257. Paper Prepared by the Counselor of Embassy in the Republic of China (Pikher)1
Statement by James B. Pilcher Regarding His Visits to the Foreign Office on May 24, 1957 in Connection with the Reynolds Case and Mob Action at the Embassy.
The Embassy had been confidentially informed on May 23, 1957 that on May 24, 1957 the Chinese Military would conduct three surprise air raid exercises in which paratroops would be dropped and street traffic stopped. To avoid the first exercise I arrived at the Embassy before 7:00 a.m.
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. the Chief of Protocol informed me that the Foreign Minister wished to see me at 10:30 a.m. I told Mr. Wang that I would be in an important meeting at TDC at that time but that I would come immediately or as soon after eleven o’clock as possible. He called me back a few minutes later and requested that I come immediately.
Before leaving the Embassy I called a four o’clock meeting of representatives of several U.S. agencies to discuss the developments in the Reynolds case and the U.S. Government’s position.
Upon arrival the Minister stated that he wished to discuss the verdict in the Reynolds case and the Chinese public resentment towards it. He inquired whether and under what circumstance there could be a retrial of the case. I replied that I had to plead ignorant of the juridical procedures under our Unified Code of Justice but that I would look into the matter and report to him later in the day.
I went directly from the Foreign Office to TDC where I arrived at 10.00 a.m. for a joint conference with Mr. Frank Nash, Consultant to the President, and his group. I remained in this meeting until [Page 532] almost a quarter to one o’clock. Before the meeting adjourned I was called to the phone a couple of times. Mr. Meyer, the Political Counselor told me that widow of the Chinese Sgt. Reynolds shot was outside the Embassy gate, and crowds were beginning to gather.
I went to the Grand Hotel with a part of the Nash group for a brief lunch and immediately upon arrival put in a call to the Foreign Minister, who was out for lunch. Before I had finished lunch Mr. Prescott, Second Secretary in the Political Section, came to the hotel, and reported that the situation at the Embassy was getting worse. I excused myself from lunch, and proceeded to the Foreign Office, stopping for a few moments en route at my residence, where two or three Embassy officers had gathered.
I arrived at the Foreign Office a little before or around 2:00 p.m. and went directly to the Minister’s office where I requested to see the Minister immediately. Mr. Hsu Shao-Chang, Director of the Department of American Affairs, was called and invited me into the Foreign Minister’s private office. I remained there for almost four hours.
I was told the Minister would be over immediately but before he arrived Vice Minister Chou joined Mr. Hsu and me. I told them that I demanded full and adequate protection to American lives and property in Taipei. I told them the situation at the Embassy was getting out of hand and overstepped the bounds of propriety by suggesting the use of fire hoses and tear gas. I told them the police protection there was inadequate.
The Minister arrived around two fifteen. There were no niceties. I rose and stated this visit grieved me and that the U.S. Government demanded immediate assistance at the Embassy. By that time Embassy officers had learned I was at the Foreign Office and began to report to me, there in the Minister’s office, the terrible developments. I pleaded that the situation was desperate and that we had to have help immediately. The Minister said he saw no way out but to call out the troops. This decision was reached after a few minutes. I replied that we wanted whatever was required to protect American lives and property.
The Minister began to put in phone calls. He called General Peng,2 Admiral Ma,3 and others. Reports to me by phone were more frequent. In fact I supplied the Foreign Office most of its intelligence information on the situation at the Embassy for four hours. I told the Minister that the mob was in the Embassy destroying it, and that some American officers and clerks were trapped in the air-raid shelter and that I was afraid the building would be set on fire and [Page 533] the shelter become a crematorium. I asked that fire trucks be sent. This was checked by Mr. Hsu who reported they were already there. At this point I began to relay names of our staff at the Embassy.
The Minister stated that he had to go to the Legislature to a committee hearing on the Reynolds case. He invited me to remain until his return.
I remained in the Foreign Minister’s office with the Vice Minister and Mr. Hsu both of whom came and went. I received more reports on the Minister’s phones. Probably few Chargés have usurped a Foreign Minister’s office for so long.
The Minister returned within about an hour. I reported to him that Sgt. Reynolds and family had left Taiwan at 1:30 p.m. I gave him the names of the persons in the air-raid shelter and of those for whom we could not account. The Minister made many telephone calls and spoke the names in English I had given him. He sent Foreign Office personnel to the scene and to the Taiwan Provincial Government hospital from where one of our officers had phoned me. The officer was with the group who escaped from the air-raid shelter. All could not be accounted for.
My residence, and until 5 p.m., the USIS office were used as clearing houses for information and reports relayed to me as received.
The Minister took a personal interest in accounting for individuals and was particularly concerned about the Political Counselor. We then learned of the attack on the USIS building.
By six o’clock we had accounted for all who were thought to have been in the Embassy at the lunch hour. (Messrs. Bonner and O’Grady4 returned from lunch and were hidden by police in an Embassy garage. It was some time later before they were accounted for.)
At various times during the four-hour period I discussed with the Minister, the Vice Minister and Mr. Hsu Chinese responsibility for this outrage. I told them the hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars damage was insignificant to the damage to US/GRC relations and the prestige to GRC in the Free World. They were obviously embarrassed and well aware of the consequences.
About six o’clock I expressed a desire to return to my residence. The Minister said my car had been placed in the Foreign Office garage as crowds were out in front. The Minister escorted me to the front door, my car was brought, and a police escort was ready. He asked me to return to the building. My car was put back in the garage. I was escorted out the back door and was taken to my residence in a closed jeep.
Shortly after I arrived home, where I found several Embassy staff members, the Ambassador called from the airport. I relayed [Page 534] briefly some of the developments. He had already learned much from the U.S. Naval Attaché who was at the airport to meet the new Naval Attaché. The Ambassador stated that he was going directly to the Foreign Office. From that point on the situation was in his hands.
- Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Riots in Taipei—Course of Events. Official Use Only. Pilcher had been Chargé in Ambassador Rankin’s absence at the time of the riots.↩
- General Peng Meng-chi, Chief of the General Staff.↩
- Admiral Ma Chi-chuang, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of National Defense.↩
- Henry S. Bonner, political officer, and Gerald D. O’Grady, Jr., attaché.↩