Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

260. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, May 27, 1957¹

Taipei, May 27, 1957

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Madame Chiang
• Vice (Foreign) Minister Shen Chang-huan
• President’s English Secretary James Shen
• Ambassador K.L. Rankin

SUBJECT

• Rioting at American Embassy, May 24, 1957.

Yesterday afternoon at five o’clock I called on President Chiang, by appointment, at his Shih-lin Residence. Madame Chiang and Vice Minister Shen were present but took no part in the conversation except to elaborate on two or three matters of translation. The President’s English Secretary, Shen, acted as interpreter, and the conversation lasted one hour.

After the usual exchange of courtesies and inquiries about health, the President said that he felt great embarrassment and deep regret at last Friday’s (May 24) events. He had been taken completely by surprise, and he was sorry not to have been in Taipei to take action. (He and Madame Chiang had just returned from three weeks at Sun-Moon Lake.) President Chiang stated that a full investigation was under way, that I would receive a copy of the findings, and that the guilty persons would be punished. He remarked that the authorities responsible for law and order had been negligent, but added that the riot apparently was spontaneous. He hoped that Chinese-American relations would continue as friendly and close as before.

I replied that the Chinese had far better means of investigation than we, but that reports coming to me indicated a combination of spontaneity and planning. Initially the crowd at the Embassy seems to have been made up largely of middle school students. They probably intended nothing more than a peaceful demonstration. Subsequently older people, including a number of apparent organizers, went among the crowd and incited them to attack the Embassy. Reports reached me that NT$10 notes were distributed to some of the crowd to encourage them to attack.

The President said he had been told that an American press correspondent was in the crowd inciting them. I replied that I had heard the same story and would appreciate any details which the Chinese could give me. (This refers to Robert Brown, local United Press representative).

I then gave President Chiang a chronological review of Friday’s events as they had been reported to me, covering substantially the same details given in the Embassy’s telegram 1190 of May 26.² I added that I must leave it to the Chinese Government to explain why our Embassy had been left in the hands of an unarmed mob for several hours despite the large police and army resources available in the Taipei area. One possible conclusion was that the organizers of the attack had sufficient influence to prevent effective action by the police.

President Chiang assured me that this last conclusion was unfounded. Rather, there had been a failure by certain officials to accept responsibility for taking action. He added that this was an old problem, going back to Mainland days, when there was always hesitation in dealing with riots.

I replied that Americans had gained the impression that both police and troops behaved well, but that they were restrained from taking timely and effective action by orders from higher authority.

As to the Reynolds case, I told the President of the extraordinary care which General Bowen had exerted in arranging for the court martial. He fully appreciated the significance of the case and obtained legal assistance from Okinawa and Hawaii. Preparations were discussed with the Chinese military, foreign affairs, judicial and public relations authorities. The consensus of opinion was that an open court-martial should be held here in Taipei with press representatives present. While the trial was entirely in American military hands, and I was not present, I had been assured that it was well and fairly conducted. Moreover, I had read all of the results of the preliminary investigations and had concluded privately that the court could not do other than acquit Reynolds.

The President complained that he had not been consulted in the matter. Showing more agitation than at any other time during the interview, he said that an American court martial should not be held on Chinese soil; that it reminded everyone of extraterritoriality.

I replied that perhaps the President was right, but that no one else had expressed such an opinion to me. I was glad to have his views for future reference.

In conclusion, I urged that the President and his associates should give their best thoughts to early steps calculated to remedy the bad impression created by last Friday’s events. I did not presume to say what these steps should be, but might mention certain actions which would not be adequate: sacking the Chief of Police or transferring some general.

President Chiang asked me to convey to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles his profound regret and his assurance that the events of May 24 do not reflect anti-Americanism in Free China, but simply resentment at the verdict of a court martial. I said that I would do so, and asked if I might quote this message at a press conference which I would hold an hour later. The President agreed.³

Note: The present memorandum was prepared with many unavoidable interruptions. It is therefore not precise as to wording or sequence, but is believed to give a faithful account of the substance of the conversation.

1. Source: Department of State, Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84. Confidential. Drafted by Rankin.
2. See footnote 5, Document 252.
3. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1196 from Taipei, May 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.93/5–2657)