11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

1254. Embtels 10972 and 1102.3 Department convinced statement at this moment re Kashmir would be counter-productive. Soviet leaders have over-played their hand and formal statement by us at this juncture would save them from their own folly.

If nevertheless you feel there is compelling need to respond to inquiries you may state US position in regard to Kashmir is too well known to require restating at this time and has obviously not been modified by any recent events or by demagogic statements of persons whose purpose is to sow hatred and bring cold war to subcontinent. (Department understands UK HICOM Karachi authorized reply to inquiries along similar lines.) If further pressed for details you may refer to statements US Security Council representative when Council considered Graham’s fourth report December 1952.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–1255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Witman and Allen. Repeated priority to Kabul, London, and New Delhi.
  2. In telegram 1097, December 12, the Embassy reported on the adverse Pakistani reaction to the support of the Indian position on Kashmir expressed by Bulganin and Khrushchev during their visit to Kashmir, December 9—10. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 1102, December 12, transmitted at midnight, Ambassador Hildreth reported that as the day progressed he was subjected to increasing pressure from Pakistani officials for statements supporting Pakistan’s position in the Kashmir dispute. In a conversation with Mirza, the Governor General pleaded with Hildreth that this was a Pakistani public opinion solidly behind the Pakistani Pakistani public opinion solidly behind the Pakistani Government with a modest statement supporting Pakistan and the proposed Kashmir plebiscite. (Ibid.)
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1286 ff.