Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 17, 1956—6:19 p.m.

2729. 1. Department continues attach great importance King–President meeting and wishes appropriately but firmly encourage both sides take positions which will contribute to success meeting. We hope meeting will accomplish following objectives:

A. At very least there should be sufficient improvement in atmosphere Pak-Afghan relations provide firm basis future negotiations on outstanding problems. Also as one of minimum results we hope parties could reach agreement to reestablish full diplomatic relations through mutual exchange ambassadors. Announcement to this effect for inclusion in communiqué at close of talks would do much demonstrate talks successful. In any case communiqué probably best means reducing likelihood either side claiming it got best of other in talks.

B. We would also hope a beginning might be made toward solution certain concrete problems:

Transit. Two governments should agree undertake active negotiations looking toward elimination difficulties which have prevented routing Afghan trade with free world through Pakistan, although Department recognizes present Afghan attitude represents considerable obstacle (Kabul 1367).² This would seem require some Pakistan action toward assuring Afghans continuance free flow of goods leading ultimately perhaps to transit agreement between parties. Afghans should for their part indicate willingness redirect some portion their trade through Pakistan. Governments should be encouraged also discuss additional facilities needed expedite transit Afghan goods. FYI USG currently considering concrete offer of assistance in development transit projects in order encourage agreement. End FYI.

Pushtunistan. Without pressing GOP retreat from its position this is matter internal jurisdiction we should encourage Pakistanis at least listen statement Afghan position. Rejection any reference Pushtunistan would probably result breakdown talks and would certainly lessen chances their successful outcome. Any constructive proposals Pakistanis could suggest bearing on welfare Pushtun people would of course be helpful. (Would appreciate any information Embassy can obtain from President or other officials re such proposals GOP might be willing submit.)

2. Department suggests missions should in manner and at time they believe most effective undertake discussions with appropriate officials of respective governments in order lay groundwork achievement foregoing objectives. Both Embassies should point out desirability both governments make every effort reduce inflammatory propaganda and prevent border incidents in order assure favorable atmosphere for visit. In discussion transit question suggest both missions state U.S. willing give sympathetic consideration request for assisting development facilities but U.S. assistance of little avail unless two sides demonstrate desire develop Afghan trade route through Pakistan. We hope high level talks may set stage for detailed negotiations.

3. In addition Karachi might stress to GOP we not encouraging Afghans believe Pushtunistan solution possible and will suggest Afghans their presentation this problem be restrained. With regard transit Embassy might review with GOP type project we have in mind facilitate flow Afghan goods through Pakistan while avoiding at present any U.S. commitment to assist. (We have in mind such project as free port at Karachi permitting Afghan goods be shipped in sealed cars for delivery directly to Afghan territory with rail spurs across border Chaman and Landi Kotal, additional cars for use Afghan goods on Pak railways, improved Afghan roads to entry ports on Pak border.) U.S. hopes GOP will go far as possible toward meeting reasonable Afghan requests for guarantee free flow Afghan goods since U.S. believes reestablishment traditional Afghan trade routes with free world remains one of major requirements for preventing Afghan absorption Soviet orbit.

4. Kabul should continue (Kabul tel 1338)³ stress to RGA need for keeping open trade channels through Pakistan provide immunity from Soviet pressure. Discussion should of course avoid impression Pakistanis have agreed any specified projects but should continue encourage Afghans take more flexible attitude on transit problem (Kabul tel 1367). If Afghans insist on raising Pushtunistan they should be encouraged make moderate statement their Pushtunistan position in order maintain friendly atmosphere of talks.

5. Re Karachi 2247.⁴ Decision character extent U.S. assistance for transit projects still under consideration USG and thus impractical at present prepare memoranda type suggested reftel.

Post comments requested before either mission undertakes representations along lines suggested.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/4–2656. Secret. Drafted by Thacher; cleared with Stephen P. Dorsey, Adolph Horn, and Jack C. Corbett; and approved by Rountree. Also sent to Kabul and repeated to Ankara, Dacca, Lahore, London, New Delhi, and Tehran.
2. Dated May 11, not printed. (Ibid., 689.90D/5–1156)
3. Dated May 8, not printed. (Ibid., 489.119/5–856)
4. In telegram 2247, April 26, Ambassadors Hildreth and Mills informed the Department that they both agreed it would be useful to assist Afghanistan and Pakistan in reaching a transit agreement since it would reduce the transit issue as a cause of friction as well as offset in part the Afghan transit agreement with the Soviet Union. They proposed delivering an aide-mémoire on the subject to the two governments. (Ibid., 689.90D/4–2656)
5. In telegram 2510 from Karachi, May 22, Ambassador Hildreth reported that President Mirza informed him that he favored doing all possible to help the flow of goods to and from Afghanistan through Pakistan. Otherwise, Mirza observed, Afghanistan would surely become a complete satellite of the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 689.90D/5–2256)

   In telegram 1348 from Kabul, May 9, Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills reported that he had met with Prime Minister Daud the previous morning. Daud had emphasized that the question of transit through Pakistan of goods to and from Afghanistan was a subsidiary issue and would not resolve itself easily until the major dispute concerning Pushtunistan was settled. (Ibid., 123–Sheldon T. Mills) Mills was appointed to succeed Ward as Ambassador to Afghanistan on March 28 and officially presented his credentials on May 6.