179. Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 19561
Present at the 285th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 3 and 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Jackson and Dodge; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence first commented on Egyptian recognition of Communist China. He pointed out that this step had [Page 364] been preceded by a lengthy series of diplomatic negotiations on the part of Communist China which had previously resulted in the setting up of Chinese Communist trade and cultural missions which virtually constituted a diplomatic establishment in Cairo. Mr. Dulles added that Egypt was the first Middle Eastern state to recognize the Peiping regime and, with the exception of Nepal, the only state which had recognized Communist China since 1950. He predicted that the Egyptian action would influence other Middle Eastern states, especially Syria. The Chinese National Government had already announced that it would break relations with Egypt as of today.
[Here follows a continuation of the intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence during which he discussed the situation in Morocco, gave an assessment of an announced cut in the level of Soviet forces, and discussed the effect of the Soviet de-Stalinization campaign.]
Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the Chinese Communists were pushing very hard to complete the new railways to the ports of Amoy and Foochow. To judge from photographic intelligence and other intelligence materials, the railways would be completed by the end of the current year. It was difficult to explain the Chinese drive to complete these railroads except in terms of their determination to open up the port of Amoy. Obviously this port could not be used while Quemoy remained in the hands of the Nationalists. This was a situation which we should ponder.
Secretary Dulles commented that, at the last session in the continuing Geneva meetings at the Ambassadorial level, the Chinese Communists had submitted to Ambassador Johnson a new draft statement2 on the renunciation of force in the Taiwan area. In an obscure way this new draft statement had suggested a time limit for these Geneva meetings. Secretary Dulles thought that this might indicate the possibility of a renewed crisis in the Taiwan area this autumn. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that such reasoning fitted into the railroad-building activities he had just been describing. Admiral Radford pointed out that the series of Chinese Communist airfields being built opposite the Taiwan area would be completed by June of this year.
Secretary Humphrey said he rather hated to make the suggestion, but should not the United States take advantage of the current lull in the Taiwan area to get out of the offshore islands?
[Here follows the conclusion of Dulles’ intelligence briefing with a discussion of the situation in Afghanistan. There follows discussion on items 2, “United States Policy Toward South Asia”, 3, “Security Requirements for Government Employment”, 4, “United States [Page 365] Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defections”, 5, “U.S. Policy on Turkey”, 6, “Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs” and 7, “Response to Soviet Announcement of Projected Reduction in Armed Force Levels”.]
8. Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands (NSC 5503;3 NSC Action No. 13124)
In the course of the discussion of the previous item, the President announced that he wished at the next meeting of the National Security Council to hear precisely what this Government was going to say and to do if the Chinese Communists attacked the off-shore islands. Pointing out that previous Council action on this problem had involved the members of the Council flying out to Denver, the President asked that this time the Council be ahead of the mark.
Secretary Dulles said that he had no objection to discussing this matter, but after all, we did have a clear policy to meet this contingency, and he believed that there were more important matters for the Council to discuss.
Admiral Radford observed that in recent months the defenses of these islands had been so greatly strengthened that he now doubted whether the Chinese Communists wanted to mount an attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. Moreover, he continued, the Chinese Communists could not mount such an attack on the offshore islands without attacking at least some bases on Taiwan itself. In short, he believed that the Congressional resolution5 had frightened off the Chinese Communists. He predicted that the offshore islands would be very tough nuts to crack.
Secretary Dulles expressed great doubt as to whether, in any future attack, the Chinese Communists could or would differentiate the offshore islands from Taiwan itself. Accordingly we must assume that the Chinese Communists could not attack the offshore islands without a belief, or at least a fear, that the United States would intervene. The President added that he wanted the report he had just asked for to contain a precise statement as to the whereabouts and activities of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
The National Security Council:6
Noted the President’s request that the current policy as to what the United States would say and do in the event of an attack by the Chinese Communists on the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, be brought to the Council’s attention at the next NSC meeting.
[Page 366][Here follows discussion on item 9, “Proposed Aerial Demonstration over Washington on Armed Forces Day”.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 18.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 174.↩
- See vol. ii, Document 12.↩
- See ibid., Document 26, footnote 12.↩
- Dated January 29, 1955; see ibid., Document 56.↩
- The following sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1562, the record copy of which is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95.↩