Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

111. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 53–56

Washington, January 10, 1956.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION²

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan’s relationships with the Bloc, Pakistan, and the West and the likely effects of these developments on Afghanistan’s independence.

Scope

This estimate is designed to supplement NIE 53–54, “Outlook for Afghanistan,”³ dated 19 October 1954, and to bring up to date our assessment of Afghanistan’s international prospects in the light of such developments as the deterioration in Pakistani-Afghan relations and the increasingly active Soviet policy in the area. Internal problems are discussed only insofar as they relate to Afghanistan’s probable international policies. The primitive nature of Afghan economic and social institutions and the concentration of political power among a handful of leading members of the royal family were discussed in NIE 53–54. A summary of pertinent portions of this estimate is attached in an appendix, “The Nature of Afghan Society.”

Conclusions

1. Afghanistan is currently drifting closer to the Bloc. A continuation of this trend would seriously threaten Afghanistan’s independence and its historic position as a buffer state. However, the USSR is likely to be content for some time to maintain close relations with and assist a “benevolently” neutral Afghanistan rather than to accomplish a clear-cut takeover either by recognizable subversion or actual force. (Paras. 8, 14–19, 30–35)

2. Afghan Prime Minister Daud’s acceptance of extensive Soviet aid is motivated by his desire to strengthen Afghanistan in its controversy with Pakistan over the Pushtunistan issue⁴ and also to develop Afghanistan economically. Daud has won effective support for his policies in the limited circle of politically significant Afghans, and he is not likely to be ousted in the foreseeable future. So long as he remains in power he will probably continue to seek Soviet aid and support. (Paras. 9–12, 14–17, 22–24, 34)

3. Nevertheless, Daud and the Afghan ruling oligarchy almost certainly desire to avoid Soviet domination, and will probably continue to seek countervailing Western material aid and political support—attempting to use the threat of growing Soviet ties as leverage. Afghan leaders probably underestimate the degree to which economic connections, technical aid, intimate diplomatic and cultural contacts, and the like, can be used under Communist direction to tighten the bonds between Afghanistan and the USSR, and make an escape from the connection very difficult. The ability of the Afghans to make such an escape would depend not only on their own efforts but also on the timeliness of Western offers of countervailing support or Western willingness to bail them out if their independence is threatened. (Paras. 20, 25, 34, 36–38)

4. Meanwhile, as long as Daud continues dedicated to the Pushtunistan cause, the USSR will have a means, not available to the West, of making itself useful or even indispensable to him. Daud might reach the point where he would choose to accept Soviet support, at whatever political cost, rather than be ousted. (Para. 35)

5. So long as Daud persists in his Pushtunistan policies, Afghan relations with Pakistan will remain strained. However, neither side is likely to provoke hostilities deliberately. Pakistan’s concern over growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan may lead it to seek some amelioration in its relations with the Afghans, but it is highly unlikely to make any real concessions on the Pushtunistan question. (Paras. 26–29)

6. US capabilities to induce Afghanistan to alter its present policies are limited. Increased US aid might lead the Afghans to affirm their neutral benevolence toward the US as well as toward the USSR, but would probably also convince them that flirtation with the USSR was a good way to get US aid. A cut-off of US aid, or other evidence of US unfriendliness would be likely to drive the Afghans closer to the Soviet Bloc as their only source of economic assistance and political support against Pakistan. In neither event are the Afghans likely to abandon the Pushtunistan issue, and [the] US could not support Afghanistan in this controversy without alienating Pakistan. (Para. 37)

7. If Western support of the “northern tier” concept should be stepped up, and particularly if the US should adhere to the Baghdad Pact, Soviet attempts to counter these developments probably would include increased efforts to insure Afghanistan’s orientation toward the Bloc. Should US bases be established in Pakistan or Iran the Soviets would probably seek to gain control over Afghan foreign and military policy. However, the character of Soviet actions would be conditioned by the attitude of India and other neutral states of the Middle and Far East. (Para. 30)

[Here follows discussion of these observations in numbered paragraphs 8–38, as well as an appendix describing the nature of Afghan society.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates were high-level interdepartmental reports appraising foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the members of the NSC. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in preparation of this estimate: CIA, and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with this estimate on January 10 with the exception of the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
3. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1481.
4. This issue results from Afghan demands that the Pushtu-speaking Pathan tribesmen in West Pakistan’s western areas be given an autonomous state, Pushtunistan. These tribesmen are ethnically akin to the dominant Afghan tribal group. [Footnote in the source text.]