Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

302. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–2–57

Washington, December 3, 1957.

COMMUNIST CHINA’S ROLE IN NON-COMMUNIST ASIA²

The Problem

To examine Communist China’s activities in non-Communist Asia and the impact of these activities on the non-Communist countries of the area, and to estimate the future role and influence of Communist China in Asia during the next five years or so.

Summary and Conclusions

1. Communist China’s already powerful impact on non-Communist Asia will probably increase, although only gradually, over the next few years, unless there is a serious crisis within China, a major change in the world situation, or a substantial increase in the strength of the factors which work against Peiping’s aspirations.

2. Asia is impressed by the progress which the Chinese Communists have made in developing their economy and increasing their military power. Most Asian governments believe that the Communist regime is firmly in control of the country and growing in strength. The countries of the area, whether firmly anti-Communist or neutralist, take possible Chinese Communist reactions into consideration when making major policy decisions.

3. Against the background of power which Peiping is able to project, many Asian countries are susceptible to its varied appeals and pressures. Communist China will continue to pose as the champion of peace and economic development and to identify itself with the widespread anti-Western prejudices which arose out of colonial experience. Many Asian leaders have an intellectual sympathy for Marxist economic concepts. Many believe also that in their underdeveloped countries there is no feasible alternative to state planning and financing of major economic development. In these circumstances, there is a tendency to be more tolerant of the Communist economic system even when there is recognition of and opposition to its excesses.

4. On the other hand, there are important factors which work against Peiping’s aspirations. Many Asian leaders dislike Communism, fear Communist China and mistrust its intentions. The most important factor limiting the expansion of its influence is the presence of the US in Asia as an opposing force, supplying elements of strength which the free nations still lack. Another major factor will be the degree of success of non-Communist governments in achieving a level of economic, political, and social progress acceptable to their people.

5. For the most part, the present leaders of Asia value their hard-won independence and recognize the ultimate threat of indigenous and Chinese Communism. They are seeking—with varying degrees of skill and energy—to satisfy the needs and potential pressures for social and economic betterment without sacrificing the basic values of their own cultures. Although the various Asian countries will react differently to Communist China in accordance with their varying backgrounds and interests, those that are not firmly anti-Communist are more apt to continue on or to take the road to neutralism than the road to affiliation with Peiping. Among such countries there will probably be an increase in contacts with Peiping, which will enhance the prestige of Communist China.

6. Although Communist China’s military strength will almost certainly increase, we believe that it will refrain from using military means to achieve its objectives in Asia so long as its leaders believe that this would result in effective US military counteraction. Rather they will seek to expand their power and influence in Asia, and to reduce that of the US, through other means. They will continue to concentrate on economic inducements, the expansion of a broad range of official and unofficial contacts, and political subversion. They also hope to foster the development of indigenous Communist movements which can influence Asian governments to adopt policies favorable to Communist China and which might eventually assume power by parliamentary means or insurrection.

7. Major political or economic crises inside Communist China would considerably diminish its impact on Asia. On the other hand, any modification of US policy which appeared to Asians as a significant softening of US constancy and firmness in opposing Communist China and in helping Asian countries to achieve their aspirations would enhance Peiping’s prospects. This would be particularly true if there appeared to be a significant weakening of US military capabilities against Communist China. A major change in the climate of the cold war could have important effects. Thus, if the Sino-Soviet Bloc became more bellicose and threatening, there might be major policy changes in some Asian countries with some seeking neutralism and others increased affiliation with the West. Or, if tensions were reduced, closer relations between Communist China and other Asian countries would probably develop, with an eventual enlargement of Peiping’s ability to influence Asia.

Discussion

Communist China’s Objectives in Asia

8. We believe that Peiping’s basic, long run objective is an Asia ruled by Communist governments, amenable to Communist China’s influence, and dependent upon it for trade and political guidance. This long run objective, derived from Communist doctrine, is reinforced by the traditional Chinese view of China as the center of civilization.

9. Peiping almost certainly realizes that an attempt to gain this objective by military means would risk war with the US, so long as the latter is committed to the defense of large parts of non-Communist Asia. In addition, Communist China is seeking to transform an impoverished, illiterate, agrarian society into a modern industrial state with a powerful military establishment. Communist China’s leaders appear to believe that their country needs time to complete this transformation and that their foreign policies must stop short of provoking destructive US military retaliation.

10. Thus, Communist China is for the present directing its energies toward more immediate objectives. These include weakening the power position and influence of the US in Asia, increasing exploitable neutralist attitudes and the susceptibility to Communist influence, and gaining acceptance as the only legitimate government of China and as a fully participating and increasingly important member of an Asian community of nations. Moreover, they consider that their revolution is incomplete so long as they do not control Taiwan and they will almost certainly be prepared to exploit any opportunity to this end providing it does not seriously risk war with the US.

[Here follows paragraphs 11–57, a nine-page assessment of the role of the People’s Republic of China in non-Communist Asia.]

Future Trends

58. Assuming that there is no outbreak of war directly involving Communist China, the Chinese Communist regime probably will remain in firm control of the mainland of China, will continue to direct its resources and energies largely to internal problems, and will achieve some degree of progress in economic development. Its military capabilities will almost certainly increase as it improves the efficiency, arms and equipment of its ground forces, continues to develop its air force, and expands its naval and maritime capabilities. However, Communist China will probably refrain from overt military aggression so long as its leaders believe that this would result in effective US military counteraction against the mainland.

59. Under these conditions and assuming no drastic changes in US policy or in the intensity or character of the struggle between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, we believe that over the next few years the already powerful impact of Communist China in Asia will continue to increase, although only gradually. The presence of the US in Asia will continue to be the major factor damping down the growth of Peiping’s influence and obstructing Peiping’s efforts to translate its growing prestige into specific action, such as diplomatic recognition or admission to the UN. There are many other factors which may counteract the impact of Communist China. One of particular importance would be the success of non-Communist governments in achieving a level of economic, political, and social progress acceptable to their people. In any event, we believe that there will be an increase in Peiping’s cultural and economic relations with other Asian countries, which will enhance its prestige. With respect to the two most important countries of the area, India is unlikely to make any significant change in its policy toward Communist China as long as Nehru heads the government; Japan, although moving toward an increase of officially approved trade and cultural relations, is likely to stop short of any over-all rapprochement that would jeopardize its relations with the US. Nevertheless, we believe that five years hence the weight of Communist China on Asia and its ability to influence developments in the area will have increased somewhat.

60. Any modification of US policy which was interpreted in Asia as tending toward a significant softening of US constancy and firmness in opposing Communist China would enhance Peiping’s prospects for expanding its influence. This would be particularly true if such modification resulted in a significant weakening of US military capabilities against Communist China. Likewise a substantial reduction in US support and assistance to Asian countries would probably be interpreted as a lessening of US interest in the destiny of the countries affected and would increase economic difficulties in these countries. This would, in varying degrees, enhance Communist China’s prospects.

61. A significant change in the intensity of the East-West struggle could have important effects. If the Sino-Soviet Bloc dropped its general line of peace and coexistence in Asia and became bellicose and threatening, we believe that throughout Asia there would be a general re-examination of national positions and of the relative power positions of the US and of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. There would probably be a clearer demarcation of Communist and non-Communist influence in Asia, although not necessarily along present lines. For example, Thailand especially is sensitive to trends in the relative strengths of the major powers in the Far East and might shift to neutralism if its leaders concluded a war of uncertain outcome was imminent. Burma, on the other hand, might seek increased ties with the West.

62. If Communist behavior is such that tensions in the Far East are substantially reduced, most Asian countries, except Nationalist China, Korea, and Vietnam, would probably cautiously relax their present suspicions of Peiping and move gradually toward broader contacts and normal diplomatic relations with Communist China. This, in time, would enlarge Peiping’s ability to influence these countries.

63. Major developments within Communist China could also affect the impact of Communist China in Asia. A serious and prolonged crisis on the mainland would impede Peiping’s efforts by undermining its pose as a progressive and dynamic state, while a marked improvement in conditions would, on the other hand, enhance Peiping’s prestige. Moreover, serious economic and political difficulties in any of the Asian countries would increase its vulnerability to Peiping’s blandishments, while an improvement in internal stability would have an opposite effect.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on December 3, 1957, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.
2. Non-Communist Asia as used in this estimate includes: Japan, Korea, Nationalist China, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Ceylon. Hereinafter non-Communist Asia is referred to as Asia. [Footnote in the source text.]