258. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

SUBJECT

  • Mob Attack on U.S. Embassy and USIS in Taipei: Tentative General Conclusions.

Based on preliminary and as yet incomplete information, we have reached the following tentative conclusions about the mob attack of May 24 on the U.S. Embassy and USIS in Taipei:

1.
The riots showed evidences of prior planning. Although the crowds were large, the actual damage seems for the most part to have been done by small groups of rioters who acted as if in accordance with a pre-arranged plan. These had prepared themselves with slogans which were mounted on the Embassy premises. The entire incident began with the appearance of the widow of Liu Tzu-jan (wife of the man Sergeant Reynolds killed) in front of the Embassy with a placard written in both English and Chinese. Also in the attack on the USIS building, the riot was led by a small group of students who apparently were responsible for most of the damage done. While the destruction was deliberate and premeditated, there is as of now no definite evidence of an intent to exploit it for intelligence purposes, although some of the classified documents from the safes which were broken open may have been picked up and retained by unauthorized persons.
2.
There are some indications that the law enforcement authorities were either grossly negligent and inefficient or acted in collusion with the rioters. Although there were many police in the neighborhood of the Embassy at the time the attack took place, they failed to take effective action to control the riot. The riot was allowed to run its course before being finally brought under control that evening by troops. Furthermore, while taking no effective action to protect American property, the police did seem most anxious that no serious bodily harm should be done the persons of Americans. Another indication [Page 535] of collusion or gross inefficiency is the fact that although the Embassy appealed for greater police protection as soon as the situation seemed threatening, and although the Chargé spent most of the afternoon at the Foreign Ministry seeking protection for the Embassy, nothing effective was done by the Chinese authorities until that evening, many hours after the riots had taken a serious turn.
3.
It is too early as yet to hazard an opinion as to possible motives for staging such an incident. The Embassy in Taipei has been asked for a full report and evaluation.2 When that is received, it should be possible to make a judgment on this matter. However, of the various possibilities that suggest themselves, that of Communist inspiration seems the least likely. So far no suggestion has been made—even by Chinese sources—that the Communists may have been behind the affair.

Regardless of the eventual judgment, it is a shock to us that an anti-American manifestation of such magnitude and violence should come to pass in Taipei. It was not fore-shadowed in any report we have seen from any of the numerous U.S. Government reporting agencies on Taiwan.

It is disappointing that the Chinese Government met the challenge with relative passivity, and that no public expression of regret has come from a source higher than the Foreign Minister.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–2657. Confidential. Drafted in CA by McConaughy and Bennett.
  2. See infra.