Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

212. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 4, 1956—2 p.m.

359. Two hour ten minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with long prepared statement “reviewing ground” at beginning fifteenth month going over familiar ground renewing charge US attempting obtain PRC abandonment territory and sovereignty and as result US intransigence “talks have become deadlocked,” “US purposefully procrastinating meetings.”² It is up to US stop using force and threat of force against PRC. Charge of September 24 statement³ PRC holding Americans political hostages is “slander.” PRC list of 55, 52 Chinese not yet returned, and of US list of 103, 26 not yet returned. US still holding Chinese in prison and should “adopt measures on own initiative in same manner as PRC enable them exercise right to return.” US using charges on civilians as pretext to cover up procrastination in meetings. In order break deadlock PRC had made embargo and cultural exchange proposals. Failure make progress on main issue renunciation should not stop effort make progress on minor issues. In view President Eisenhower’s Geneva proposal on cultural exchange and contacts,⁴ no reason for US refuse PRC proposal this field.

I made long extemporaneous statement in reply incorporating first three paras Deptel 374.⁵ (As I had previously sent him copy September 24 statement and he referred to it in opening statement, I did not read out full text at meeting but wove in substantive language at appropriate points.) Charged them with procrastinating on renunciation pointing out that whenever agreement seemed near they retreated to pleas of internal affairs sovereignty, etc. Made long charge on mistreatment Americans in China including numbers of those imprisoned, numbers those who died, etc., leading up to charge that PRC is one who had cut off cultural and human contacts, and coming back to fundamental importance implementation September 10 announcement. During course this statement I made it entirely clear no discussion trade or cultural exchange until renunciation force and release of Americans achieved.

In reply Wang charged me with trying to “poison” our negotiations and during course rebuttal referred to three groups Americans in China: Those who continue reside freely; those who opposed Chinese people; and those “dropped from air carrying poison, pistols and bombs.” Did I expect them treat latter as distinguished guests? Cited long list alleged US wrongs against “Chinese people”, bombings, occupation territory, etc., etc., and for first time in talks mentioned UN membership, alleging US pressure on others deny PRC legitimate rights in international affairs including representation UN. PRC attempting by every means improve relations. If US intends use talks poison relations “what is good of continuing such talks.” PRC efforts shown by successive draft proposals. With respect cultural relations Americans are protesting against own government’s denial permission journalists visit China and appears American government has lost confidence in own people as well as system. PRC made cultural exchange proposal “in friendly spirit.” Failure US give favorable consideration this proposal would require PRC consider giving publicity thereto.

Meeting closed with my renewing charge PRC procrastinating on accepting simple and fundamental renunciation force proposal as well as on carrying out agreement already reached on release American[s]. I refuted his lack confidence charge and while regretting their threat again go to public, expressed confidence world could judge.

Next meeting Thursday, October 18. Departing Prague tomorrow morning.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. In his expanded comments on the meeting in telegram 362, October 4, Johnson reiterated his conviction that the Chinese were preparing to break off the talks: “Wang took expected line which fits in with previous pattern and reaffirms my belief they are attempting put selves in position carry out break or indefinite recess within next few meetings”. (Ibid.) Johnson expanded his analysis in letter No. 46 to McConaughy, October 4:

   “I may well be wrong and you all may well be right, but I do not think it can be assumed because they have continued talking up to now they will continue to do so indefinitely. During past months I have been able to do a certain amount of stringing them along and dangling a certain amount of ‘pie in the sky’, but I have now largely run out of that as I have never been in a position where I could say if you do so and so we will do so and so. I full well realize the reasons it has never been possible to enable me to take any such positions, but I know also that you realize the extremely narrow limits in which this has required I operate. As I did full well realize this at my last meeting I threw renunciation in the cultural exchange package and strengthened it today. My only point is that with the material now at hand, I do not feel confident that I will be able to keep things going much longer. Perhaps I feel low this afternoon after the verbal exercise of this morning and perhaps I am unduly pessimistic.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)

3. See Document 209.
4. The White House Office in Geneva issued the statement as a press release on July 22, 1955. (Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, pp. 174–175)

5. These paragraphs read as follows:

   • “1. In connection with Communist proposal that there be announcement on cultural exchange US position is that there can be no such exchange while US citizens held in Communist jails and in violation Agreed Announcement. Point out how inconsistent with cultural relations is the refusal of Communists to make meaningful renunciation of force.
   • “2. Refer to exchange of public statements on trade restrictions and read Department’s September 24 statement into record.
   • “3. If Wang should attempt open discussion on trade repeat reasons why we must decline to discuss.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–256)