106. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, Paris, May 7, 1955, 3–4 p.m.1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Chancellor Adenauer
  • Dr. Hallstein
  • Mr. Blankenhorn
  • Interpreter
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Amb. Conant
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Bowie

[Here follows discussion of the Paris Agreements, the political situation in Germany, and Communist tactics in Europe.]

[Page 168]

The Secretary then turned to the question of German unification, and asked the Chancellor’s thinking on how this problem should now be approached. The Chancellor considers that it is time to do something about the problem, and that the Three Western Powers should take the initiative. In his view the USSR is now in a weaker position both by reason of economic strains arising from overextending their resources and from their failure to pull the Far Eastern countries into their orbit. At the same time it is necessary to have patience and to endure long negotiations, for we must recognize that the East Zone of Germany raises for the USSR questions of its security and its position in the satellites. In Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, there is much opposition to Soviet control which the Soviets would feel would be enhanced by their release of East Germany. The Secretary then asked whether the Chancellor meant that German unity could be obtained only within the framework of some security system offering assurances to the Soviet Union. The Chancellor considers that the Soviets do not fear Europe or Germany but only the United States, and that their whole policy is directed to getting the United States out of Europe, as is shown by their emphasis on foreign bases. Looking at things from their point of view and their goal of world domination, the United States is the only real barrier. Hence, it will take time to convince them that they cannot achieve that goal and to induce them to adjust themselves to that fact. That is why the Chancellor feels that European integration is so vital in order to bind the United States closer to Europe and to block the Soviet aim to strengthen themselves, vis-à-vis the United States. He is convinced that the Soviet people are farther away from democratic attitudes today than under the Czars, and that it will take a long time for them to evolve into a democratic pattern. The Soviets will be a threat as long as they are a dictatorship. The Chancellor feels that the Soviets have failed in their efforts to strengthen themselves in Asia. To him the Bandung Conference2 showed that Asian countries, including Red China, were not willing to subject themselves to Soviet leadership. In their internal position the Soviets had had serious failures, especially in agriculture both in the Soviet Union and in the satellites, which he viewed as creating critical conditions. They had undertaken an enormous task in trying so rapidly to change the pattern of agriculture radically and to create industrial workers from peasants. From the prisoners-of-war the Germans had learned that the industrial situation in many sectors of the Soviet Union was bad. Another factor is the continuing doubt about the top control. In summary, without being over optimistic, he felt there were signs that the relative Soviet position was weakening: Europe [Page 169] was growing in strength; Asia wanted to keep clear of Soviet control; the United States has stood firm in its European policy. All this gives basis for hope for a good outcome in the long run, but it will take patience, tenacity and consistency.

Turning to the possibility of Four Power talks, the Secretary then asked the Chancellor’s views on (1) whether such talks should include German unity as a topic; (2) whether the Federal Republic would want to participate; and (3) whether its position would be affected by participation also of East Germany. The Chancellor said that he hoped that after due preparation, say by late summer, it would be possible to have a conference on German unity which would of course also raise the question of security safeguards. On the second and third questions, he said that since East Germany could not be excluded if West Germany took part, he felt it would be better for neither to participate. If the East German Government did take part, the psychological effect on the people of the East Zone would be extremely bad. For this reason, he would prefer that the Federal Republic be a full partner in preparing for the talks and be constantly consulted during any conference, but not be a direct participant.

The Secretary then asked the Chancellor’s view on the handling of the Autobahn issue. The Chancellor said that since the East German ordinance applies to all vehicles except those licensed by it, it clearly violates the Agreement of 1949.3 Hence, the Three Powers should carry the ball. Ambassador Conant then referred to the meetings with the Russians (Pushkin) scheduled in Berlin for the 20th. In any settlement, the Chancellor was most anxious to avoid the impression that the West was always ready to give in. He was ready to agree to higher payments if calculated on a fair basis and if the money was actually applied to the roads. The Secretary agreed that the Three Powers should insist that the tolls violated the 1949 Agreement with the Soviets, which Ambassador Conant pointed out had been done from the beginning. Both agreed, as did the Chancellor, that stronger action might have been taken earlier in pursuance of the protest. The Chancellor remarked that in dealing with the Soviets it was wise to insist on strict adherence to agreements, even on small points.

Coming back to any Four Power negotiations, the Chancellor said he had one point of deep concern which he wished to entrust to the Secretary. In any negotiation, it should be made quite clear that the implementation of the Paris Agreements would not be stopped. [Page 170] In his opinion the present French Government shares this view, but a future one—and changes are frequent—might not take the same attitude. Hence, the United States should find an occasion to make the point clearly in order to remove any such risk. The Chancellor trusts Pinay and has had good talks with him, but in some countries power is divided between the Minister and the Ministry.

The Secretary then asked how promptly the Federal Republic could get started with carrying out the Paris Agreements so that they would become an accomplished fact. The Chancellor said that contrary to the original plans—which might have been better—he now thinks that they will probably start with volunteers, of which they already have had 100,000 without any appeal. In this way, he believes they can perhaps get started in the fall. In response to a question, he said that even this would require legislation regarding their status, but that this was relatively simple and could probably be passed by the end of July.

The meeting had to be broken off as the result of the arrival of Macmillan for a 4 o’clock appointment with the Secretary.4

  1. Source: Department of State, CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 170. Secret. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 4 from Paris, May 7. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 448)
  2. Reference is to the Bandung Conference which took place in April 1955.
  3. For text of the Communiqué of the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1062.
  4. The only U.S. record of this meeting was a brief summary report which reads:

    “Then Macmillan came in and we discussed primarily possible Big Four meeting of Heads of Government. He does not think that this meeting should attempt to take up any substantive matters, but merely to identify points of tensions and to consider what acceptable procedures could be set up to deal with them. In essence, his concept is something like what took place at Potsdam when the Heads of Government agreed to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with various problems arising out of the war and the making of the peace treaties.” (Dulte 2 from Paris, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–755)

    For Macmillan’s account of this meeting, see Tides of Fortune, pp. 587–588.