Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

25. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State ¹

Geneva , August 16, 1955—10 p.m.

500. Believe following are among considerations in planning our next moves:

1. Do not believe we should minimize importance ChiCom devotion to “legal forms” in spite their agility in adopting their forms to suit their political needs. It will be seen from today’s meeting as well as previous I have tried hard to leave them a “legal” way out and believe this should be continued.

2. Also believe they now consider flyer release was probably tactical mistake that has largely backfired on them rather than producing hoped-for results. This has not increased standing Peiping proponents of release of American prisoners.

3. Possible additional factor is suspicion from our tactics we have been trying trick them into releasing Americans while holding out bait third party representation which we intended find excuses for withdrawing after release accomplished. Our proposal today will have removed any doubts they may have had this regard.

Believe present tactic can be continued for little while longer particularly at Thursday’s meeting when Wang will have had opportunity receive Peiping reaction our today’s proposal. Now believe we should if possible avoid any prolonged recess which would require public explanation and inevitably return problem to public propaganda forum while Americans remained in prison. Therefore believe that I should strive as necessary keep discussion going while continuing maintain my present position.

In order accomplish these purposes and in light today’s discussion, request authorization propose at next meeting amendment first sentence numbered paragraph 1 draft “agreed announcement” (mytel 463²) by insertion phrase “as a result of official action taken in accordance with its governmental processes” following words “and declares that”. Same amendment to be made in paragraph one PRC section.³

Would appreciate any other suggestions Department may have in this regard.

I do not anticipate Wang is going to attempt precipitate any “break” in discussions but rather that he will face me with statement they have gone as far as they can go and there is nothing further to talk about under item one.

At that point I perceive no alternative under our present tactic except to propose a recess as suggested in first paragraph Deptel 496.⁴ However I believe that to publicly explain the recess I should first propose to Wang we make a simple joint statement somewhat to the effect that two of us have decided that a recess would be helpful in resolving the remaining problems standing in the way of final agreement. I feel we should if possible avoid unilateral public statement along lines suggested Deptel 496 as seems to me this would constitute a public challenge and return problem to propaganda forum.⁵

Dept will observe Wang pressed me hard today on question raised last para mytel 458⁶ and my efforts avoid direct reply. Would appreciate Dept’s suggestions on what further I might usefully say if as anticipated he continues press me on this.⁷

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. See footnote 3, supra .
3. Telegram 542 to Geneva, August 17, approved by Dulles, authorized Johnson to propose these amendments. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1755)
4. Telegram 496 to Geneva, August 15, drafted by Dulles, instructed Johnson that if a break in the talks was threatened over the first agenda item, he should suggest a recess of approximately 2 weeks to permit the Chinese Communists to complete their investigation of certain American cases, informing Wang that when they recessed the United States would state publicly its willingness to make a joint declaration along the lines Johnson had proposed. (Ibid., 611.93/8–1555)
5. Telegram 542 to Geneva, cited in footnote 3 above, instructed Johnson that he should propose a recess only in case of a threatened break and stated that the instructions in telegram 496 to Geneva, cited in footnote 4 above, were designed to enable him to demonstrate the strength of the U.S. position from a public relations standpoint, on the assumption that this would probably make Wang try to avoid a recess. (Ibid., 611.93/8–1755)
6. Johnson commented in telegram 458 from Geneva, August 13 (see footnote 2, Document 22), that he had always assumed that the United States could not and would not agree to the blanket return of any Chinese who might have committed crimes but that he had been taking maximum advantage of the fact that the Department knew of no Chinese under arrest who wished to return. He asked to be informed if the United States was willing and able to assure the departure, even for a limited time, of any Chinese, regardless of any crimes they might have committed.
7. Telegram 541 to Geneva, August 17, informed Johnson that the Department was unable to help him on this point and commented that the question had “difficult constitutional, administrative and political ramifications.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655)