82. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
2994. Messages in Deptel’s 2541 and 25422 delivered to Mendes this afternoon and 1-hour discussion ensued:
On aspects other than East-West talks his only comment was with respect to President’s statement that he was considering issuing assurances “closely similar” to those of last April in connection with EDC. Mendes hoped that new assurances would be as nearly as possible identical with those of last April except for replacing term EDC by Paris agreements since critical eyes would attempt to exaggerate any other changes.
On East-West talks he said he was greatly disappointed. He several times expressed conviction that his UN speech and subsequent démarche in Moscow on Austria had swung small but decisive number of votes in Assembly and that favorable decision could not otherwise have been obtained. It was necessary to do something similar before Senate debate. Disavowing presumption of questioning his estimate of French political scene, I nevertheless told him bluntly that in last 10 days we had been struck by complete absence of any signs of French public or Parliamentary interest in new approach to Moscow at this time and by apparent unanimity of many Senators and others with whom we had talked that Senate was simply not interested.
He said he would be consulting his colleagues in Cabinet about it, but we could be sure topic would be live one in Senate debate. I stressed importance, particularly at this time, of avoiding any suggestion of disunity and of developing maximum strength and unity for any eventual negotiations. He thought Anglo-Saxons tended to underestimate concern not only in France but elsewhere on continent, which he had found in Rome and Germany, that West was continuing to permit Moscow to appear more interested in relaxing tension and developing real peace than was West. I expressed opinion Russian propaganda in this sense was making little impression and that rapid succession of their notes was decreasing their effectiveness. He agreed on latter point but not on former.
He reiterated that his continued references to “parallel” negotiations with East had been essential and believed he would be tasked in Senate with not having made greater progress since November and particularly since Assembly vote. I asked whether it might not be [Page 127] tactically wise to let Senate take initiative by passing harmless resolution (Embtel 2974, January 133), expressing desire French Government, in concert with its allies, seek to resolve problems with USSR. He replied that question of negotiations was his business, not Senate’s, that he would be in box if such resolution directed him to make some approach US and UK would not accept and that moreover such a resolution might take form of “suspensive” clause. To my suggestion that he seemed to have enough votes in Senate to write his own ticket, he replied that while he did not wish to appear overly pessimistic, he did not want to be overly optimistic either. While party distribution was more favorable than in Assembly, all non-Communist parties would split. He must leave nothing undone. If agreements must be repassed by Assembly, he was confident he could get them repassed but he very much wished to avoid having to do so.
He reiterated that he had always insisted negotiations should be held only after ratification. Why was it not possible to say the same thing in positive form, i.e., invite the Russians specifically to attend a meeting after ratification?
I asked effect on this problem of Moscow’s latest statement and read him Moscow’s 1110 to Department.4 He was much interested in reference to press reports that French Government pressing for new approach, inquired whether they had been in French press and indicated seemingly genuine surprise when I replied they had been primarily in Russian press. He observed that Russians seemed to differentiate between negotiations on Germany and on other questions, apparently seeking to come as close as they could, without actually doing so, to closing door to post-ratification negotiations on German unification while leaving it more ajar on other questions.
During conversation he referred two or three times to British suggestion of possible tripartite working group (Deptel 2536, January 155) and I did not question his comment that Washington apparently disliked idea.
In summing up, he reiterated that he must do something before Senate debate. He would have preferred tripartite démarche in Moscow or as second choice, unilateral one with US and UK approval. Now he would have to devise third choice and perhaps such [Page 128] working group might do. I reiterated Washington felt best course was to do nothing but expressed opinion that if he considered it essential to propose something, Washington would dislike a proposal from him for a tripartite working group far less than for any further initiatives to the Russians.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–1566. Secret. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.↩
- Document 80 and supra↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–1355)↩
- Telegram 1110 reported the latest Soviet declaration on the Paris Agreements and indicated that press reports showed the French Government to be pressing for a four-power conference. (Ibid., 762.0221/1–1555)↩
- Telegram 2536 reported that Eden had expressed to the French Counselor in London British opposition to the approach to the Soviet Union, but had speculated on the possibility of a tripartite working group in Paris whose work would be secret but whose existence would be known. (Ibid., 396.1/1–1555)↩
- On January 17, Achilles reported that Jebb and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler had seen Mendès-France later in the day and that they had presented arguments substantially along the same lines as his. (Telegram 3004 from Paris; Ibid., 396.1/1–1755)↩