Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State ¹

Kabul , December 14, 1955—10 a.m.

609. Copy of President’s reply to King (Deptel 387)² was handed to Naim this noon. He said he would deliver soonest to King and expressed hope that President’s “initiative will bear fruit”. Naim added that in conversation week ago, Pakistan Chargé³ made impromptu suggestion that Pakistan’s GG visit Afghan or King visit Pakistan not to engage in talks but as social gesture, to go hunting, etc. While seeing nothing really useful in this particular proposal, Naim said he had no objection to that or any other Pakistan-Afghan exchange for his government is interested in any measures which have even remotest chance of helping resolve Pakistan-Afghan differences.

Noting that he has always sought to be frank and honest with Americans, Naim said during forthcoming talks with Russians, GOA will not “accept any conditions which will prejudice the independence of Afghanistan”, however, GOA will be favorably disposed to commercial-type agreements for strengthening itself. As he had said previously, GOA never was overly concerned with arms procurement, under assumption it could maintain friendly relations with Pakistan. Now, however, arms for defense are a necessity because of Pakistan hostile attitude. He added his previous complaints about futile GOA efforts to obtain arms from USG (due he suspected to British opposition). He also reiterated theme that American arms have encouraged Pakistan aggressiveness against Afghan.

Describing this news as most unfortunate, Embassy Counselor⁴ suggested that GOA had in its relations with Pakistan reached fork in road, with two possible courses—conciliation and militancy—and decision apparently has already been made to take latter course. An arms deal with Soviet bloc during visit Soviet leaders, Counselor said, will be construed by whole world as clear evidence that Afghanistan is becoming Soviet satellite.

Naim replied that arms were merely for self-defense and no one could believe that small Afghanistan could commit aggression on Pakistan. As for satellite status, GOA leaders would never concur.

Counselor said it was not matter of what GOA leaders had in mind but rather intentions of Soviets. Eyes of world will be on Bulganin-Khrushchev visit this week. If visit is highlighted by arms deal, as well as probable Soviet statements supporting Afghan claims re Pushtunistan, whole world will be led to believe that Soviets are “using Afghans” preparing another Korea in this country. He should know by this time that Soviet arms offer as well as any Soviet statements re Pushtunistan are not made because of Soviet love for Pushtuns or Afghans but are obviously designed to exacerbate Pakistan–Afghan troubles for ultimate benefit of Soviet imperialism. In a sense, GOA by insistence on extremism re Pushtunistan seems about to destroy Afghanistan itself and facilitates Soviet expansion to this whole part of Asia.

Naim insisted outside world, including Washington, would have no right to consider arms deal as anything but simple uncomplicated matter of GOA self-defense. With Pakistan having unsheathed sword, he asked, could anybody dispute its right to use small knife? Counselor repeated that arms deal at present would be universally interpreted that GOA has decided to resort to military means to settle its affair with Pakistan. This to say least is not conducive to conciliation which King’s letter suggested nor to favorable conditions for talks which President had solemnly expressed an interest in encouraging. Least GOA could do was to hold off on arms deal, and try door which President’s letter opens.

Comment: Naim’s attitude reflects clearly that highest government decision has been made to enter arms deal with Soviet bloc, probably during Bulganin–Khrushchev visit. Counselor did not specifically state that arms deal would cancel President’s gesture, but implication was strong that such action by GOA will render successful talks most difficult.

Although some may criticize this seemingly last-minute USG effort, Embassy believes President’s letter was most timely. It should have some effect, but even if it does not no one including Afghans can ever say we did not try to save this country. Admittedly latter thought is small consolation.

Ward

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–1455. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Tehran, Ankara, London, Moscow, Lahore, and Dacca.
2. Supra . A signed copy of this letter, as well as the earlier correspondence between the President and the King, is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.
3. Mohammed Ahram Khan Khattak.
4. Armin H. Meyer.