Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

247. Delegation Record of the Second Part of the Seventh (Restricted) Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 2:03 p.m.¹

Geneva, July 23, 1955, 2:03 p.m.

At 2:03 p.m. the Heads of Government reconvened with the same advisers as at the morning session.

Faure declared the meeting open, saying that they had all had an opportunity to reflect on the proposal submitted by Bulganin that the directive have the following order: (1) European security, (2) the German problem, (3) Disarmament. In addition, M. Pinay had presented a suggestion that there be added to the preamble the following phrase: “taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security.” He asked the others for an expression of their views.

Eden said that so far as M. Pinay’s amendment was concerned, it was acceptable to him.

Bulganin said that he would like to suggest a small addition to M. Pinay’s text. He thought it would be improved if the complete text read “taking into account” etc., as M. Pinay had proposed, with the addition of the words: “and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.”

Eisenhower said that along the lines of the proposal of the Soviet Delegation, the U.S. Delegation had been thinking the matter over at lunch and were of opinion that something might be added to the end of paragraph 3 of the directive as follows: “The Ministers should organize their work so as to insure that the unification of Germany will take place within the framework of European security.” He thought that this proposal, together with that by M. Pinay, should make the present order of the agenda acceptable to all Delegations. It was intended to make clear that with the order remaining as it is the two questions were linked. The U.S. Delegation also accepted M. Bulganin’s suggested addition to the proposal made by M. Pinay.

Faure asked whether all agreed to the addition proposed by M. Pinay as amended by M. Bulganin. (All agreed) Noting that all agreed, he said that there was next to be considered the U.S. proposal to add a supplement to paragraph 3. The French Delegation agreed.

Eden said that he agreed.

Eisenhower said that he would like to make clear that his proposal had been advanced in an effort to meet the Soviet viewpoint. If they did not want it, he would be quite prepared to withdraw it.

Faure asked Marshal Bulganin what was his decision, noting that the President’s proposal had been accepted by the others.

Bulganin said that he would prefer to stick with the text as drafted and not to add the U.S. amendment.

Faure, summing up, said that the American proposal (to add a sentence to paragraph 3) had been rejected, but that the draft as it stood appeared to bring the different views very close together. Now how about the question of order of the two items? They had two views, those of the U.S. and of the USSR. He would like to ask M. Bulganin whether, with the Pinay proposal as amended (by the additional phrase proposed by Bulganin), he could now accept President Eisenhower’s suggested order of priority, which accorded with the order of debate at this Conference.

Bulganin said that he would like to have the position clear. The proposal of the U.S. had been Germany first, European security second, then disarmament. The Soviet Delegation had proposed first, European security; second, disarmament; third, Germany. Then the Soviet Delegation had agreed to change their original order so as to make the German problem second and disarmament last.

Faure asked Eden whether he had any comment.

Eden said that the Chairman was addressing him out of order. So far as he was concerned, he could not agree to put anything above German unification. He had tried to put them together, so that unification might be considered parallel with European security. He could not agree to put anything above it.

Faure said that they had reduced the gap. It now appeared to be merely a matter of drafting. The problem of substance had been settled by agreement on the preamble. Could he suggest deleting the numbering 1, 2, 3, etc. so as to make it clearly apparent that there was no subordination?

Eden said that he had nothing to add. Due to the agreement on the preamble the order appeared to be of less importance. He preferred to abide by it, however, because it was the order in which the questions had been discussed here.

Bulganin said that the fact that the figures were suppressed would not change the substance. The Soviet Delegation continued to support its point of view.

Eisenhower said that he did not know what more could be done than to combine the two paragraphs (on Germany and European security) and put “and” in between, making it one long paragraph.

Faure said that this was a valuable suggestion. Could they delete the subtitles and put everything together under the title of “Germany and European security”.

Eden said he thought that was a good idea.

Bulganin suggested that perhaps the figures could be suppressed, as the Chairman had proposed, leaving the items in the order of European security, German reunification, and disarmament.

Faure said that that would take care only of the subtitles. They had to start with one sentence. The directive speaks of an “exchange of views” in the preamble and the order proposed by the Soviets would not coincide with the order in which the subjects had been taken up at the Conference.

Khrushchev interposed that that prejudged the substance.

Bulganin said that disagreement remained on this point.

Faure said that the opening statement referred to the “following subjects” which had been discussed. It would be difficult to reverse the order of discussion at Geneva. A different order would prejudge the substance.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation believed that the order was a question of substance, not merely one of procedure. The Soviet Delegation had compromised by putting Germany second, not third. But that this was a question of substance was borne out by the argument here.

Eisenhower said that he agreed it was a question of substance. That is why he had tried to make his position so clear. For this reason he had proposed making the subjects of equal priority rather than putting them into a serial relationship. He thought that this was a fair position.

Faure asked whether he might address himself to Marshal Bulganin. With M. Pinay’s amendment, plus Bulganin’s own amendment, which was certainly substantive, he thought that they had gone a long way to meet the Soviet position. He thought it was difficult for the Soviet Delegation to ask the others to reverse the order of discussion. It would be unfortunate if they were to indicate disagreement even before they had the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. He asked whether Marshal Bulganin saw the present draft clearly. There was the preamble, then paragraph 1 running to the end of the present paragraph 2. Then paragraph 3 became paragraph 2.

Bulganin thought that the Chairman possibly had a way out of the difficulty. They could entitle the paragraph “European security and Germany” and leave the text as it was.

Eisenhower said that he would like to understand that. Did Marshal Bulganin propose that they make the title “European security and Germany” and leave the rest of the text as it was?

Bulganin said that the President’s understanding was correct, but that the text would then have to be worded properly.

Faure suggested that they have the text typed out.

Eisenhower asked what Marshal Bulganin meant. It seemed to him that the text needed no change. They would have one paragraph headed “European security and German unification” and leave the text exactly as it was.

Bulganin said that in that case the text would have to be changed to correspond with the title. It would be improper to have the title “European security and the German Problem” and not have the text correspond.

Faure said that both the French and the U.S. Delegations had understood Marshal Bulganin’s proposal to be intended as a compromise; that the Soviet idea was to be in the title and the others’ idea in the text.

Bulganin said that was a special kind of compromise.

Eden suggested that they retype the text with Bulganin’s subtitles and the President’s order of text, and including the amendments to the preamble proposed by Pinay and Bulganin. He was not sure that he understood all the amendments that had been added.

Faure proposed that they adjourn for 15 minutes while the text was typed out.

Bulganin said that he thought they would only lose time by adjourning. It should be agreed now that the text should correspond to the title and vice versa. If the title were changed to read “European security and the German Problem,” the text should be changed similarly.

Faure said that that was a new exaction and no compromise. If, after the others had accepted the change in the preamble, the Soviet Delegation retained its demand for the order “European security” and then “the German Problem,” the Soviet Delegation would have given no consideration to the others’ concession. He would suggest that each Delegation type out the text according to its own views and that they then come back and compare them. Was there any objection? He heard none. Should they adjourn?

Bulganin interposed that the Soviet text had been circulated yesterday.² They had agreed as a compromise to move “Disarmament” to the bottom, putting “the German Problem” in second place, and leaving “European security” as the first. They had no other text to suggest. They could agree to suppress the subtitles, leaving a common heading for the two topics with “European security” first, if the text followed that order.

Eisenhower asked whether he might call attention to the fact that the Heads of Government formally made a decision on July 21 as follows:

“It was agreed: (1) to ask the Foreign Ministers to frame and submit to the Heads or Government a detailed directive to guide the Foreign Ministers in their studies of the reunification of Germany and European security.”

That was an agreed decision. He thought that they had gone very far in attempting to meet the Soviet view when they agreed to join the subjects in the title on an equal basis, just as though their priority had never been decided.

Bulganin said that the whole point, in the Soviet Delegation’s view, was that the two questions could not be treated on an equal basis.

Faure said, addressing himself to Bulganin, that they had made a great concession in linking European security and Germany together in the title in that order, with the text as it was. He thought that the Soviet Delegation had received substantial satisfaction.

Bulganin said that he saw no great concession in that. It was their view that “European security” should have priority over “the German Problem,” therefore if the title was combined, the text should be reversed to conform, putting “European security” first. That was the Soviet position and no other decision was acceptable to them.

Faure suggested that they adjourn for 15 minutes so that they might examine the retyped text.

(All agreed. Meeting adjourned at 3:10 p.m.)

At 3:30 p.m. the meeting resumed.

Faure asked whether anyone wished to speak.

Eisenhower said that he had a suggestion to make. In this problem of trying to reconcile the different views of the Soviet Delegation and the U.S., it had occurred to him that just as they had combined the titles, “European security and Germany,” so they might combine the text. The full sentence which was now paragraph one (concerning Germany) might be transposed to the end of the first sentence of paragraph two (concerning European security), which began with the phrase “The Ministers are instructed to consider”. This would put the paragraph on German reunification down under the items that were to be considered, while giving priority of purpose to the establishment of European security, which is what the Soviet Delegation had emphasized.

(At the suggestion of the Chair there was a brief recess while this proposal was passed informally around the table. At 3:45 p.m. the meeting resumed.)

Faure said, addressing himself to Bulganin, that he would like to repeat President Eisenhower’s proposal, if this might bring them nearer to a solution. The parties differed on the order. If they froze their positions there could be no agreement. The Soviet Delegation wished to place European security first while the others wished to place Germany first. The President’s suggestion was to place “the German Problem” in the middle of “European Security”, like a sandwich. There would be in all one general paragraph and three subparagraphs: first European security, second Germany, third European security again. Possibly the first paragraph was too general.

Eden said that he agreed to this proposal.

Bulganin said that it did not change the substance. He could not accept the proposal.

Faure asked Bulganin whether he could accept the draft if the preamble were strengthened with regard to security, or whether he had any other suggestion.

Bulganin indicated by his hands that there was no change in his position, and Khrushchev said “Nyet”.

Faure commented that he would certainly not go down in history as a great chairman of this meeting. He felt at a loss how to proceed. Everyone had a part to play and some compromise was necessary.

Eden said that he now had a copy of the revised text. It showed the addition in the preamble stating the link between European Security and the German problem. He thought that this should be a sufficient safeguard for Marshal Bulganin and would fit everyone’s views.

Faure asked Eden to read the text after the preamble.

Eden enquired, including the President’s proposal?

Eisenhower said no, that this had been rejected.

Bulganin said that the suggestion of the Soviet Delegation, based on its former concession, was to bring the two subjects under a common heading, but in the order: “European Security”, then “the German Problem”. That was their second concession. The first had been when they placed Germany ahead of Disarmament. All this seemed logical, and should be acceptable.

Faure asked whether anyone had any new idea.

Eisenhower said that he had none.

Eden said that he would like to suggest an improvement in the draft. Suppose they moved the old first paragraph, originally titled “Germany” and now headed “European Security and Germany”, to the end of the preamble, adding a sentence along the lines of “at the same time” to the new second paragraph (the present third paragraph, relating to European security).

Bulganin said that he was unable to agree with Eden’s suggestion.

Eisenhower said that he had nothing to add. He might have a suggestion on the next round.

Faure said that he would like to make a new proposal. The United States Delegation and the Soviet Delegation had both made a step along the same road but from different ends. The Soviet Delegation had wanted to have Germany at the end of the list and had now placed it in the middle. The United States had wanted to put Germany at the beginning and were now ready to put it in the middle of the paragraph devoted to European security. Would it not be possible to go further and put the German question after the word “aggressor” in the second paragraph?

Bulganin said that he was sorry, but that would not be acceptable. According to the Soviet Delegation’s idea the paragraph on “European Security” should come first. To move the German question into it would be in fact to make it first in the list of subjects to be discussed, because it would be the first thing to be considered under “European Security”. The Soviet Delegation felt that the first thing to be discussed was a pact. Wording could not help the dilemma since it was a disagreement in substance.

Eisenhower said that he had an English text of the directive which, he was told, was the Soviet draft prepared during the recess. It put “Germany” after “European Security”. He asked whether this was the Soviet draft.

(Eisenhower handed the text to the Soviet Delegation, asking Bulganin please to compare the translation from Russian into English of the key paragraph.)

Wilkinson (Secretary General) said that he was quite sure that it was the English translation of the Soviet text, but he would check.

(Brief recess until 4:15 p.m.)

Eisenhower said that he wished to speak directly from this text, which he understood to be the Soviet draft, but before speaking he wished to confirm that fact.

Bulganin said that he had studied the English text and in the main it corresponded with the Soviet Delegation’s desires. There were only certain questions of wording, all minor points.

Eisenhower said that he referred particularly to paragraph 1.

Bulganin: “Quite right.”

Eisenhower said that he considered it impossible for the world leaders assembled in Geneva to terminate the conference without results. They could not possibly face the people of the world, hungering for peace, with the fact that they had come to such an impasse on German unification and European security that they had been unable to agree on the draft of a directive for their Foreign Ministers. That was how matters stood. So he was going to accept the Soviet desires with respect to paragraph 1, but in so doing he wished to explain the spirit in which he did it. These directives were words—ideas—not deeds. The true test of these words would come in October when the Foreign Ministers met. Each Delegation around this table had stated many times that it had come here in a new spirit of conciliation and with a determination to ease tensions in the world. In the October meeting those statements of friendship and conciliation and the desire to approach problems in a new spirit would be put to the test. Only history could then tell. It might be the end of the year before they would know whether they had in fact made a real step toward bringing peace to the world, or alternatively had merely repeated the same old dreary exercises. It was his earnest hope and prayer that the record of the October conference would carry forward the spirit they had expressed here. They would see in October whether they could all work cooperatively together toward the ends so eloquently stated in the preamble of this paper (CF/DOC/25).³ While he was definitely disappointed in certain aspects of this directive, he would do his best to carry it out loyally, and he hoped that his French, United Kingdom, and Soviet colleagues shared this view.

Faure said that, as Head of the French Delegation, he fully associated himself with the President’s views and the spirit, expressed in such noble words, in which he had shown them their duty for the future.

Eden said that his Government likewise associated itself with the statement of the President, expressed with so much clarity and conviction. He believed that this document represented the greatest common measure of agreement that could be obtained around this table. It also represented, like so many others, another attempt by the four of them at this table to bring hope to mankind. Everything would depend on its execution. If they could really carry it out in the spirit of the words of the President, they would have no reason to be ashamed of their work.

Bulganin said that what the President had just said fully conformed with the desires and intentions of the Soviet Delegation, and he would also like to associate himself with what had just been said by Sir Anthony Eden. The Soviet Government would make every effort to bring into effect the provisions of this document. It would do all it could to put into practice its noble purposes.

Faure said that there remained certain practical questions. First, the experts would have to put the text into proper form and then the Heads of Government would have to agree to it. Was it agreed that one expert from each Delegation should meet and decide on a common text?

(All agreed.)

Eisenhower asked whether the meeting should not also decide on the place where the Foreign Ministers would convene in October.

Faure agreed, recalling that there was also the question of the directive with regard to improvement of contacts between East and West. What place was suggested?

Eden: (Shrugged.)

Bulganin thought that that should be up to the Foreign Ministers. They would be the ones to meet.

Eisenhower proposed Geneva.

(All agreed.)

Faure said that there was then the question of the third directive on East-West contacts. Did Marshal Bulganin wish to make his speech on that subject now?

Bulganin said that he preferred to consider his speech as having been made. He had filed the text.⁴

Faure said that the experts should then draft the directive on “contacts” between East and West. The subject might be left with the speeches of the President and himself and the filed statements of Marshal Bulganin and Sir Anthony Eden.⁵

(Brief recess.)

Eden asked, how about a communiqué?

Eisenhower proposed that the Head of each Delegation make a short speech in the plenary session, which would be published, and which would thereby permit them to dispense with a communiqué.

Faure asked whether it was agreed that they should publish the Directive and consider everything else completed by the four speeches.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation considered it desirable to have a communiqué. It was necessary to sum up the week and the prospects for the public.

Eisenhower said that his own feeling was that the directives were the best communiqué. At the plenary session each of them could state their hopes. He recommended that they eliminate the agonizing language-negotiation of a communiqué.

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation would not insist.

Faure said that they appreciated the generous words of President Eisenhower and the happy conclusion of their work. Should the Heads of Government resume the meeting at 5:30?

(After brief discussion it was agreed to resume at 6:30 p.m.)

Eisenhower said that the Secretary of State had to leave almost immediately for Washington. Mr. Merchant would take his place in any dealings henceforward. The President had a suggestion for the experts who would draw up the directive on contacts between East and West. It was a short paragraph. He did not insist on the exact words, but he thought that the idea was good.

(Eisenhower then read that part of the text as it finally appears, para. 3 of CF/DOC/25.)

Bulganin said that the Soviet Delegation associated itself with that text.

(All agreed.)

(The meeting then adjourned to reconvene at 6:30 p.m.)

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 510. Secret. Regarding the drafting of this record, see footnote 1, Document 245. This section comprises pages 14–26 of the composite record.
2. A copy of this text, circulated as CF/DOC/20, July 22, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514.
3. Document 257.
4. Bulganin’s remarks on East-West contacts were circulated as CF/DOC/23, July 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 514)
5. For the concluding statements of the four Heads of Government, circulated as CF/DOC/24 (Rev. 1), CF/DOC/26, CF/DOC/27, and CF/DOC/28, see Geneva Conference, pp. 26–82, or Cmd. 9543, pp. 25–29.