Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

214. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, October 18, 1956—noon.

415. Two hour twenty minute meeting this morning. I opened with statement along lines para 1 Deptel 440² except that only stated prison authorities refused permit UK Chargé representative see McCarthy, not mentioning prison official allegation McCarthy did not wish interview. (My thought was if Wang briefed on subject and made this statement would use it as point for counterattack. However during discussion it was obvious he not briefed on any details McCarthy case.) He made no response my notification we were considering public statement and after extemporaneous rebuttal my opening statement along familiar lines, made prepared statement opening with sentence “talks have now come to stage where no progress can be made”. Reviewed negotiations along familiar lines and then alleged US has revealed “it deliberately blocking progress in Ambassadorial talks and is fearful of any improvement in Sino-American relations”: PRC has exerted “greatest efforts” which have not been rewarded and considers such “futile situation should not continue any longer”.³ PRC therefore formally proposes the holding of a foreign ministers conference “to discuss the questions of relaxing and eliminating tensions Taiwan area, as well as questions mutual renunciation force by China and US, lifting embargo, peoples contacts and cultural exchange,⁴ etc”. “What is at stake is the future of Sino-American relations and indeed peace of Far East and world”. In reply I reviewed history their bad faith implementing first agreement and their refusal abandon use force Taiwan area as showing futility discussion at any other level. If they desired resolve these problems could be done between us as Ambassadors, if they did not desire resolve them changing level would make no difference. US would not negotiate under threat of force.

During subsequent give and take he did not attempt force any more specific reply, obviously content let matter rest here until next meeting, and subsequent discussion centered around implementation with my continuing come back to McCarthy case, PRC refusal permit third party arrangement operate absence representations Indian Embassy etc Wang consistently took refuge in Taiwan entry permit charge.

Next meeting Friday, November 2. Returning Prague tomorrow.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1856. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. Paragraph 1 of guidance telegram 440 to Geneva reads as follows:

   “Major portion your presentation should be devoted to attacking Communist failure carry out pledge made in Agreed Announcement. Lead off with McCarthy case as typical example of Communist disregard of pledged word. First point out McCarthy and other nine Americans should have been released long ago if clear language of Agreed Announcement had any meaning. Now one of nine belatedly permitted write British Chargé stating he is unjustly prevented from leaving and requesting representations his behalf. When Chargé endeavored investigate case as provided in Agreed Announcement his representative prevented from seeing McCarthy, after Communists had authorized interview and made appointment. Statement by prison official that McCarthy did not wish interview is not credible. Note written evidence that McCarthy wanted interview and ask why prison official refused permit Chargé’s representative verify McCarthy’s wishes.” (Ibid., 611.93/10–1656)

   The “McCarthy case” cited in telegram 440 was explained in greater detail in McConaughy’s letter No. 57 to Johnson, October 12:

   “The principal event since your last meeting has been the Chinese Communist last-moment refusal to allow Addis, the British Counselor from Peiping, to see Father McCarthy in Ward Road Jail in Shanghai on October 5, after all arrangements had been made and after Addis arrived at the prison. Addis was met with the bland statement from the officials that McCarthy had changed his mind and did not want to see Addis. The officials added that they could not force McCarthy to have the interview. Addis was naturally taken aback, but did what he could by way of remonstrance. The British are of course as aware as we are that McCarthy did not voluntarily change his mind. The Communist claim was either an outright lie, or else they had broken McCarthy. We suspect that they want to demonstrate to the British that they are wasting their time in trying to see the prisoners. The Communist decision may have been made after they allowed Father McCarthy’s letter to O’Neill to be delivered. We are enclosing a copy of the full text of this letter, which shows that Father McCarthy was alert and resolute when he wrote the letter. We have it from other sources that he probably is the most resourceful and durable of the remaining Shanghai prisoners, which makes it all the more unlikely that he would have voluntarily given up the fight. Since this represents a callous and completely indefensible hardening of the Chinese Communist position, Mr. Robertson believes that we should attack Wang very vigorously on it at the October 18 meeting.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)

3. In his expanded comments on the meeting in telegram 416 from Geneva, October 18, Johnson repeated his conviction that the Chinese were preparing to break off the talks and he added that “barring unforeseen reversal only question is timing.” (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/10–1856) McConaughy, in letter No. 57 cited in footnote 2 above, noted that the Department did not feel that the Chinese were likely to withdraw from the talks. In any case, the Department felt itself to be in a very strong position on the prisoner and renunciation of force issues: “By way of general comment, don’t expect any new tack to be authorized here on either of the two big issues. The emphatic conclusion here is that our position is unassailable on both questions and that any attempt to look for new wording on renunciation [or] otherwise show any ‘give’ would only weaken our position, both from a tactical standpoint and from the standpoint of our public position when the eventual public showdown comes.”
4. On October 16 the Foreign Ministry in Peking and the Chinese Delegation in Geneva released the text of the cultural exchange proposal which had been advanced during the September 22 session of the Geneva talks. The Chinese statement noted the “American side has refused to discuss Chinese proposal for promotion of mutual contacts and cultural exchange between their peoples on pretexts that no agreement has yet been reached on question renunciation force and that a few Americans who offended Chinese law are still serving their sentences in China”. The Department assessed the press reaction to the Chinese statement and concluded that it had “fallen flat”. Johnson was informed in telegram 443 to Geneva, October 17, that the Department planned to ignore the statement as long as the press continued to do so. The Chinese statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 406 from Geneva, October 16; ibid., 611.93/10–1656. For text of the Chinese draft announcement on cultural exchanges, see footnote 5, Document 210. Telegram 443 to Geneva is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1756.