261. Memorandum of Discussion at the 325th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 27, 19571
Present at the 325th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler and Dearborn; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Page 541]1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on developments in Haiti.]
Mr. Dulles then summarized what had happened in Taipei, on the basis of intelligence received in Washington over the weekend. He noted that the Chinese press in Taiwan had called for the punishment of Sgt. Reynolds ever since his acquittal, and had become increasingly inflammatory in tone. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the uprising in Taipei had been very carefully planned from the beginning, and that the widow had had some official backing. The actions of the government authorities to maintain order in the early stages, were not very clear and cetainly not very active. There were very few police at any time in the grounds of the American Embassy, and thus little protection until 7:00 p.m., when Chinese Nationalist troops began to move in. Some U. S. classified material has been compromised, although the safe containing Top Secret material is intact. Among the documents lost was the emergency plan for the evacuation of Taiwan in certain contingencies.
The acquittal verdict of the court martial had touched Chinese National feeling at a very tender spot—namely, hatred of extraterritoriality. It seemed probable that the government had permitted the demonstration to begin as a means of applying a little pressure on the United States. Thereafter the matter got out of hand.
Secretary Dulles intervened to point out that we were even now negotiating a status-of-forces agreement with the Chinese National Government.
Mr. Allen Dulles went on to say that it was not yet clear whether or not the Communists had had a hand in starting the uprising. Certainly as yet there was no clear evidence of Communist participation. Mr. Dulles said he was also inclined to doubt the validity of the charge that the Generalissimo’s son had started the uprising, though this charge had been made by a high Kuomintang official. Nevertheless, certain reports stated that some Chinese Nationalist officers had viewed the whole sequence of events with satisfaction, and that the affair had been planned this way. Meanwhile, Communist propaganda from mainland China has been having a field day, as has Moscow, which is studiously following Peiping’s line.
Mr. Dulles concluded by stating that some considerable interval would be required before a sound analysis of these happenings could be provided. Meanwhile, he still doubted the existence of a strong and deep anti-American feeling in Formosa, or very deep Communist penetration in the island. We should know better what had happened, and why, in two or three weeks’ time.
[Page 542]The National Security Council:2
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the character of the present government in Haiti under Provisional President Fignole; and the anti-American outbreak in Taipei.
[Here follows discussion of item 2, “Basic National Security Policy”.]