83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1

1973. Bonn’s 2032 and 2044.2 Department carefully studying various suggestions that have been made for “study group”. For your guidance our preliminary view is that establishment study group prior ratification Paris Agreements might give rise to serious misunderstanding (Moscow’s 10883) and provide opportunity for opponents of ratification to propose further delays. Our immediate aim is to secure ratification Paris Agreements since it has always been U.S. view that increased strength and unity of Europe resulting therefrom would put West in better position negotiate with Soviets on German reunification, etc.

FYI Idea of study group had already occurred to us as possible means of deterring Mendes-France from making his Moscow démarche but it appears that general unfavorable reaction to démarche may have made him less insistent on carrying out plan. We feel Adenauer’s present proposal should be discouraged for the present and [Page 129] only employed as a “last resort” in event Mendes and/or Adenauer continue insist such step essential to ratification by their respective Parliaments. Note also possible conflict Adenauer’s desire four-power group (on which composition we agree if group were established) and Mendes-France reference to tripartite group. We also have serious doubts inclusion parliamentarians as Adenauer suggests in any such working group. End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/1–1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Elbrick; cleared by Tyler, Lyon, and Thurston; and signed for the Secretary by Merchant. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.
  2. Telegram 2032 reported that at a meeting with Mendès-France on January 17 Adenauer advanced the idea of a quadripartite study group to consider plans for a four-power conference after the coming into effect of the Paris Agreements. Telegram 2044 reported that the study group would include members of the SPD. (Both ibid.)
  3. In telegram 1088, Bohlen reported that there appeared to be solid agreement that any approach to the Soviet Government along the lines of Mendès-France’s idea would be dangerous and would provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to state that the conference was dependent on the postponement or abandonment of ratification. (Ibid., 740.5/1–1255)