Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

24. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 16, 1955—5 p.m.

490. As stated my 485² no visible progress made today on fundamental issue of return of Americans. Wang stuck firmly to his previous position on cases being reviewed and we would promptly be informed results those completed. He raised no objections to form our draft agreed announcement (mytel 463³) and confined objections to para one, pressing for substitution para one his draft⁴ and for broadening scope para 2 (a) to include inquiries initiated by respective governments. Only other point was substitution “China” for “China mainland” to which I countered with substitution by People’s Republic of China to which he made no definite reply. However he reserved right further comment.

I again argued against broadening scope para 2 (a) as unnecessary and pointed out direct mention of and discretion given PRC our draft that para. Discussion this point inconclusive.

However discussion centered around two versions para one with much talk from Wang about international law, sovereignty, extraterritoriality, jurisdiction over foreigners, attempt by US establish principle Americans not subject PRC law, reciprocal and bilateral nature their para one which recognizes US jurisdiction over Chinese in US, they not asking us exempt from US jurisdiction Chinese in US involved in crimes or having unsettled debts, why should we ask them do so for Americans in China etc.

In reply I disclaimed intention raise theoretical questions jurisdiction. Our para one dealt with practical situation and we asked them say no more than we said ourselves. Said I recognized their desire handle matter within framework their law, para one our draft specifically designed enable them to do so, was not something imposed but simply statement what each government decided do within framework its sovereignty and laws. Chou’s statement before talks led me believe would promptly and easily be done with respect Americans. Puzzlement at time thus far consumed with no results whatever on Americans. All I had were vague statements cases being “reviewed”. Simultaneous release of flyers who had received varying sentences pointed up what could be done when they wanted to (he had previously alluded to flyers) etc. In reply my specific questions as to what he objected in para one our draft he indicated might be acceptable if second sentence first para his draft added. I immediately rejected pointing out that as far as Americans in China concerned this took away [garble]⁵ two sentences our draft and still left Americans where they were when these talks started. Said I held no brief for exact wording our para one, what I was interested in was substance which I considered vital. Willing consider any wording he might suggest with same substance. At end long discussion these lines both tacitly agreed neither had anything more to say and agreed meet Thursday with usual fencing as to who was going to do most thinking over subject during interim.

At close this phase he said wished “raise another point” and brought up “propaganda campaign” which had been “launched in order slander Chinese people” etc. Since beginning talks PRC “has repeatedly made clear its conciliatory attitude”. Questions “mistreatment” raised. PRC could “endlessly recount miserable treatment” captured Chinese in Korea, campaign was having “adverse effects” talks here etc. I had clear feeling he had received specific instructions make statement and that he was somewhat reluctant do so. I deliberately showed anger and curtly replied I did not understand his motive in raising [this point?]. Accounts I had seen were factual interviews with men released.⁶ Our free press accounts not unique, almost all released have told similar accounts. Fault was not with accounts but with treatment that gave rise to accounts. These reports had raised anxiety in US over Americans in China and made it all more important find early resolution to problem. He was somewhat taken aback and endeavored smooth atmosphere before we left.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Confidential; Priority.
2. Johnson gave a brief, preliminary report in telegram 485 from Geneva, August 16, on his meeting that morning with Wang. (Ibid., 611.93/8–1155)

3. In telegram 463 from Geneva, August 15, Johnson transmitted the text of the draft agreed announcement which he planned to give Wang the next day. It was identical to the draft which he had proposed to the Department on August 13 (see footnote 2, Document 22) except for revisions made in accordance with telegram 495, supra. In the proposed U.S. statement, numbered paragraph 1 reads as follows:

   “USA recognizes that Chinese nationals in US who desire return to China mainland are now entitled do so and declares that no Chinese national who desires depart US for China mainland is now being prevented from doing so. This includes all those Chinese nationals who were at one time prevented from departing US.”

   Paragraph 2(a) reads as follows:

   “If a Chinese national believes that contrary to declared policy of US he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform Indian Embassy and Indian Embassy may, if desired by PRC, investigate facts and intervene on such national’s behalf with Government of US.”

   “China mainland” had been substituted for “PRC” in every case in which it signified location. (Ibid., 611.93/8–1555)

4. Proposed by Wang on August 11; see Document 16.

5. Johnson’s detailed report of the meeting, which he sent in telegram 499 from Geneva, August 16, reads at this point as follows:

   “I pointed out second sentence his paragraph took away from American nationals everything granted them in rest of paragraph since American nationals prevented from departing China were described by him as involved in crimes or civil cases.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655)

6. Dulles commented in telegram 526 to Geneva, August 16, marked “Personal for Johnson from Secretary”, that he had the impression that the Chinese had intended to announce the release of the U.S. civilians promptly, expecting that this would create a wave of good feeling toward them, but that they had altered this policy because reports of their treatment of the fliers had created a wave of indignation. The message continues:

   “ChiComs should realize that whenever prisoners are returned there is inevitably initial wave of resentment as they tell their stories. This is a phase which ChiComs must live through and they do not get anywhere by postponing it. However, once the American civilians are out of China, then we may be compelled to alter our policy toward visitors to the China mainland because principal reason for deterring those visitors will have ceased, namely that we do not want more Americans to get in until it has been demonstrated that those now there can get out. Subject to possible restraint of Foreign Assets Control Regulations visits will then occur which would bring back reports which if facts justify may lead to a different judgment. I do not know whether ChiComs realize this possible sequence of events or whether you will want to intimate it to them in a very cautious way without of course any promises. In any event, it may be useful for you to know my thinking on this matter.” (Ibid., 611.93/8–1655)