Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

80. Telegram From the United States Delegation at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 19, 1957—2 a.m.

Polto 1807. This cable reports December 18th morning and afternoon meetings of Foreign and Defense Ministers.² Discussions related to NATO atomic stockpile, IRBM’s, force contributions, defense production, scientific research and educational training. They resulted in adoption by Ministers of communiqué language for submission to drafting committee. (Economic section of communiqué also discussed and reported separately in Polto 1804.³) Following summary combines discussions in morning and afternoon sessions.

Lange (Norway) opened discussion on IRBM’s by tabling text of communiqué language.⁴ He stated Norway would have preferred that declaration on IRBM’s be deferred until a subsequent disarmament discussion could be had with Soviets, but, since Norway understood there was general feeling around table that these weapons should be accepted now, he was introducing this amended proposal. Paper in essence stated that, because Soviets have adopted these weapons and have stated their readiness to use them, there is no alternative but to adopt the best weapons ourselves. Council, however, will have to “consider certain political and economic questions relating to their use and deployment.” The military will have to report at an early date on their introduction. In the meantime, he suggested that disarmament talks continue.

Denmark, in supporting Norway, stated that they, too, would have preferred delay.

Belgium stated there should be no delay from a military point of view in taking these weapons at earliest possible date.

Secretary then expressed appreciation Norway’s position, was very happy they had adopted this attitude, accepted their text in principle. During subsequent discussion, it was agreed to modify wording of text by changing words “consider certain political and economic questions” to “study of the various questions involved.”

. . . . . . .

France discussed problems of sites and conditions of use, indicating that these matters should be determined bilaterally between supplier of weapons and receiving country.

Much discussion as to relationships between NATO, supplying country and receiving country. Was decided that conditions of use should be omitted from communiqué draft.

France thought financial arrangements would have to be made bilaterally.

Belgium and France agreed that weapon sites would be determined by country concerned, in accordance with SACEUR’s military planning.

Spaak summed up, saying a country has to agree to accept weapons, weapons must be taken in accordance with military plans of SACEUR, question of use must be approved by NATO, and question of location and financial arrangements should be decided on bilateral basis. However, in agreed draft for communiqué, Spaak’s suggestion that use must be approved by NATO was changed so that both location and arrangements for their use would be decided “in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with states directly concerned.”

On IRBMs, Greece thanked the United States for offer and reserved for the record its right to determine subsequently whether or not desires weapons. However, supported amended communiqué.

Netherlands thanked United States and said will be glad to have IRBMs if SACEUR desired. Dutch said unimportant to them where missiles are located; they were not afraid to have them on theory that they would attract Russian attack because any Russian attack would be a general one and part of a general Soviet plan.

NATO atomic stockpile and IRBMs were treated together, with discussion focusing on IRBMs and practically no discussion of NATO atomic stockpile.

In opening discussion on the “balance of collective forces” Duncan Sandys indicated that coordination, integration and standardization relate not only to forces but also to production, research and development.

Netherlands stressed interdependence and that NATO had never decided what balanced collective forces are. Integration should be a slow and progressive process.

There was then a general discussion whether or not to hold meeting of Defense Ministers after MC–70⁵ had been approved and prior to Foreign Ministers spring meeting.

United Kingdom wanted discussion of MC–70 prior to its becoming final military document. Nobody agreed with United Kingdom. Spaak promised MC–70 by February 1. It was then agreed that there would be a special Foreign Ministers meeting.

Under item of defense production, United Kingdom indicated very happy that United States would seek ways to purchase European-produced advance weapons for its own forces. This would provide foreign exchange needed to make possible purchases in the United States of weapons not manufactured in Europe.

Greece put in plug for consideration by NATO of countries not having modern production facilities.

France suggested some use of common financing in defense production, but this not accepted.

There was no further substantive discussion of this item, and Spaak appointed working group, consisting of Assistant Secretary-General for Production and Logistics and representatives of United States, United Kingdom and France, to draft communiqué language.

Spaak introduced discussion of scientific and technical cooperation, saying there were two ideas having universal acceptance, one, a scientific committee and, two, a scientific advisor. No country objected and no one discussed this. He referred to French proposal for foundation for scientific research.⁶ French did not speak in support of their proposal.

Secretary Dulles suggested communiqué include reference to some specific items which had been suggested and which the science committee might consider implementing. While this was not adopted in final communiqué, it was agreed that science committee would be responsible in particular for making recommendations on French proposal and many others proposed by task force and NATO parliamentarians.

Canada urged communiqué include language on necessity for pooling scientific and technical resources and this was accepted for final draft.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1957. Secret. Authorized by Reinhardt. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Moscow.
2. The summary, C–R(57)85, and the verbatim, C–VR(57)85, records of these sessions, both dated December 18, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 952.
3. Supra.
4. A copy of the Draft Declaration/Communiqué, PC–10, undated, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 952.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. A copy of the French proposal to establish an Atlantic Foundation for scientific research, RDC/57/428 (Final), Annex C/2, undated, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 937.