Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

213. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 43–56

Washington, October 9, 1956.

THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA²

The Problem

To estimate the present strength and weakness of the Government of the Republic of China and its prospects.

Conclusions

1. The Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future.

2. So long as President Chiang remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur. Should he die prior to the expiration of his present term of office in 1960, Vice President Ch’en Ch’eng would probably succeed to the presidency without provoking internal disturbances. However, the difficulties that would confront the National Government internationally would be substantially increased and domestically Ch’en’s authority would probably be increasingly contested by Chiang Chingkuo, the elder son of President Chiang.

3. If present international trends persist, international acceptance of the National Government as the government of China and the prospects of realizing the objective of a return to the mainland will almost certainly continue to decline. Although the Chinese Nationalists almost certainly believe that the US will not assist them in an attempt to return to the mainland by force, the morale on Taiwan probably will not weaken critically so long as the people there remain confident of firm US support for the defense of Taiwan.

4. In the longer run, it is likely that evidence of growing prestige and material progress on the part of the Chinese Communists will have a serious impact upon the attitude of the people on Taiwan. Were this situation compounded by increased uncertainty on Taiwan over continued US support, the task of sustaining morale and loyalty might exceed the capabilities of Chiang or his eventual successor.

[Here follows the text of NIE 43–56.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff”. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on October 9, 1956, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.