Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

220. Telegram From the Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State¹

Karachi, December 12, 1956—3 p.m.

1643. Summoned by Prime Minister last evening. He gave me message to President Eisenhower dated December 11, set forth below which he requested cabled. Verbatim text (unnecessary words omitted).

My dear Mister President, during my visit Peking last month, I had several talks with Premier Chou En-lai as well as chairman Mao Tse-tung in course of which I explained my government’s views on wide range subjects including Kashmir question, Bandung conference, defensive nature Pakistan’s alliances and threat of direct or indirect aggression .… Chinese leaders expressed views on most of subjects .… They reaffirmed their belief in principles of peaceful coexistence and reiterated desire for, and offer of, a collective security pact embracing all Asian nations.

2. Sino-American relations also constituted an important topic of our discussion. Chou told me China had constantly been striving find practicable and feasible means of settling her disputes with US. Complained that US side deliberately dragged out Geneva talks and refused enter into any agreement on means of relaxing and eliminating tension in Far East.

3. On question of return of US nationals from China, Chou repeated accusation that United States has been continually haggling over implementation of Geneva agreement and of violating it by failing furnish China with complete list of names Chinese nationals under detention and those who are being prevented from returning China. So far as I understand position it is that Geneva agreement contemplated release those prisoners who were under detention and had not been convicted in accordance with legal process and that to circumvent agreement Chinese rapidly secured conviction eight Americans under detention. Hence your government regard Chinese as guilty of breach faith. In regard to Chinese on list, I understand there are no Chinese nationals under detention who are eligible for release and no Chinese nationals who have been prevented from returning to China. I should be grateful if you would be good enough let me know whether this correct and whether there is any further information you could give me to enable me discuss this matter further with Chou.

4. Chou also criticised US embargo on exports to China.

5. Chinese premier also blamed United States for latter’s failure accept principle of renunciation of force. Chou emphasised that his government could never agree to two Chinas. He said the root cause of tension was US armed occupation of such Chinese territories as Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu. He alleged Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macao were being used by Kuomintang for disruptive activities against Chinese mainland. He referred to 800 American “bases” Japan, Philippines and Siam. He said tension this area could not be relaxed unless there was change in United States policy.

6. Chou finally pleaded: “We would ask you to tell your American friends that we want to be friendly with them. We are prepared to negotiate and extend our hand of friendship. Please see if you cannot bring about an understanding between us.” He said he was prepared to go even to United States if that would help in furthering cause of peace.

7. Although we are fully aware your government’s views, as elaborated in US State Department declaration January 21, 1956,² on Chinese allegations cited in paragraphs 2–5 above, I, nevertheless, think you would be interested to know view of Chinese leaders as expressed to me. My personal impression is that Peking would be prepared release remaining American prisoners if there is some indication from your side that US Government would be willing have a Foreign Ministers’ conference as suggested by Chinese Communists at ambassadorial level talks in Geneva. As you know our government has in past years voted in favour of US resolution for postponement of question of Chinese representation in UN. There can be no doubt that, having recognized Central People’s Government of China, we cannot but concede that it is entitled to represent China in UN. Continued elimination of China from UN is not only unrealistic but is unfortunately being used as an instrument of propaganda against US and her allies. This propaganda making considerable headway against our common interests, specially in Asia. In my opinion it would take away increasing bitterness from this propaganda if American public opinion could be persuaded agree abstain from opposing admission of Communist China into UN.

8. You also probably know that Chinese Prime Minister will be visiting Pakistan on 20 December, 1956 for about ten days. His visit would afford me further opportunities of exchanging views with him. If we could be of any use to your government in breaking deadlock caused by failure of Sino-American negotiations held Geneva, we would be glad to help. I am sure your government, like ours, would welcome every opportunity which could fruitfully be used for promoting cause of world peace and to bring harmony among nations.

With assurances of my highest consideration, yours sincerely, (H.S. Suhrawardy).

End verbatim text.

Embassy comment: From Foreign Secretary Baig, I learned several days ago that above message had been prepared by Foreign Office immediately following return of Prime Minister from China October 29 but Prime Minister so swamped message had stayed on his desk. Foreign Office jumped him on this yesterday immediately on his return from week’s visit to east Pakistan because Foreign Office wanted GOP to be in position to tell Chou En-lai when he arrives here that message had been delivered as agreed. Foreign Office also afraid Chou had told Nehru about GOP agreement deliver this message while Chou had been in Delhi in recent days and Foreign Office afraid Nehru might mention it to President Eisenhower. This accounts for request that message be cabled. Original signed message being pouched (Embassy despatch 387³).

Regarding Suhrawardy’s evident desire continue with Chou discussion of US–Chicom issues Department will recall he expressed complete agreement US position re prisoners (Embtel No. 1062⁴). Furthermore, Suhrawardy can be under no misapprehensions re US wishes that he not intercede with Chicoms on these issues. Pursuant instruction Deptel 835⁵ Ambassador and Counselor made this point very clear as reported Embtel 1062.

Obviously Suhrawardy wishes attempt replace Nehru as intermediary between Chou and US and in conversation said Chou told him he Chou mistrusted both Nehru and Nehru’s influence with US Government and felt he Suhrawardy could [have?] more influence with US Government than Nehru.

Since Chou’s visit begins December 20 request guidance before that date on nature reply to Suhrawardy, with special reference paragraphs 3 and 8 his letter; Suhrawardy obviously inclined to play mediator, despite discouragement passed on to him pursuant Deptel 835.

Hildreth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1256. Secret; Priority.
2. See Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1956, pp. 164–166.
3. Despatch 387 from Karachi, December 12, transmitted to the Department the original text and four copies of Prime Minister Suhrawardy’s December 11 letter to President Eisenhower. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/12–1256) The signed original of the letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.
4. In telegram 1062 from Karachi, October 15, Ambassador Hildreth reported that he had reviewed with Prime Minister Suhrawardy various U.S. positions with respect to China prior to Suhrawardy’s scheduled trip to China. The Prime Minister agreed, inter alia, that there could be no quid pro quo for the release of American prisoners held in China. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.90D93/10–1556)
5. In telegram 835 to Karachi, October 10, the Department instructed the Embassy to brief Prime Minister Suhrawardy on the attitude of the United States with respect to China prior to the Prime Minister’s visit to China. The Embassy was instructed to avoid giving Suhrawardy the impression that the United States wanted him to intercede on its behalf in Peking. (Ibid., 033.90D93/10–1056)