262. Letter From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the President’s Special Consultant (Nash)1
Dear Frank: Thank you for your letter of June 1.2 I share your feeling that it was much better for you and your party to have left Taipei when you did, thereby missing the excitement on the afternoon of May 24. I first learned of the riot after my return to Taipei, where I had hoped to find you at the airport. As you know, the military plane which was to have brought me earlier turned back on account of weather, and my proposal to fly direct to Manila was given up in the absence of a reply to the telegram I sent to you early on May 24.2
Apparently you are seeing our current telegrams and despatches, so I shall try not to repeat their contents here. But since you ask for an opinion on the long term outlook I shall venture a few observations.
As you know, of course, we have no military bases in Free China. The only United States tactical forces stationed here at the present time are a Matador unit and a fighter-bomber squadron, consisting of a few hundred men altogether. We have hoped to avoid any need for American ground forces on Taiwan, or for anything that could be called a “base”, except perhaps in the event of a large scale war in this area which directly involved the United States. Otherwise, [Page 543] the plan is to use Chinese facilities, which we have helped to develop under our mutual defense assistance program and which are available to us under the broad terms of our bilateral treaty, for any American tactical units which circumstances may require to be stationed here from time to time. So far this plan has worked well, rather better than in many countries where we have actual bases. Its success obviously is contingent upon good relations with the local government and people. But the value of a formal military base in a foreign country, no matter what the treaty provisions may be, is scarcely less dependent upon local relationships.
While our tactical forces in Free China are small, the remainder of the official American family here is substantial, totaling over 8000 including dependents. These belong to a variety of agencies, largely military. All American military personnel now stationed in Free China, as you may recall, enjoy the provisions of the 1951 “MAAG Agreement” which gives them diplomatic privileges and immunities. The originally approved strength of our MAAG was less than 800. No dependents came with them. Now we have about 4000 military personnel, plus a similar number of dependents. Obviously the situation is quite different from that foreseen when the MAAG was set up six years ago. And among the 75 percent or so who are not in tactical units today, Parkinson’s Law is in full operation. The same is true among United States civilian officials here, of course, although their number is measured in hundreds rather than thousands. (Combat forces, stationed abroad presumably obey some other “law”, but they are a secondary factor on Taiwan in any case.)
Our negotiations during past months for a status of forces agreement with China have established a substantial identity of views on virtually all points except that of criminal jurisdiction. The recent Reynolds’ case, and the ensuing riot on May 24, obviously have contributed nothing toward the resolution of these differences, but perhaps they have cleared the air. One of my tentative and reluctant conclusions is that an American serviceman could not be assured of a fair trial in a Chinese court. The argument can be advanced that, on the average, Chinese courts would be more lenient than American. But we do not regard one of our fellow citizens, whatever his rank, as a mere statistic. The idea is repugnant to us that even one innocent man should suffer at the hands of any court of law. If we could be sure in advance that a man was guilty as charged, and that a Chinese court would punish him no more severely than an American court, it might be a different matter. Perhaps the Girard case in Japan falls in some such category, but how can we cover this point in general agreements with foreign countries?
Frankly, I see no complete solution, particularly for a worldwide problem such as that which faces us. But there are certain remedial [Page 544] measures which can be taken now, with others to be developed in the future. One that we should start on immediately is the systematic reduction in numbers of American official personnel, military and civilian, stationed in Free China. (I exclude tactical or combat forces as involving a separate set of considerations.) Doubtless well over half of our non-combat American personnel are engaged in housekeeping of some kind. This stems in part from the normal operation of Parkinson’s Law, but also from a multiplicity of organizations and complex chains of command. Here on Taiwan we have some 15 lines of authority from agencies in Washington to their local representatives. This encourages the building of separate little empires, and some not so little.
As a corollary to the remedy just mentioned, we should use “indigenous” (unhappy word!) personnel wherever possible. Often, they actually are better, both for linguistic and other reasons, than the type of Americans available for positions of minor responsibility. There is much less turnover among them, and we need not be concerned appreciably with either their morale or their morals. In this way, plus the consolidation of duplicate housekeeping facilities and the elimination of structures which have outlived their concept, we can reduce very substantially the scope of our problem. In this process we should be able to bring about the largest reduction in precisely the categories of American personnel who most frequently get into trouble abroad.
The foregoing comments, of course, deal with only one general aspect of our governmental operations outside the United States, but I assume that your special interest lies in this field. It is an important feature of our broad effort to confront the communist menace firmly and successfully without alienating our friends abroad by what now appears to many of them as neo-colonialism.
I am sorry to have missed you in Taipei, but what we might have discussed then would have been overtaken by events.
Best regards.
Sincerely yours,