303. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 9, 19571

PARTICIPANTS

  • Minister Yu Ta-Wei
  • Dr. Hollington Tong, Chinese Ambassador
  • Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
  • Mr. Ralph N. Clough, Director, CA

Minister Yu said the Chinese forces now consisted of 21 divisions plus two tank divisions, a parachute regiment, a marine division and one marine brigade (the latter not yet combat-ready). These units were at 95% strength. Equipment was rated at 84% and training 80%. They were considered combat-ready.

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Mr. Robertson inquired how many troops there were altogether.

Minister Yu replied there were 11,000 combat troops in a division, but a division slice was 15,000. Total combat forces were 375,000. If Navy, Air and Service Forces were included the total would be close to 600,000.

In response to a question from Mr. Robertson, Minister Yu stated that 1/3 of the forces were Taiwanese, who made very good soldiers. Since drafting of Taiwanese began only three years ago, there are as yet no Taiwanese officers. There has not been time for them to advance to officer rank. There are two ways to become an officer: to be promoted up through the ranks, or to enter the officers’ academy. Candidates are selected for officer training on a merit basis, irrespective of whether they are Taiwanese or mainlanders. As time passes, Taiwanese will become officers.

Minister Yu explained that youths reaching 20 years of age are drafted regardless of whether they were of Taiwanese or mainland origin. They are given four months recruit training and then assigned to one of the 21 divisions where they complete 20 months’ service. They then become reservists and are obligated to serve one month per year. There are already 15,000 reservists who have completed their two years’ service.

Mr. Robertson inquired what the attitude of the Taiwanese was regarding return to the mainland.

Minister Yu replied that he had not asked this question of the soldiers, but believed they should feel the same as mainlanders because of the Communist menace to Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson agreed that the Taiwanese soldiers should feel that way but asked the Minister what evidence there was that they did. He said he was frequently asked this question.

Minister Yu replied that he had probably spent more time at the front lines than any other official in the Chinese Government, having recently made his 100th visit to Matsu. He had not talked with the Taiwanese soldiers concerning this point, but had no reason to believe that they were opposed to return to the mainland, beyond feeling the universal reluctance to leave one’s home. He referred to the refusal of the Hunan troops to leave Hunan Province to fight the Taipings. The Szechwan troops during World War II were also reluctant to leave Szechwan Province, but were made to realize the best way to defend Szechwan was to fight the Japanese outside the province rather than allow the war to come there. The same is true with respect to Taiwan, and the attitude of the soldiers will depend on how the case is presented to them.

Mr. Robertson inquired how much intermarriage there is between mainlanders and Taiwanese.

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Minister Yu said there was very little, principally because the Chinese were very clannish. He himself was married to his first cousin and a number of his relatives had made similar marriages within the clan. Mainland families are more willing to have their sons marry Taiwanese girls than to have their daughters marry into Taiwanese families because of differences in customs. Of course, as time goes on increasing intermarriage is inevitable.

Minister Yu remarked that in present day Asia no one can predict where trouble will break out next. We could not, for example, have predicted the Indonesian reaction against the Dutch. Mr. Robertson interjected that we had anticipated that one. Minister Yu went on to say that since trouble may break out unexpectedly, it is necessary to be prepared. He recognized that the Chinese cannot at this time develop a pentomic division on the United States model but his staff in consultation with MAAG has developed what they call the “forward look” to modernize the Chinese Army. This proposal will soon be sent by MAAG to the Department of Defense. On the assumption that the cold war will continue and that brush fires may break out anywhere, it is important to have not only combat-ready troops but “export-ready” troops and there is quite a difference between the two.

Mr. Robertson commented that if the only front we had to worry about were the Taiwan front, we could do things very differently. However, we are confronted with a global threat and we must recognize that we face a common enemy in Germany, Viet Nam, opposite Taiwan, and in Korea. One thing that worries Americans is the possibility that one of our allies might precipitate military conflict for which the free world is not prepared.

Minister Yu replied that the United States could rely on the Chinese not to act independently.

Mr. Robertson responded that he himself was confident that they wouldn’t. He had known President Chiang and Minister Yu both for many years and was satisfied that they would cooperate fully. He was concerned rather about President Rhee and certain other individuals who might exercise less discretion.

Yu pointed out that independent action by the Chinese without American support would certainly not serve China’s enlightened self-interest, Mr. Robertson agreed and added that of course we must be prepared for any eventuality.

Minister Yu inquired where he thought trouble was likely to start. Mr. Robertson replied that of course no one could tell. The point is that we must maintain both our strength and our patience. There can be no successful revolt by unarmed people against modern weapons as was shown in Hungary, but if there had been a Hungarian Government in exile across the border with an armed force, things [Page 656] might have turned out differently. In any totalitarian state the opposition of the people can only become effective when the army takes the side of the people. Time he said was on our side and we must guard against any unwise action which would precipitate military action prematurely.

Minister Yu responded that the Chinese believed that the free world would win in the long run, even though it had only parity in weapons rather than superiority. He assured Mr. Robertson that the Chinese intended to continue full cooperation. Mr. Robertson replied that no ally had been more cooperative than the Republic of China. He went on to say, however, that in the last session of Congress he had been asked in a classified Committee hearing how we knew the Chinese would not act independently. He had referred to the treaty and exchange of notes with the Chinese and when his statement later became public and was printed in Taiwan, he was lambasted in the Chinese press for having said that the Chinese could be depended upon not to act independently.

Minister Yu commented that of course it is impossible for the Chinese to move independently against the mainland without United States logistic support. He had appeared before his own Congress and explained why it would not be in the enlightened self-interest of China to attack the mainland without United States support. He had felt he had made some impression. He went on to say that the important thing was not the amount of money contributed by the United States for developing military capability to resist the Communists but the total operational capability for such resistance. For example, a year ago he had been offered a squadron of all-weather fighters for the Chinese Air Force. He had turned down the offer pointing out that it would take two years to train Chinese pilots to operate these planes and asked instead that a United States squadron of such fighters be stationed in Taiwan. He had suggested to Admiral Burke that Nike missiles be placed on Taiwan. This new attitude on the part of the Chinese he referred to as “the Copernican revolution in Chinese thought.” They no longer think in terms of the amount of money needed for Chinese forces but of the total operational capability of combined United States and Chinese forces in the area.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that whether the money goes to the Chinese or is used for United States forces, it had to be covered by appropriations. Congress had cut one billion dollars from the mutual security program last year and at the same time had cut two billion dollars from the United States defense budget. Our programs have to be adjusted to this reality.

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Minister Yu closed by leaving a memo2 renewing an earlier request by the Chinese Government for the purchase of CISAYI vessels on which the Chinese Government had made a down payment but had been unable to keep up the payments.

Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Clough to look into the status of the matter.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/12–857. Secret. Drafted by Clough.
  2. Not found in Department of State files.