Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, March 22, 1956–6 p.m.

2147. During discussions with Nehru and other Indian officials in Delhi March 9—10, it was clear that chief Indian concern was due to GOI military intelligence reports re US arms deliveries to Pakistan. Indian military officials may well have accepted exaggerated rumors and unverified information in order to justify larger appropriations for Indian army.

Department would welcome your views re two courses of action which might deprive GOI of opportunity to spread accusations of aggressive Pakistani intentions:

1. GOP might suggest full exchange of information with GOI re respective military establishments and armament of each side, somewhat along line of President Eisenhower’s proposals to Soviets at Geneva last summer,² which was highly effective in emphasizing US peaceful intentions.

2. US with GOP concurrence, might inform GOI of precise nature of US military aid to Pakistan. If desirable or necessary, fact could be made public subsequently that US had done so with Pak concurrence.³

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5—MSP/3—2256. Secret. Drafted and approved by Allen; cleared with Jones. Repeated to New Delhi.
2. Reference is to proposals at the Conference of Heads of Government at Geneva in July 1955.
3. In telegram 1947 from Karachi, March 28, Hildreth commented that while he was sympathetic with the Department’s concern which prompted telegram 2147, he did not believe that the basic issues dividing India and Pakistan could be solved by either of the two proposals. He maintained that the first suggestion would not have any real chance of acceptance unless substantial progress were made beforehand in solving those basic issues. “However,” the Ambassador added, “it is possible that Pakistanis might be persuaded for tactical reasons to make some such proposal under certain circumstances and with appropriate safeguards in anticipation of such progress and that such offer might have some value in present situation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3—2856)