegan agreed. Mr. Murphy pointed out that this was a problem which Mr. Dodge’s committee7 was now studying.

Admiral Radford concluded that this problem was the worst situation he had run into on his trip.

2. Pakistan Political Situation

Admiral Radford said that he had stayed with Governor-General Mohammed Ali in Karachi, but hardly saw him, since the Governor-General was in bed.8 He was, the Admiral said, a very sick man, and might drop off at any time. If he does go, there was certain to be a struggle for power within the country. General Mirza, the Admiral understood, was the No. 2 strong man, but in the Admiral’s opinion the best man was General Ayub. Mr. Jernegan said that he did not know General Mirza, but that the specialists in the Department think that General Mirza, who definitely expects to be Prime Minister one day, is more competent than General Ayub. The Admiral said that that very well might be, but as far as honesty and directness is concerned, Mirza was no match for Ayub. Further discussion prompted the Admiral to recount that during the recent government crisis in Pakistan involving Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, the Governor-General was prepared to name Ayub as Prime Minister, but that it was Ayub himself who persuaded the Governor-General to keep Ali. Mr. Jernegan said that, as a matter of fact, both Generals Ayub and Mirza had persuaded the Governor-General to keep Ali.

Commenting further, Admiral Radford said that Prime Minister Ali was not the man we would want to have stay in ….

The Admiral emphasized that Pakistan was a potential ally of great importance, and that meanwhile from the military point of view, they have a trained armed force which no other friendly power can match, not even the Turks.

[Here follow discussion on developments in the other countries visited by Admiral Radford; analysis of current trends in Formosa, Korea, and Japan; and consideration of several matters affecting the Asian region as a whole, such as the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia.]

  1. Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared by any of the participants.”
  2. These discussions between Radford and Ayub Khan concerned implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, which had been signed at Karachi on May 19, 1954, and entered into force on that same date. It stipulated that the United States would provide military aid and training to the Pakistani armed forces. The text of the agreement is in 5 UST 852.

    Under the terms of an aide-mémoire given to the General on October 21, 1954, the United States agreed to meet deficiencies in the Pakistani Armed Forces by providing (a) screened equipment requirements for 5½ divisions of the Army; (b) 12 vessels including 6 destroyers and 6 minesweepers for the Navy; and (c) 6 squadrons of aircraft for the Air Force. For the text of this aide-mémoire, as well as extensive documentation concerning the negotiation of the military aid agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1869 ff.

  3. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali.
  4. Ralph R. Will.
  5. James C. Baird.
  6. Reference is to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, chaired by Joseph Dodge.
  7. Mohammed Ali was the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Ghulam Mohammed was the Governor-General.