Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

181. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, May 31, 1956—1 p.m.

1958. 1. Two hour 20 min meeting this morning. Balancing all considerations decided best to open on renunciation which I did, making points para 4 Deptel 2067,² mentioning however that I had information for him on first item and therefore would make my discussion renunciation brief.

2. Give-and-take generally followed previous lines except that he pressed harder for specific detailed comments and invited textual amendments. “If two months period not enough time what period would be enough?” While he avoided explicit threat go public he renewed stalling charge in context world opinion being disappointed by failure these talks produce results.

3. I made statement on Chinese prisoners along lines paras one and two Deptel 2067³ except that I did not explicitly inform him no publicity was being given to decision. In context meeting I felt it probably more productive leave him guess on this. In any event probably more effective if they learn this through Indians.⁴

4. Wang had prepared statement obviously based on Higgins article⁵ and other press reports reflecting instructions to “demand” that we release all Chinese prisoners and specifically asserting they included in September 10 announcement. Although my previous presentation undercut basis for his prepared statement he nevertheless used some of it, making foregoing points. In reply to his question as to how many, I said did not have exact figure but was between 30 and 40,⁶ to which he replied this was “quite big number”. I ignored his request for list of names. He renewed charge on coercing Chinese apply for permanent residence and Taiwan entry permits, adding charge that US born children Chinese students being denied exit. I immediately and categorically denied latter charge pointing out that even though American citizens children were being permitted accompany parents.

5. My statement on Chinese prisoners obviously took him by complete surprise, he had no instructions to cover possibility, and therefore confined himself to prepared material despite incongruities.⁷

6. At Wang’s suggestion next meeting Friday June 8.

7. Proceeding Prague tomorrow returning Geneva Wednesday June 6.

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–3156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. In paragraph 4 of guidance telegram 2067 to Geneva, May 29, Johnson was instructed to reiterate the reasons why the Chinese draft of May 11 was considered to be a retrograde step by the Department, and was therefore unacceptable. (Ibid., 611.93/5–2956)

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of telegram 2067 to Geneva read as follows:

   • “1. Inform Wang that in order remove any vestige basis for Wang’s claim that US has not performed under Agreed Announcement because Chinese prisoners not free leave US each Chinese alien criminal in Federal or State penitentiary in US being informed of Agreed Announcement and is specifically being told that if he desires do so he may apply for immediate voluntary deportation to mainland. Indian Embassy being informed that arrangements being made for its representatives interview each imprisoned criminal of Chinese nationality to ascertain to Embassy’s satisfaction whether individual desires release for immediate return mainland China. US will take prompt action upon any application by such Chinese criminals for immediate deportation.
   • “2. Inform Wang that while Chinese alien criminals in US prisons were not included in Agreed Announcement September 10 or in discussions leading up to that Announcement and none so far as we know have expressed any wish return to Communist China, nevertheless in view of Wang’s statements we have carried out careful investigation in all Federal and State prisons to identify alien Chinese imprisoned there. Extensive investigation necessary because no Chinese imprisoned on political type charges or because his race, nationality or political beliefs. They are all imprisoned for common crimes such as murder and narcotic traffic. Names and addresses all Chinese alien criminals who have been identified will be given Indian Embassy here. You may inform Wang that Indian Embassy will be informed morning May 31 Washington time but that no publicity now being given to decision.”

4. On May 31 Assistant Secretary Robertson informed Indian Ambassador G.L. Mehta of the decision relating to Chinese aliens serving sentences in American prisons. Ambassador Mehta was given an aide-mémoire containing a list of the prisoners identified as alien Chinese and expressed satisfaction at the decision to allow the Indian Embassy to interview the prisoners. McConaughy informed Minister S.H. Tan of the Republic of China of the decision on the same day. Tan objected to the decision as politically motivated and inconsistent with the status of the Republic of China as the sole representative of Chinese interests in the United States. (Memoranda of Robertson’s conversation with Ambassador Mehta and McConaughy’s conversation with Minister Tan, both prepared by McConaughy, are in Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/5–3156. A copy of the aide-mémoire handed to Ambassador Mehta is attached to the memorandum of conversation between Robertson and Mehta but the list of Chinese prisoners is no longer attached.)
5. Reference is to an article in the New York Herald Tribune, May 25, by Marguerite Higgins, which quoted a “high Administration source” as having stated that the Chinese had demanded the release of all Chinese prisoners held in American jails, and that this demand further impeded the release of American prisoners held in China.
6. According to telegram 2066 to Geneva, May 29, the total was 34. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2556)
7. In telegram 1965 from Geneva, May 31, Johnson recommended that he delay any further initiative on the issue of the Chinese prisoners until the Chinese reaction to the U.S. decision could be assessed. He felt that it could take several weeks to assess the effect of the unexpected move. (Ibid., 611.93/5–3156)