Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

225. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, December 19, 1956—7:08 p.m.

1446. Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister Suhrawardy. Confirm date and time delivery. Signed original to follow.

“December 19, 1956

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message of December 11² transmitted to me by Ambassador Hildreth.

I share your strong desire to bring about harmony among nations and contribute to a lasting peace. It was in this spirit that in mid-1955 we undertook conversations with the Chinese Communists at Geneva. Although those talks have not borne out our hopes, they are continuing and we intend to persevere. Under present circumstances we are convinced that the Ambassadorial level is more appropriate than the Foreign Minister level for this limited negotiation with the Chinese Communists. The matters under discussion can be dealt with adequately by the fully empowered Ambassadors who are meeting regularly at Geneva, if the Chinese Communists have any desire to reach a reasonable agreement on these matters. Since they have so far not demonstrated such a desire we do not consider that raising the level of the talks would improve the prospects of agreement.

We cannot alter our opposition to Chinese Communist entry into the United Nations simply on the basis of Chinese Communist pretenses of good will and in the absence of concrete actions which would demonstrate without question that their policies and practices have changed since the United Nations declared them aggressors in Korea. The seating of Communist China in the United Nations under present circumstances, would, in my opinion, gravely imperil the progress which has been made in strengthening the independence of the free countries of Asia, violate the provisions of the Charter as to membership, and strike a serious blow at the vital interests of our ally, the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

With regard to the ten American civilians (all reputable persons held on political charges) who are still wrongfully imprisoned in Communist China, we consider that they should all have been released long ago. The Chinese Communists declared in the Agreed Announcement of September 10, 1955 that ‘Americans in the People’s Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so’ and further promised to ‘adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return’. This pledge was not qualified in any way and was clearly understood to apply to the Americans in jail, for these were the very persons on whose behalf we were negotiating. We have never been concerned in the Geneva talks with Chinese Communist legal processes and the question of whether or not some of the Americans had been ‘convicted’. Our concern—referred to by Chou En-lai as ‘haggling’ and ‘dragging out the talks’—was and continues to be to bring the Chinese Communists to fulfill their public commitment to free all of the imprisoned Americans.

With respect to Chinese in the United States, I can assure you that no Chinese is prevented from leaving this country. We issued a public appeal for anyone who knew of a Chinese being prevented from leaving to bring it to the Government’s attention. No one has done so. Moreover, we made arrangements for the American National Red Cross to interview personally all Chinese aliens in Federal and state prisons in this country in order to ascertain which of them desired to go to Communist China. There were some thirty such prisoners, all common criminals serving terms for various crimes such as traffic in narcotics or homicide. Only one chose to go to Communist China in preference to completing his sentence. He was deported there through Hong Kong on October 29.

Our experience with the Chinese Communist refusal to fulfill their pledge to release American civilians does not encourage us to rely on any other pledges they might give in the future. Nevertheless, we are pressing them at Geneva to recognize that the serious issue with us regarding the Taiwan area should not lead to armed conflict. We seek an unqualified renunciation of the use of force, which they adamantly refuse to give. The continued assertion by the Chinese Communists that they are entitled to attack Taiwan if it is not surrendered to them, coupled with the standing Chinese Communist threat to the Republic of Korea and all Southeast Asia, is a continuing source of instability in the area and a chronic threat to the peace. The disturbing Chinese Communist buildup of its aggressive capabilities in the South China area is a cause for grave concern. Were the Chinese Communist threat of force demonstrably removed, the conferees at Geneva could proceed to the discussion of other practical matters at issue.

I wish to thank you for your interest and to utilize this opportunity to convey to you personally my appreciation for the constructive actions which you and your government have taken in connection with this and other critical international problems which have arisen during recent months. We are aware of your staunch defense of free world interests during your visit to Peiping. Your position on the Hungarian and Middle Eastern crises³ again demonstrated the adherence of Pakistan to the principles of freedom and justice. Pakistan’s posture in foreign affairs, like that of the United States, is independently established in consideration of its own interests. We Americans are proud that Pakistan has determined that its interests and our own lie in the same direction, so that we may pursue parallel courses in so many important fields toward the achievement of our goals. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower”.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1956. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted in S/S and approved for transmission by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Joseph N. Greene, Jr. A note on a December 19 memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, covering a draft of the message, indicates that the President approved the message on December 19, with the single deletion noted in footnote 3 below. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)
2. Transmitted in Document 220.
3. The draft of the message conveyed to President Eisenhower on December 19 contained at this point the phrase “and your effective efforts to strengthen the Baghdad Pact”. Eisenhower marked the phrase in brackets and indicated that it should be reconsidered by Dulles. The phrase was subsequently deleted.