Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

224. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, December 18, 1956, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, December 18, 1956, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

• Admiral Radford
• Minister of Defense Nationalist China Yu Ta-Wei
• Lt. General S. L. Ho, Chief of the Military Staff of the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations
• Rear Admiral Griffin

After normal amenities, Minister Yu Ta-Wei stated that he had seen Admiral Burke, General Twining and Secretary Quarles. He had hoped also to see General Taylor but had been unable to because General Taylor had been ill. The Minister said that he would like to give the Admiral a round-up of the Nationalist China military situation, that he hoped to see General Taylor, and would report further to Admiral Radford after this meeting.

Minister Yu gave the following summary report of the readiness of the Chinese Nationalist forces:

Army. 21 divisions are in an advanced state of training and have been combat-ready since 31 October 1956. From the logistical viewpoint there are some deficiencies. However, they will be corrected by May of next year at which time all troops, including logistic elements, will be fully combat ready.

Navy. The Navy has continued training and is considered to be in a good state of readiness. The basic deficiencies here are associated with the problem of maintenance, largely incident to the many types of ships which they have. (This is directed primarily to the Japanese type ships which are part of the Nationalist Navy.)

Air Force. Mr. Yu considers that the Air Force is in a high condition of readiness. The F–84 groups are combat ready and the F–86 groups are combat ready except for one which will be ready in March. At that time they will have five combat ready groups, in addition to the reconnaissance, patrol, and transport aircraft.

Minister Yu then stated that the Chinese Nationalists had gone through several phases in their development. The first phase was at the time of the Truman announcement regarding protection of Taiwan.² The second phase was what the Minister called the hardware movement phase. This has largely been completed. The third phase, and the Minister considers that they are in that now, is the phase of bringing about a combined defense and joint effort with the United States. He pointed out that the Chinats do not want more hardware at this time because they would be unable to utilize it efficiently. (New equipment would be required only for replacement purposes.) In this connection the basic problem is one of maintenance. The Chinats now have 5000 technicians in training and can’t absorb any more.

Minister Yu then indicated that he was puzzled about what to do at this time. They have good forces that are highly trained and he is casting about for ideas as to how to keep them in this condition. Admiral Radford pointed out that the problem which the Chinats have is essentially the same as our own. Our personnel change rather rapidly, so there is a continuing requirement for training as new personnel are inducted.

The conversation then turned to a discussion of the new German draft law, and Admiral Radford suggested that maybe something along this line might prove beneficial to the Chinese. He asked Minister Yu of the status of the manpower pool on Taiwan. Minister Yu indicated that he had no problem at this time and for the next few years, but that he anticipated the situation would get bad in about three years. However, he came back to the point that maintenance was the number one problem. Again Admiral Radford referred to the German solution, in which personnel who want technical training would have to agree to serve longer periods of time. He also referred to the fact that volunteers of the German Armed Forces receive higher pay than do draftees.

In extension of his thoughts about the phase three which they were now in, Minister Yu indicated that it was his objective to have the Chinese Navy as an adjunct of the Seventh Fleet; to be particularly available to perform jobs which the American Naval forces are not authorized to perform. With respect to the Air Force, he desired to have the combat units in such condition that they might operate as an integral part of FEAF. In this connection he pointed out that it would be necessary to tie in their radar network with ours and for this and other reasons we must have much better communications between Taiwan and Okinawa than we have at the present time. He also observed that there are no better reconnaissance units in the world than the Chinats. However, he felt the U.S. should provide its own all-weather fighter units. With regard to the Army, he again emphasized the fact that the active divisions are combat ready and that the reserve is almost ready. The training program turns out nine companies of troops each week. He indicated with respect to all forces that he would like very much to maintain a forward looking policy and to keep their forces modern. In this regard he would welcome the deployment of Matador units on Taiwan at the earliest possible date and would also like to have advanced equipment such as Nike and Talos deployed to Taiwan and the off-shore islands at an early date. With regard to the Navy, the principal thing he wanted to do was to replace the old Japanese type ships with American types. He indicated that he had discussed this subject in considerable detail with Admiral Burke and would send over for Admiral Radford’s attention a letter³ from the Chief Navy Section MAAG Taiwan to Commander-in-Chief Chinese Navy, which contained recommendations for a JCS force basis for the Chinat Navy.

Minister Yu then discussed some details of the build-up of Chinese Communist Air which he said was considerable. He said they had recently found a new Jet field about 190 miles north of Canton. He indicated that the Chinats were tying down approximately 50% of the Chicom Air Force in the general area of the Chinese mainland opposite Taiwan. The railroad to Amoy is completed but is not yet in use.

Admiral Radford inquired as to the impact of the Hungarian situation in China. Minister Yu said that this situation had made a decided impact on the Chinese and that he felt that the Chinats were making significant progress in regard to the people on the Chinese mainland. He pointed out that the situation now as compared to 1949 is quite different, insofar as the overseas Chinese are concerned. In 1949 about 20 overseas Chinese went back to the China mainland as opposed to about one to Taiwan. Now the situation is reversed. In this connection Admiral Radford suggested that the Chinats take such steps as might be possible to attract investments in Taiwan from wealthy overseas Chinese.

The conversation ended with Minister Yu again summarizing the condition of the Chinat Armed Forces and indicating that he would report again to Admiral Radford following his meeting with General Taylor. Finally, he mentioned that, although the Chinats had carried out their end of the bargain, no work had started on the Kung Quan airfield project.

1. Source: Naval Historical Center, Radford Papers, Memos for the Record. Secret. Drafted by Admiral Charles D. Griffin of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Apparent reference to the announcement by President Truman on June 27, 1950, in the wake of the outbreak of fighting in Korea, in which he instructed the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Taiwan and to see that all sea and air operations by the Republic of China against the Chinese mainland were stopped. (Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5)
3. Not found in Department of State files.