259. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
1191. Department’s 892.2 Separate telegram3 gives chronological review of May 24 riot at Embassy and USIS as well as details can be established at present. Basic causes are summarized following paragraphs, but more immediate explanations must await further investigation and establishment of facts. I am placing on Chinese authorities [Page 536] burden of proof that there was adequate excuse for leaving Embassy in hands of unarmed mob for period of several hours.
Anti-Americanism. As such, apparently remains relatively insignificant, but as elsewhere in Asia there is always undercurrent of distrust and dislike of Western influences. (Even hated Communism was importation from Europe.) Whether directed at colonial powers or white race in general, open manifestations usually are directed against Western group most in evidence. Nearly 11,000 Americans are on Taiwan most of whom ride about in new cars, enjoy various special privileges and living standards which seem very high to Chinese. These Americans occupy themselves with almost every phase of Chinese life on scale scarcely less extensive than colonial powers in their colonies. (There are said to be many more American civilian officials on Taiwan today, for example, than in Philippines when it was US possession.) Working and personal relationships have been surprisingly good, but latent resentment at above circumstances doubtless responsible in part for events of May 24.
Another anti-Western aspect is that present GRC Cabinet largely made up of Western-educated Chinese who are ipso facto regarded with suspicion by many if not most of old school. Premier, Foreign Minister and Economic Minister in particular under fire recently, ostensibly for their support of US and other foreign interests. Reynolds case offered exceptional opportunity to discredit them and prepare way for cabinet along more traditional lines, possibly including old time military figures.
Frustration. Whether expressed in terms of morale, confidence or otherwise, people of Free China are uncertain of their future and suffer from “pawn complex” lest their eventual fate be decided by others, perhaps behind their backs. Sense of frustration would explain in part outbursts in which they demonstrate their independence, temporarily at least, and their dissatisfaction with things as they are.
Status of Forces. Prolonged delay in concluding US–GRC Status of Forces agreement, together with extensive press coverage of Girard case in Japan have contributed to public awareness here that US forces in Free China at present enjoy diplomatic immunity of unusual character. Particularly unfortunate but unavoidable that Reynolds case, first such US court martial in Taiwan, should have come up just now.
Nationalism. Victim of shooting, Liu, was connected official Institute of Revolutionary Practice, albeit in minor capacity. Purpose this institution is to develop national or “revolutionary” spirit which is praiseworthy to a degree but can lead some people to excesses in crisis. Fact that this institution receives no direct benefit from US aid programs and presumably considers US policy toward China as woefully [Page 537] inadequate could be expected to reinforce resentment over present case. No reliable evidence produced as yet but certain members this institution may have made preparations in advance to exploit verdict of court martial. Some preliminary work apparently done also among youth corps (again strongly nationalist) students of middle schools who swelled numbers of mob at early stage. When mob found police few in numbers and apparently instructed not to fire, situation was exploited but seemingly with care that no Americans too seriously injured. Perhaps promoters of demonstration did not foresee its eventual scope; it simply got out of hand. Police reportedly had instructions protect life (US and Chinese) rather than US property.
Indecision. Absence of serious public disturbances past several years, and anxiety that February 1947 episode4 should not be repeated, offer only legitimate, if entirely inadequate, explanation for not using larger police force initially (apparently never more than about 20 in Embassy compound during actual rioting), for reported instructions that police must avoid use of arms, and for delay in [of?] several hours in ordering out troops.
Tentative conclusion is that taking advantage of differences in US-Chinese legal conceptions, and in anticipation of not guilty verdict, certain persons with some influence and connections prepared for demonstration at Embassy. Situation developed in manner to encourage exploitation, for which they had also prepared. To this extent it was professional affair although no evidence so far that looting Embassy for classified material or valuables was part of plan. After Embassy was thoroughly wrecked, large part of mob went on to repeat process at USIS, then turned attention to nearest MAAG (“sugar”) building which was saved only by arrival of rifle company from Chinese Army. Order restored everywhere around 9 in evening by which time large numbers troops patrolling streets.
I am seeing President Chiang at 5 pm today.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 121.93/5–2657. Confidential. Repeated for information to Tokyo, Manila, the Departments of the Army and Air Force, and CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 892 to Taipei, May 24, summarized the conversation between Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador Tong on May 24; see Document 255. Telegram 892 concluded with an instruction to the Embassy to provide an “estimate basic causes this unexpected violence and full report actions and attitude Chinese Government officials in situation”. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.93/5–2457)↩
- See footnote 5, Document 252.↩
- Apparent reference to the riots which took place in Taiwan in February–March 1947. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, pp. 423–455.↩