Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

113. Memorandum of a Conversation, Prime Minister’s Residence, Karachi, March 7, 1956, 6:20 p.m.¹

Karachi, March 7, 1956, 6:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Hildreth
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Gardiner
• Pakistan
  • The Hon’ble Mr. Mohamad Ali,
  • Prime Minister

SUBJECT

• Afghan Situation

The Secretary had sought this interview with the Prime Minister and opened the discussion by saying that he wished primarily to devote time available to the discussion of the Afghan situation.² He said he hoped that the Prime Minister was satisfied with the statements made today in the SEATO meeting.³

The Prime Minister expressed his thanks for what had been said in SEATO. (Subsequently, the Prime Minister approached the reporting officer at the reception held the same evening with the request that the Secretary be informed of his extreme gratitude at the action taken by the U.S. and other Council Representatives. He said that he had not been fully informed as to the nature of the morning’s proceedings which dealt with Kashmir and the Durand Line and that had he known what had been said, he would have been much more gracious in his thanks and probably have spent more time on examining future courses of action.)

The Secretary then said that he did not like to concede that Afghanistan was bound to become a Soviet satellite and that he was afraid that the Prime Minister and his colleagues in Pakistan took this too much for granted.

The Prime Minister then stated that he thought that the deterioration of the situation had come about because of one man only, Daud, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. The USSR has played on Daud’s ambitions and has been aided and abetted by India in the process. The Prime Minister wished the facts were otherwise and did not like the situation at all. The Pakistanis were prepared to make every reasonable effort to improve the situation. He did not have much faith in the outcome of the projected visit of the GG but would do his best to make it successful. He was willing to try economic collaboration. He pointed out that it was after he became Prime Minister last August that the GOP took the first opportunity to free transit shipments and restore normal trade relations. The facts point out that Russia and India are meddling in the situation. When they talk to Americans and British, the Afghans’ position is that they are being forced into an alliance with the Russians. In this they are patently insincere. Pakistan could not stand attacks on its territory. The Prime Minister referred to certain maps published in Afghanistan indicating that the projected state of Pushtoonistan would embrace the entire northern and western areas of Pakistan on the right bank of the Indus River. This proposal made no sense whatsoever. The Afghans wish to unsettle an area which is by and large a settled and stable one. He pointed out that the Pakistani control of the tribes is a loose one, that the tribes abide by their own laws and that Pakistan collects no taxes nor revenue from them. On the contrary, Pakistan is spending money on their education and economic development projects in general. The Prime Minister pointed out that a substantial number of tribesmen are armed, and that if Russia is allowed to stir up trouble, an explosion could result. During the British occupation of India large forces had been maintained in the North West Frontier Province. Despite the fact that Pakistan maintains small forces—much smaller than the British—there had been eight years of tranquility until Daud became Prime Minister. The bulk of the Afghans hate communism, hate the Russians and pray for Pakistan in their mosques. Thousands come from Afghanistan to Pakistan every winter. All the present trouble has been caused by the mad desire of Afghanistan’s rulers.

Mr. Allen then inquired why if this problem was a century old the removal of Daud was the key to its solution.

The Prime Minister replied that it might be difficult to be rid of the problem entirely, but that the uncles of the Prime Minister and other important Afghans are most unhappy at the course he is taking. He quoted the former Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Rafiq Attik, who before his departure from Karachi said to the Prime Minister, “We are foolish people and shall commit suicide.” The totalitarian regime prevents people in Afghanistan from expressing their dissatisfaction with the course of the Government.

The Secretary asked where power rested in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister replied that sources of power rested on the Army, and on fear. The Afghans who objected to the course of the Government were put in prison. Great trouble, however, was likely because of the Russians who could direct an attack on Pakistan through Afghanistan without being directly involved. Under the circumstances, Pakistan and her allies must exert themselves to the utmost.

The Secretary then inquired how endeavors on our part could best be directed, pointing out that the policy of Pakistan would probably make certain that a bad result would ensue.

The Prime Minister replied by giving the history of eight years of Pak-Afghan relationships. Throughout the entire time, Pakistan had been patient with the Afghans despite much criticism of the Government’s course within Pakistan. Pakistan stopped an intensive series of raids in 1950–51. The Afghan Government, however, continued throughout its vicious propaganda, and things came to a head in March when the Afghans sacked the Pak Embassy at Kabul, and the Consulate at Jalalabad, as a protest against the proposed establishment of the single administrative unit for West Pakistan. This was an unprecedented action, and Pakistan naturally retaliated by slowing down transit trade. The eventual settlement was carried out in a generous spirit by Pakistan, which was not reciprocated, and thereafter the Russians in consultation with the Afghans and with authorities in Delhi entered the scene. Under the circumstances, he feared that the GG’s visit would have a negative result, that the King was weak and would not oppose his brother, Daud, and thereafter it would only be a matter of months before hostilities began. Therefore, something should be done quickly before Daud becomes stronger and the Russian grasp stronger.

The Secretary asked what it should be.

The Prime Minister replied that we should leave no doubt in any minds regarding the Durand Line, and that the U.S. would come to the aid of Pakistan if Pakistan were attacked. Then the Afghans might realize that blackmail did not pay. If the Afghans were given only one option, that of joining with Russia fully, the people of Afghanistan might be able to bring the rulers to their senses. The Prime Minister also pointed out that tribal people respect strength rather than weakness.

Mr. Allen pointed out that what the Prime Minister was requesting was not only to recognize the frontier of Pakistan but to guarantee it. The U.K. had done this for India for a couple of centuries but, the peoples of India had asked the U.K. to leave. Pakistan should realize their independence involves responsibilities of sovereignty.

In response, the Prime Minister indicated that he understood the responsibilities of independence and that Pakistan is prepared to face difficulties. However, the difficulties arose not alone from Afghanistan but from Russian attitudes. If the Afghans alone were concerned, the Pakistanis could handle the situation easily.

Mr. Allen pointed out that arms available to Afghanistan from the Soviets were not comparable to the assistance given by the U.S. to Pakistan, and that the Russians seemed primarily to be working on an economic program in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister replied that in the economic programs, neither the airfields nor the roads were without military significance, and that the information available to Pakistan was that $40,000,000 of the Russian line of credit was available for arms.

The Secretary then said that Russian aid to Afghanistan appeared to be rather less than that furnished by the U.S. and observed that the Prime Minister did not appear to have a constructive program for handling the Afghan problem.

The Prime Minister replied that there had always been the fullest exchange of thoughts on the Afghan problem with the Embassy here and that the Pakistanis had heeded our advice in the past and would welcome our advice in the future.

The Secretary then inquired of the Prime Minister as to his opinion on the exchange of correspondence between the King and the President. He wondered whether he was aware of the letters written by the King.

The Prime Minister observed that the Royal Family of Afghanistan had an exceptional technique of reputed division within their own ranks; one would be pro-Russian; one would be pro-Free World. This made a most useful working partnership.

The Secretary then asked what Pakistan would like us to tell the Afghans.

In reply the Prime Minister thought that they should be told straight that they must play either with us or with the Russians. Nothing would please the Pakistanis more than to have the Afghans opt for the Free World, through a decision to join the Baghdad Pact, and to follow the democracies in other ways. It was unfortunate that the present regime prevented the Afghans from expressing their true pro-Western feelings.

The Secretary then said it appeared to him that the Pakistanis had lost hope in the situation and in effect that they were saying that the case was a lost one and that Afghanistan would inevitably become a Soviet satellite. He observed that this was bound to be a threat both to Iran and Pakistan.

The Prime Minister stated that the only hope was to change the regime.

Mr. Allen pointed out that this might buy time, but that the problem would persist.

The Prime Minister said that the British had been very successful during their occupation in staving off the real problem, that of Russian maneuvering.

Mr. Allen suggested an active program on Pakistan’s part of improving living standards in the border area. This might encourage the tribes to turn more and more to Karachi, rather than to Kabul.

Ambassador Hildreth stated that improving living standards had resulted in demands of the tribes on the Afghan Government which might be partly a cause of the Afghan Government’s resentful attitudes to Pakistan.

The Prime Minister again said that the case had only become serious since Russian intervention.

The Secretary then said that he for one did not believe in quitting in a case like this. He wanted a program to save Afghanistan from Soviet control. He did not want to miss any opportunity, and he thought there must be a way to solve this problem in view of the hostility between Daud and the King and the hostility in the tribes. The Russians are really not doing very much yet, and are not helping the tribes in the southern part of the country. A way must be found to do something constructive.

In reply, the Prime Minister stated that it was most important that the Afghans know our attitude, and understand that blackmail would not pay.

The Secretary then said that under certain circumstances there might be a justification for using our funds in such a situation. He gave an example of Yugoslavia where our assistance caused unrest among other satellites of Russia. If resources were made available to the Afghans, their use might stop, or delay, Afghan absorption by Russia, and it therefore might be worthwhile to carry out assistance programs.

Mr. Allen pointed out that if we stopped all aid to Afghanistan, the Afghans would most likely have to turn to the Russians.

The Prime Minister then said “Tell us what is wrong with the Pakistani position and we will modify it.” On the other hand, if it were the opinion of the U.S. that Pakistan has no aggressive designs (Mr. Allen agreed that this was the case) then the U.S. should help support Pakistan.

The Secretary then concluded the interview as he had another engagement, ending it with an expression of hope that a way out could be found.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Gardiner. Secretary Dulles was in Karachi for the second SEATO Council meeting.
2. The Secretary had an earlier conversation with the Pakistani Prime Minister and Governor General regarding Afghanistan on March 5. During that discussion, both Mohammed Ali and Mirza expressed their fear of the serious threat to Pakistan posed by the Soviet Union, as a result of the latter’s provision of arms and supplies to Afghanistan. The Prime Minister asked Dulles for U.S. recognition of the Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Secretary replied that time did not allow an extensive discussion of these issues but remarked that “while he did not pose as an authority on the long-standing dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, he wondered whether Pakistan’s action in refusing to allow goods to transit Pakistan enroute to Afghanistan had not tended to force Afghans to look toward the North.” He also indicated that he was anxious to have further talks regarding this subject during his stay in Karachi. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, March 5; ibid.)
3. At that meeting, Dulles stated that the United States had recognized the Durand Line as an international boundary ever since it first entered into diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1947.