Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

301. Memorandum From the Commander of the United States Taiwan Defense Command (Doyle) to Various United States Military Officers in the Republic of China¹

Taipei, December 3, 1957.

SUBJ

• U.S. policy for ChiNat offensive actions

1. Enclosure (1) represents CINCPAC policy on the offensive use of forces by the GRC, and lists ChiNat air, naval, and ground action in two categories as follows:

a. Those ChiNat actions requiring prior U.S. endorsement;

b. Those ChiNat actions not requiring prior U.S. endorsement.

2. This enclosed policy statement was originally prepared principally for the guidance of Chief, MAAG in his monitoring of GRC intentions and activity, to ensure that the GRC does not become involved in any operation against the ChiComs contrary to U.S. policy. In order for this document to have maximum effectiveness it must reach the working level of all U.S. officers whose Chinese counterparts are likely to ask questions regarding Chinese offensive action. Therefore, enclosure (1) is furnished for your information and guidance. Authority is granted to reproduce this document as necessary for distribution on a strictly “need to know” basis. Any GRC proposed offensive action which the GRC considers to be of sufficient significance to warrant making it the subject of an official query, whether covered by the attached guidance or not, will be referred to COMTAIWAN DEFCOM(US), with recommendations.

3. This policy statement, as such, has never been, and should not be, transmitted to the GRC, since any such official specific listing could provide an opportunity for legal loopholes for GRC offensive action in the many areas not specifically foreseen.

A.K. Doyle

[Enclosure]

LIST OF CHINESE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

A. Air Operations

Operations Requiring no Prior US Endorsement	Operations Requiring Prior US Endorsement
1. Air action of a defensive or repelling nature in the immediate vicinity of any GRC territory or ship which is attacked.	1. Air attacks of artillery positions require prior US endorsement.
2. Air to air action at any time or any place.	2. Air attacks against mainland airfields.
3. Air to surface action against all enemy military shipping within the China Sea Operational Area.	3. Air support of friendly ground patrols on the mainland.
24. Air to surface action against enemy ground installations on enemy held off-shore islands within the China Sea Operational Area.	4. Air attacks against shipping tied up to mainland wharves and against any shipping not within the China Sea Operational Area.
5. Air reconnaissance, both photo and visual, to limit of capabilities.	5. Air attacks against any other mainland targets.

B. Naval Operations

Operations Requiring no Prior US Endorsement	Operations Requiring Prior US Endorsement
1. Reconnaissance and patrol.	1. Sea mining.
2. Destruction of enemy military shipping within the China Sea Operational Area.	2. Raids on enemy mainland harbors or portions of harbors which are outside the boundaries of the China Sea Operational Area.
33. Destruction of enemy military ground installations on enemy held off-shore islands.	3. Support of friendly ground force engaged in mainland raids with gunfire beyond that necessary to cover withdrawals.
4. Gunfire and escort support of friendly ground patrols against the mainland of company size or less to cover withdrawals.	4. Naval gunfire (except for direct naval counterbattery fire) against mainland targets of any type requires prior US endorsement.
5. Support of ground operations against enemy held offshore islands.

C. Ground Operations

Operations Requiring no Prior US Endorsement	Operations Requiring Prior US Endorsement
1. Any defensive action including artillery counterbattery firing.	1. Raids or patrols against the mainland for the purpose of destroying enemy military installations or forces.
2. Artillery firing at any type enemy military target in any location.	2. Reconnaissance patrols on the mainland of greater than company size.
43. Recapture of off-shore islands lost to the enemy.	3. Reconnaissance patrols against the mainland of company size or less involving air and/or naval support. Excepted is naval gunfire support for covering withdrawals only.
4. Combat patrols or raids against enemy held off-shore islands.
5. Reconnaissance patrols of company size or less against the mainland for intelligence purposes.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2158. Secret; Noforn. Ninety-three copies of this memorandum were distributed to American military officers on Taiwan likely to have to answer “questions regarding Chinese offensive action”. The memorandum was sent to the Department of State as an attachment to despatch 474 from Taipei, February 21, 1958. In commenting on the December 3 policy statement, the Embassy noted that “In conversations locally among U.S. authorities the policy statement is referred to as ‘The Do and Don’t List’.” The Embassy concluded that the effect of the policy statement was “to tighten restriction against offensive use of force by the GRC”. (Ibid.)

2. COMTAIWAN DEFCOM(US)’s interpretation:

   This does not mean that the GRC can, without prior US approval, start bombing the ChiCom held off-shore islands. The overall US policy is to prevent the GRC from taking any offensive action which could precipitate a situation inimical to the best interests of the United States. The US considers it to be of utmost importance that the onus for any hostilities in the off-shore island area be on the ChiComs. Any GRC offensive action which is not clear cut retaliation against the ChiCom attack would greatly complicate the issue in the US and abroad. Therefore air to surface action by the GRC against ChiCom held off-shore islands may be taken without prior US endorsement only if in retaliation or in self-defense. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. COMTAIWAN DEFCOM(US)’s interpretation:

   This does not mean that the GRC Navy can, without prior US approval, initiate the destruction of ChiCom ground installations on the ChiCom held off-shore islands. The overall US policy is to prevent the GRC from taking any offensive action which could precipitate a situation inimical to the best interests of the United States. The US considers it to be of utmost importance that the onus for any hostilities in the offshore island area be on the ChiComs. Any GRC offensive action which is not clear cut retaliation against the ChiCom attack would greatly complicate the issue in the US and abroad. Therefore GRC naval action against the ChiCom held off-shore islands may be taken without prior US endorsement only if in retaliation or in self-defense. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. COMTAIWAN DEFCOM(US)’s interpretation:

   This does not mean that the GRC can, without prior US endorsement, proceed to mount operations to recapture those off-shore islands already lost to the ChiComs such as the Tachens. Item number 3 is intended to be more narrowly interpreted than might appear from the actual wording, in that the words “lost to the enemy” are intended to be construed to be in a future tense, and the “off-shore islands” referred to are considered to be those islands held by the GRC as of 3 March 1955 on which date the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the GRC entered into force. The recapture of off-shore islands lost to the enemy prior to 3 March 1955 must have prior US endorsement. [Footnote in the source text.]