Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

22. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 13, 1955—9 p.m.

457. Developments at today’s meeting show that our tactics of keeping representation arrangement as bait for release Americans has paid dividends. (I carefully avoided at today’s meeting asking “how many” as such a question could not have been put without weakening stand on release of all.)

Question we now clearly face is whether we can or should pursue this tactic further.

We all have strong impression from today’s meeting that it will not be possible further to advance position we have gained without great difficulty and much time.

Question therefore is what approach is going to get most Americans out in shortest time. Related to this is question whether we are justified in taking action which will result those Americans whose release we can now obtain remaining in prison because we strive to obtain simultaneous release larger number or all of them. I refrain from commenting on coldblooded attitude ChiComs which has brought about this situation but simply say it is fact we must face in dealing with these people however distasteful it may be.

We have carefully discussed among ourselves all aspects problem and have come conclusion that course in best overall interests detained Americans is to reach some agreement on representation at present point.

• First we strongly feel that I would not in forseeable future be able to move Chinese off of legalistic approach to individual American cases. They are not going take simultaneous action on cases all Americans which would jeopardize their ability maintain public pretense action is result workings “justice”. I have tried hard avoid backing them into comer where they could not do this and believe any other course would only indefinitely delay release of any Americans regardless strength Chinese desire get ahead to item two.
• Second we believe that after release of first group we will be able maintain steady pressure for release of remainder during course talks on “other practical matters”. ChiComs obviously very anxious get to “other practical matters” and while they will want much we not able give believe we should be able play hand so as to continue pressure for release. I now have commitment for “review” all cases including Downey and Fecteau and can take maximum advantage all opportunities exploit this. Of course ChiComs could continue hold remaining prisoners for further bargaining but they may well estimate prisoners are diminishing asset and I do not exclude possibility of fairly prompt release remainder. Of course, before agreeing proceed second agenda item we would reserve right revert agenda item one as long as any Americans detained.
• Third, they have come so far on substance our representation proposal that it is difficult maintain further discussion this except in context straight trade for release Americans. In fact this point virtually reached at today’s meeting. In this connection believe it helpful recall that original concept before these talks was that agreeing to representation proposal would assist in obtaining release Americans. I undertook tactic use as bait obtain release some Americans and avoid anticipated ChiCom tactic of asserting agenda item one completed with agreement on representation. Believe it would be mistake now to extend this tactic to point of making release all Americans price of representation agreement.

If Dept agrees with foregoing position it will be very important that at Tuesday’s meeting I have the maximum discretion Dept is willing to give me and instructions on our minimum positions on points at issue.

I would plan at Tuesday’s meeting to present Wang with a draft of simultaneous unilateral statements to be issued by joint agreement accordance our agreement on private nature these talks. (See following tel for text.)²

For best bargaining position I would require considerable discretion exact language we would be willing accept so that I can press him for agreement and reach firm as possible understandings. Possibility should not be excluded he willing reach immediate agreement and make statement public.

I do not believe I should be in position of asking him how many they are releasing before entering into agreement on representation, or being required to haggle over numbers or in any way ever to imply that we are satisfied with anything other than release of all. Do not believe I should go any further toward bald position of bargaining representation agreement against Americans.

I will also require instructions on our minimum position on enlarging scope of representation proposal to include governmental inquiries or inquiries from families. There were some indications at today’s meeting Wang may be prepared recede on this point and I will of course press hard on it. However if we are willing to concede in any way (and I believe we should for reasons set forth my tel 364³) it would be of maximum bargaining use to me at Tuesday’s meeting.

If Dept does not accept foregoing general approach situation is such I do not at moment see any alternative for Tuesday’s meeting other than asking him for numbers of Americans they prepared now to release (which I think undesirable for reasons stated above), indicate number is unsatisfactory, and recess talks, at least on item one, until they have “completed review” of more or all cases (I would have to indicate which) and we would then have to be prepared on that position.

Will remain Hotel du Rhone tomorrow from 2 p.m. in event Dept believes any phone discussion possible or desirable.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1355. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. The draft “agreed announcement”, which Johnson transmitted in telegram 458 from Geneva, August 13, states that the American and PRC Ambassadors had “agreed to announce the measures which their respective Governments have adopted with respect to return of nationals of each located in country of other” and set forth statements, identical in substance, to be made by each Ambassador. The proposed U.S. statement reads as follows:

   • “1. USA recognizes that Chinese nationals in US who desire return to PRC are entitled do so and declares that no Chinese national who desires depart US for PRC is being prevented from doing so. This includes all those Chinese nationals who were at one time prevented from departing US.
   • “2. Embassy of Republic of India in US will be authorized assist return to PRC of those Chinese nationals who desire to do so as follows:
     • “(a) If a Chinese national believes that contrary to declared policy of US he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform Indian Embassy and Indian Embassy will, if it deems such complaint valid and if desired by PRC, intervene on such national’s behalf with Government of US.
     • “(b) If a Chinese national in US who desires to return to PRC has difficulty paying return journey, Indian Embassy may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.
   • “3. Government of US will give wide publicity to foregoing arrangements and Embassy of India in US may also do so.”

   Johnson commented that Wang would almost certainly reject the statement on the ground that his government was not yet prepared to state that all Americans, including those who had been detained, were free to leave and suggested that he be authorized to accept, if necessary, a substitute paragraph 1 along the following lines:

   “PRC recognizes that American nationals in PRC who desire return to US are entitled do so and declares that aside from those American nationals previously prevented from leaving PRC whose release has just been announced PRC has undertaken speedily review cases all remaining Americans whose departure being prevented by reason of imprisonment or otherwise and promptly settle these cases in spirit of foregoing declaration of policy.”

3. See footnote 2, Document 15.