180. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State1
1925. 1. Two hour 25 minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with prepared statement again rejecting April 19 draft and advocating May 11 draft para by para. Said “mutual respect” clause replaces “self-defense clause which embodies ulterior motive” to justify continued US seizure Taiwan and interference in liberation offshore islands. Second para was “more conspicuous” accommodation to our views by making it specific that peaceful settlement of disputes without threat of force applies to Taiwan area. With respect to “elsewhere” are there any “real and not imaginary other disputes which finds China and US facing each other as parties international dispute?” With respect third para should be acceptable as I had not opposed holding FonMin conference and I had said this [that?] US not desirous perpetuate danger in Taiwan area. “Must two of us sit here and go on talking without an end? PRC cannot be left without assurance FonMin meeting if Taiwan area to be mentioned.”
2. In reply I impliedly characterized their May 11 draft as willingness renounce force for two months; as willingness renounce force only on condition FonMin meeting; as willingness renounce force only on condition disputes settled entirely on their terms on failure which they held selves free renew threat of force. Also referred back his statement at last meeting on preparations by PRC for use of force characterizing it as shocking and disturbing and not only no advance from PRC position prior these talks but even retrogression from position taken by Rockefeller at Bandung.2 Concentrating on last para said [Page 367] mention two months there contained definite implication resort to force if no agreement reached in that period and this contradictory with profession desire for peaceful negotiations. Expressed regret he had not this morning or previously clarified this contradiction.
3. There was then long and diffuse give-and-take during which I characterized fundamental issue as their unwillingness unconditionally and without time limit renounce force and he characterized fundamental issue as US use of force in occupation Taiwan. I refuted latter allegation with strong restatement our position. Also came back to our April 19 draft as clearest expression renunciation force in form meeting both points view. He attempted interpret my concentration on “two months” last para as indicating acceptance other two paras and repeatedly tried needle me into specifically commenting on first para.3 In context inviting me make amendments May 11 draft he implied my continued flat rejection that draft as basis discussion would “force them consider” making it public.
4. At close meeting I noted Miner’s release five years after he made original application for exit and nine months after Wang told me he would be released in two or three months. Nevertheless gratified he finally released and hoped this portended early release other Americans still detained. Wang replied entirely defensively simply saying was not “entirely” PRC fault and made no mention whatever Chinese in US.
5. Next meeting Thursday May 31.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–3156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- In letter No. 43 to Johnson, May 21, McConaughy summarized the Department’s view of the Chinese May 11 draft: “we consider Wang’s new draft a retrogression from his December 1 draft and extremely dangerous. Judge Phleger is of the opinion that the Communists now realize that they came within an ace of agreeing to a formula that would have tied their hands. They are now taking care to protect themselves more fully.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)↩
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In guidance telegram 2023 to Geneva, May 22, Johnson was instructed to avoid being drawn into specific comment on the May 11 draft. He was instructed to be particularly careful to avoid comment on paragraph one of the May 11 draft, but to probe into the meaning of the 2-month limitation in paragraph three. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/5–2256)
McConaughy explained the Department’s desire to avoid comment on the May 11 draft in the letter to Johnson cited in footnote 2 above:
“It is noteworthy that the Communists worked into the first paragraph of their new draft two of their five “principles of peaceful coexistence” which have formed the basis of joint declarations with India, Burma and other states. Judging from Wang’s efforts at the last meeting to get you to comment on this paragraph, they are hoping to demonstrate that we reject these principles and thus harbor the intention of interfering in their internal affairs and encroaching on their territorial integrity. This would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the neutralist states. Of course, we cannot accept paragraph one without, in effect, recognizing the PRC. It was for this reason that we asked you to try to get back to our April 19 draft as a basis for discussion, rather than comment in detail on the Communist draft.”
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