Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

128. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, April 2, 1957—6 p.m.

1264. From Richards.² My comments on Afghanistan follow:

1. Extreme isolation evident during flight to Kabul. Extent of underdevelopment of country and dearth of basic facilities is striking.

2. Afghans remain proud, suspicious mountain people.

3. Previous efforts modernize Kabul testified to mainly by unfinished grandiose structures. Most impressive signs some recent progress attributable to Soviet aid, i.e., silo and bakery, paving of streets and petroleum depot. Established United States position in educational field provides most hopeful counter-weight and should not be neglected.

4. German influence appears still quite strong. Considerable number Afghan leaders we met educated in Germany. Perhaps we could obtain useful assistance here from West German Government.

5. Afghanistan obviously totalitarian type state run by small oligarchy. Government is on tribal lines and firmly in hands small group members royal family which heads dominant Pushtunistan tribal element. Even Afghan officials showed embarrassment when questioned re Parliament. Tribal loyalties plus ready avail of force—police and army very much in evidence—appear to be main pillars of government. Afghan in too early stage of development to be beset by discontent of type sparked by effendi in Arab Mid East countries. Any shifts in power in near future likely to take place within ruling group.

6. Prime Minister Daud and Foreign Minister Naim obviously at helm of government with final decisions resting with former. Daud’s energy and determination to develop country with support of slowly growing number of educated Afghans returning from abroad said to be reasons for his top position.

7. I have no reason to doubt fixed determination Afghan leaders to strive fiercely to maintain independence of country from any threat including international communism. Danger lies in their overrating their ability to control subversion in face of increasing number Russians in country and also in possibility Russians, if severely prodded, could stir up tribal revolts.

8. Present leaders fully alive to and naturally preoccupied with exposed position Afghan. They recognize present dependence on USSR and Soviet capability retaliate effectively by economic measures if not by armed force. They probably desire to loose embrace of Russian bear but know they must move slowly to avoid being crushed. They hope to develop relations with United States as form of insurance against USSR.

9. Leaders appear unreceptive to concept of cooperation with other area states smacking of defense arrangements against USSR. I believe they are right in this stand. On other hand they are eager for commercial transit arrangements which over period time would have effect of lessening dependence on USSR and providing practical alternative to trade through USSR.

10. Reception accorded my exposition of President proposals was most reserved received to date and probably reflected realistic appraisal of Afghan’s actual situation. Naim seemed at times to be led on by enthusiasm and desire for closer cooperation with United States but Daud was more cautious and probably more accurate in his assessment of extent to which Afghan could move prudently.

11. I believe what we should strive for is really “neutral” Afghan on Swiss model. We should help country to extract itself from Russian fold but at cautious pace to keep down likelihood counter moves by Soviets to tighten their hold. We need also to avoid arousing on part of Afghans expectations of support which in actual crisis it would not be practical for United States to extend. During final meeting I told Afghans I fully recognized reason they desire to neutral policy and thought this best course for them. Naim declared RGA “genuinely interested in seeing that our neutrality is as useful to us as to our western friends”.

Presentation of President’s proposals to Afghans posed special difficulties. We understood from discussions in State Department and memo approved by Secretary March 4 as guidance for mission re Afghanistan, that Department preferred to avoid clearly including or excluding Afghanistan from area comprehended by Mideast proposals. Inclusion would engage United States prestige and confront United States with particularly difficult situation if subsequently Afghans should request United States assistance against acts of aggression by international communism. World situation might make it impractical for United States respond, which would result in severe blow to our prestige and to standing of document. On other hand exclusion would remove deterrent effect versus USSR and cause Afghanistan to conclude it written off by United States thus damaging will to stand up to Russians.

I had reached conclusion, especially in view implications stemming from fact of mission visit to Afghanistan, that on balance I should state if obliged to give clear-cut answer that Afghanistan included under Mideast proposals. Fortunately, question not pinpointed officially by Afghans. Prime Minister Daud although “personally” welcoming document, officially accepted only principle of support for independence and sovereignty of nations. He almost pointedly avoided seeking exact definition of doctrine’s applicability to Afghanistan. In private talks much more precision sought by Afghan officials, including Naim. We succeeded in avoiding explicit statements. However, Embassy may be pressed after departure of mission and will need further guidance from Department.

[Here follow Richards’ detailed and specific proposals regarding a United States economic aid program for Afghanistan.]

Mills

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–257. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Moscow, Paris, London, Athens, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Khartoum, Cairo, Amman, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, New Delhi, Rome, and Addis Ababa.
2. Detailed accounts of Richards’ discussions with Afghan leaders are in telegrams 1253 and 1254 from Kabul, April 1. (Ibid.) A comprehensive report on his visit to Afghanistan is in despatch 552 from Kabul, April 16. (Ibid., 120.1580/4–1657)