109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris1
Tedul 3. Eyes only Secretary from Hoover. This afternoon I showed the President your message (Dulte 22) and US–UK draft (Dulte 43). He also read account of your conversations with Adenauer, Macmillan and Faure with great interest.4 At the end of our conversation [Page 173] he especially asked me to send you his warmest regards and appreciation.
With respect to US–UK draft he commented essentially as follows (your Dulte 105 with suggested additions re Foreign Ministers prior meeting had not yet arrived):
- a)
- We have always insisted heads of state should not meet until after Foreign Ministers had canvassed the field.
- b)
- He therefore thought it possible Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna on Austrian Treaty might resolve itself into separate but subsequent meeting to explore methods, timing, and location for heads of state to get together (this is slight variation on your Dulte 10).
- c)
- Foreign Ministers meeting would not enter substantive discussions.
- d)
- Re timing of Summit meeting, he did not express firm views, saying only there were many reasons why we should not rush into it, yet mere statement that a meeting would take place in future would lead to increasing buildup of speculation in public mind as time went on.
- e)
- He also speculated on idea that Summit meeting might be held at Edinburgh, Geneva or some other location other than capital of one of interested powers although he did not come to any conclusion.
- f)
- He made no comments on proposed text US–UK draft except suggesting perhaps use of words “exploring for a” instead of “their” near end of last sentence in third paragraph.
In discussion that followed he viewed recent Soviet moves re Austrian Treaty etc. as not being fundamental changes in Communist motives or objectives, but rather represented shift in tactics. Our method of handling was all important particularly in view of large elements in U.S. who would regard entire exercise with considerable suspicion.
(Of course I think you will agree with me that on both sides of the curtain there will also be great cynicism over our entering into a meeting of this kind. Perhaps there is now no choice but it seems to me that the statement could well contain at least a few words indicating reserve on our part that the fundamental objectives of the Soviet bloc have changed.)
(The President’s comments on other subjects included in your cables are being transmitted separately.)
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–855. Top Secret; Priority; No Distribution. Drafted by Hoover and cleared by Murphy.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 106.↩
- Supra.↩
- Regarding the conversation with Adenauer and Macmillan, see Document 107 and footnote 6 thereto. A summary of the discussion of Indochina with Faure and Macmillan was transmitted in Secto 8; see vol. i, p. 372.↩
- See footnote 1, supra.↩